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## Hunger

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### Synonyms

[Appetite](#); [Famine](#); [Gluttony](#); [Malnutrition](#); [Starvation](#); [Undernutrition](#)

### Introduction

This entry is concerned with the array of physiological and psychological states that distinctively promote, accompany, and follow the human act of eating. This array of states is here referred to – in a technical way – as “hunger.”

Hunger is arguably the most important concept in the study of malnutrition, undernutrition, and famine. A study of hunger is hence a crucial step toward framing philosophical questions pertaining to the ethics and politics of food access and dieting, subjects to be addressed in the second section of this entry. Hunger can also be approached from an existential point of view, as a defining aspect of the human condition. Through this lens, hunger raises little-explored philosophical difficulties, to be pointed out in the first section of this entry. Finally, an appreciation of the complex facets of hunger is relevant in high-end

gastronomy and makes a difference to the aesthetic value of a dining experience, as shall be discussed in the third section.

The terms by means of which we express, attribute, or theorize hunger are relevant to framing its study and demonstrate the variety of its cultural understandings across history and world regions. Each natural language has a wide range of expressions signifying (some of) the states correlated with the human act of eating, and it is interesting in itself to study how languages differ from and resemble each other in this respect. For instance, English vocabulary includes *hunger*, *famine*, *appetite*, *craving*, *disgust*, *starvation*, *gluttony*, *distaste*, *longing*, *need*, *desire*, etc. To any such list, one should add the rhetorical figures expressing physiological or psychological states correlated with the act of eating; the most recurring examples in this class involve metaphors or analogies, such as *I could eat a horse* or *I am as hungry as a bear/wolf* or *He is a pig* (said of a person who eats sloppily or too much) and *She eats like a bird* (for someone who eats very little), or consider the expression *pig out* to express some forms of overeating and the expression to *wolf down* food, to signify extreme voracity in eating.

The range of linguistic expressions correlated with the human act of eating has not been systematically studied. We have evidence that children learn a subset of such expressions early in their linguistic development, along with expressions referring to inner physiological states (studies in developmental psychology show that words

relating to such states (*hungry, tired, sleepy*) tend to be acquired before words having a more cognitive flavor, like “knowing” or “believing”; cf. Doherty 2008; Taumoepeau and Ruffman 2006). But the range of vocabulary used to convey hunger states is vast, and it also includes sophisticated expressions, or expressions typical of specific subcultures or *milieus*, so that it cannot be affirmed that all the hunger-related expressions are learned early in life.

We can furthermore point out important etymological and semantic variations. To stay within the English language, the noun *hunger* is of Germanic origin, and its cognate expressions may be traced as far back as Sanskrit (*kakate*, to thirst); *appetite* is typical of Romance languages, has a Greek origin, and its cognate expressions can be traced as far back as Sanskrit (*patram*, wing) and Hittite (*pattar*, wing); but the history of the word *famine* is less clear and can be traced back only to its Latin roots. At the semantic level, an agent *experiences* famine but cannot *have* it; yet an agent *has* appetite and does not *experience* it; and – in some languages, though not in English – she can both *have* and *experience* hunger.

The ways in which such etymological and semantic variations do and should constrain a theory of physiological and psychological states correlated with the human act of eating have not been assessed. In fact, such theories themselves are lacking, by and large. Scholarly efforts have dealt with only selected aspects of the topic, such as the physiological effects of undernutrition (Keys et al. 1950), the psychology of mindless eating (Wansink 2006), the social causes of famine (Sen 1983), and its metaethical implications (O’Neil 1980; Singer 1972).

## The Philosophical Significance of Hunger

Hunger is a primary mode of being. We are born hungry. We have been hungry well longer than we can remember being alive and well before gaining self-consciousness of our own pleasures. Each human, *qua* human, is endowed with an array of

physiological and psychological states correlated with the act of eating; the satisfaction of hunger is one of the most complex and important ecological relationships in which we partake. The irreducible nature of hunger was once well expressed by French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (cf. also Wurgaft forthcoming): “It is not really true to say that we eat in order to live, we eat because we are hungry [...] The need for food does not have existence as its goal, but food” (*Existence and Existents* 1978: 37).

Hunger is clearly related to (if not identical with) a complex array of neurophysiological states. Some of these states are independent of the will (e.g., trivially, we are hungry while still in the womb); and yet, we cannot say that being hungry is just an automatic bodily mechanism, as is the work performed by the lungs. You can learn to control your hunger: you can resist it, you can train to contain it, and you can make efforts to become hungry. As neurogastroenterologists have shown, human hunger is neurophysiologically far more complex than the hunger of other animals (cf. Gershon 1998).

Hunger’s essential ties go beyond those to our senses, bodies, and brains. Because it can be managed in various ways (e.g., trained, resisted, stimulated), hunger is part of the world of *culture* too. Many of the complex facets of hunger are culturally transmitted (e.g., via upbringing or advertisements). Learning how to manage hunger is part of one’s education, and the ways in which we come to terms with it reflect (sometimes arguably *express*) a wealth of personal and collective values, beliefs, and desires. In connection to those remarks, an important example is the negotiation of our appetites in order to dine with others. The extent and the modalities within which we are willing to modify our diet for the purposes of attending a party or a reception, or for sharing food or an experience with someone, are at the core of a long-standing dispute over the ethical, political, and civic implications of our diet. It is only under this perspective that we can make sense of the fierce opposition against Luigi Cornaro’s *De Vita Sobria (On a Temperate Life)* (1634) on the part of figures such as Nietzsche (in the *Twilight of the Idols*) (2007)) Cornaro’s

book was advocating a strict and disciplined diet, thereby propagating an ascetic attitude that prevented his followers from engaging with their societies as freely and vigorously as they should.

Hunger is correlated with a wide array of pleasures. Some of these are hardly controllable, such as the palatal pleasure provided by a fatty and sugary food (e.g., a bite of ice cream or chocolate); some are highly refined, such as the appreciation of a slight variant in a recipe, say a touch of French tarragon on eggs Benedict. Some pleasures are long lasting, like the memory of a dish at a three-star Michelin restaurant; some are ephemeral, such as the satisfaction of an undifferentiated longing for *something salty*. And yet, hunger cannot be equated with pleasure, for at least two reasons. First, hunger – unlike pleasure – is deeply entangled in our relationship to what is not us. Second, hunger is part of the lives of those who may not feel pleasure or may do so in a far different manner, such as early-stage fetuses or humans in a vegetative state (for instance, the part of the brain connected to the stomach continues to function even in a vegetative state). In this sense, one could contend that *hunger is more fundamental than pleasure for the human condition*.

A (contemporary) philosophy of hunger is yet to be developed (cf. Leder 1990 for an original attempt), and the subject itself has arguably been ostracized by the philosophical establishment for centuries (see Shapin 1998). Nevertheless, it seems plausible to imagine a view according to which hunger is at the root of the human condition. It is in the ways that humans experience hunger that one can trace our identity as beings. Eating in humans lies at the intersection between evolutionary history, ontogeny (individual development), behavioral evolution, and symbolic evolution. More specifically, in eating we find not only the characteristic function of living entities (i.e., metabolism) but also a point of convergence between the rational and emotional aspects of human agency, as well as the point of convergence between humans as biological organisms and as expressions of a culture. (It should not surprise us that authors such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant did not come to think of hunger

as a state distinctive of humans, since they lacked the biological and evolutionary insight that made such distinctiveness specific.)

Thus, on hunger one could hope to rest a philosophy that is antagonistic to the Cartesian model – hunger is a primary mode of being, yet, unlike Descartes's *cogito*, it is *not* a pure intuition – as well as to utilitarian theories resting on pleasure: hunger is a primary mode of being, yet it is *not* hedonistic. If hunger is taken as a paradigm of the human condition, then at least two significant consequences ensue. First, the most appropriate metaphysics is a relational one – since eating is a relation – as opposed to a metaphysics of individuals, each of which is defined in terms of intrinsic or essential properties. Second, rational reflection would cease to have a foundational role, yielding to the array of entangled mind-body states related to hunger; rational agency would become the special case of human agency in which an action is highly independent (yet never completely independent) of the performing body.

### **Hungry Bodies, Hungry Souls, and Disordered Hungers**

The centrality of hunger to the human condition serves to introduce and explain the so-called omnivore's dilemma (cf. Fischler 1988; Pollan 2006). Any human has to eat in order to survive; humans are omnivores and, moreover, can go without eating for weeks; hence, in virtually any circumstance in which foods are supplied to a human, she will be confronted with the choice of whether or not to eat them, and which ones to consume.

To do justice to our topic, it is very important not to trivialize the dilemma by viewing it as either a physiological *or* a psychological dilemma. It is tempting (and customary) to believe that some humans have a *hunger problem*, namely, the problem of finding sufficient nutrients to (potentially) live a healthy life, while others have an *appetite dilemma*, the problem of choosing what to eat and avoid being tricked by their palate; the hunger problem is physiological, while

the appetite dilemma is psychological (on the modern history of the idea of hunger, cf. Vernon 2007). This is a fundamentally misleading representation of the human relationship to food consumption, because it purports to isolate certain aspects of the experience of eating, confining them to either the level of physiology (hunger) or psychology (appetite). Any act of eating, however, involves multiple intertwined layers, spanning from extremely complex neurophysiological mechanisms to a vast spectrum of hedonistic responses and a huge spectrum of cultural connotations. Eating, in other words, is not simply a matter of need vs. excess, no matter how sophisticated our analysis of such concepts (for an attempt to disentangle different concepts of need, cf. Wiggins 1987). The act of eating encompasses physiological, psychological, hedonistic, and broadly cultural aspects of the self, which cannot be bracketed in a hunger vs. appetite and physiology vs. psychology dichotomy. Hence, the omnivore's dilemma involves both what is commonly called "hunger" and what is called "appetite" and embraces any occasion of eating. Indeed, the author who first theorized the dilemma, Claude Fischler, introduced it to study the relevance of the act of eating to personal identity.

The omnivore's dilemma serves to stress the common roots of different conceptions of hunger, which are at play in humanitarian efforts, theoretical psychology, and clinical practice. We shall survey each of these conceptions, in order.

*Hungry Bodies.* The topic that is most readily associated with the word "hunger" is food deprivation, as connected to famine, war, and economic poverty; we may refer to this topic as the study of hungry bodies (cf. Sen 1983; O'Neil 1980). Hungry bodies have been a subject of research throughout the history of medicine, providing precious information to tackle issues such as infertility (Toulalan 2014), curing of disease (Williams 2012 and Carlson 1916), and longevity (Keys et al. 1950); hungry bodies occupy a special place in the history of economics too, beginning at least with Malthus's *An Essay on the Principles of Population*. At the turn of the twentieth century, the physiology of hunger was an up-and-coming field of academic research; important data for the

study of the physiology of hunger were collected in extreme situations, most importantly during World War II, in the Warsaw Ghetto (Tushnett 1966), and during the so-called Great Starvation Experiment (sometimes also referred to as the Minnesota experiment, cf. Tucker 2007). Current data on hungry bodies are lacking, mostly due to the ethical restrictions on data collection (it is not morally acceptable to ask a patient to starve, and you cannot collect data from people who are starving, no matter the reason). Also for this reason, the physiology of hungry bodies is not a popular topic in the growing field of food and nutrition studies, and the most important work is more quietly carried forward in a few selected labs around the world (cf. Russell 2005, Chapter 1; cf. also Le Magnen 1985, a volume published at a moment of high hopes and expectations for the study of hunger).

The most sophisticated and influential contemporary publication for the study of hungry bodies is the Global Hunger Index (GHI). This is a yearly report jointly published since 2006 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Welthungerhilfe, and (since 2007) Concern Worldwide. The GHI provides a multidimensional measure of global hunger. The concept of hunger it adopts is borrowed from FAO: "Hunger is usually understood to refer to the distress associated with lack of food. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines food deprivation, or undernourishment, as the consumption of fewer than about 1,800 kilocalories a day – the minimum that most people require to live a healthy and productive life" (von Grebmer et al. 2015, p. 8, box 1.1). The distress associated with the lack of food is analyzed in terms of two further concepts: undernutrition and malnutrition. *Undernutrition* "goes beyond calories and signifies deficiencies in any or all of the following: energy, protein, or essential vitamins and minerals" (von Grebmer et al. 2015, p. 8, box 1.1). *Malnutrition* "refers more broadly to both undernutrition (problems of deficiencies) and overnutrition (problems of unbalanced diets, which includes consuming too many calories in relation to energy requirements, with or without

low intake of micronutrient-rich foods)” (von Grebmer et al. 2015, p. 8, box 1.1).

Contemporary tools used to study hungry bodies bracket the psychological, identity-related, ethical, and political dimensions of hunger. Researchers have thus inadvertently fueled the myth of a hunger problem, which stands in opposition to the equally artificial understanding of the omnivore’s dilemma as being experienced by the lucky individuals who do not suffer food deprivation. The disastrous effects of these misconceptions can hardly be underestimated. For one, they lead to misguided humanitarian efforts that inadequately appreciate the nonphysiological dimensions of food deprivation. But most importantly, they divide the world of bodies into two classes – those that are hungry and those that are not – thereby obscuring the connection between undernutrition and overnutrition, which jointly afflict the poorest sectors of societies on a global scale. (Typically, societies that overcome the first become at high risk for the second, as the case of the United States well illustrates.)

*Hungry Souls.* The complex effects of hunger on human behavior have been of interest to a wide variety of scholars, including anthropologists, economists, evolutionary psychologists, and sociologists. The study of hungry souls is typically treated as the study of human *appetites*, where the terminological choice of “appetite” is meant to stress the possibility of a choice and the likelihood of a perceptual error in estimating what our bodies “need.” At least since the introduction of the concept of a calorie, appetite started being seen as an obstacle, rather than a guide, to good dieting. Indeed, multiple lines of research aimed at pointing out the ways that human appetite can be stimulated and oriented, stressing the automatic and uncontrollable mechanisms through which humans come to introject food. For instance, an important strain of research theorizes that humans are *addicted to food* (Ziauddeen and Fletcher 2013), that is, that food intake is akin to drug intake, so much so that a great deal of our eating behavior can be shown to be mindless (cf. Wansink 2006). Data collected in the study of appetites have been used for different and often conflicting goals, such as, for instance, lowering

the obesity rate and shaping food marketing strategies in the same population

Unlike the perspective adopted in the study of hungry bodies, the study of hungry souls does not dissociate the psychology of eating from its physiology. In fact, the most notable findings concerning human appetite have come from the study of the physiological mechanisms connected to eating. However, the study of hungry souls has bracketed the most fundamental aspects of the ethical, political, and identity-related dimensions of hunger. The extent to which identity and values affect the way we eat can hardly be quantified; but these effects are obvious in the taboos and aversions that populations have concerning certain foods. To fulfill our appetite is not simply to fulfill a momentary wish; it feeds our souls in ways that intimately connect us to those who do not have the privilege of satisfying their own appetite. Thus, the study of hungry souls has by and large failed to appreciate the value of fasting (adopted in most food cultures) or the value of staying hungry in order to have a balanced relationship with our body (also widespread in several food cultures). In fact, most contemporary diets prescribe which foods must be consumed, not the *mindset* in which they are consumed. We focus on the foods, regarding human behavior as a mechanism, overlooking the plasticity of human hunger as well as its ethico-political dimension.

*Disordered Hungers.* Lastly, an important chapter in the study of hunger concerns eating disorders, such as anorexia, bulimia, and orthorexia. This is where the absence of a link between the study of hungry bodies and hungry souls is most harmful. Clinical practice addressing eating disorders is timidly sustained by theoretical conceptions of hunger, which connect eating choices (“appetites”) with the core of individual identity. For instance, eating disorders have historically targeted women, demonstrating how certain forms of appetite can showcase oppression and lack of power; and, yet, current theories of appetite are unable to explain the links between socio-political roles and eating behavior, while current studies of hungry bodies discard eating disorders as issues that are outside the sphere of political concern for humanitarian efforts (cf. Giordano

2005 for an overview of the ethical issues connected to eating disorders). A theoretically unified understanding of hunger could help provide a foundation to clinical practice, a model through which individual agents could represent their agency and parallel it to other, more “ordered” ways of eating.

## Hunger and the Aesthetics of Food

If dining or drinking has an aesthetic worth that compares to contemplating a painting or a sculpture, watching a movie, a ballet, or a play, or listening to a symphony, then the palate must be placed on a pedestal the like of vision or hearing. Such a move has important consequences for aesthetic theorizing, which have been discussed in contemporary philosophical literature (cf. Korsmeyer 1999; Telfer 1996). For instance, mundane experiences such as a home-cooked meal or a coffee consumed at the bar of a coffee shop may turn out to be of high aesthetic worth. The artistic discourse is, in these cases, broadened to novel spaces, where human agency is seen under transformed lenses. This seems indeed to be the trend, where happenings in restaurants, butcher shops, wineries, breweries, coffee shops, etc., become increasingly intellectualized and fetishized, turning ordinary places into spaces where societal ideals and values are negotiated, changed, and put into question.

In the past two decades, a wealth of philosophical literature has sustained the effort to vindicate the aesthetic worth of gastronomic experiences. Yet current mainstream aesthetics is as far as ever from considering hunger in particular among its major themes for philosophical reflection. In this respect, philosophy parts with other fields. Today, museums and galleries across the globe exhibit a wide spectrum of visual art projects that deal with dieting, starvation, food cravings, and other modalities of hunger; similar considerations apply to literary works and to cinema. The lack of a philosophical analysis of the role of hunger in the aesthetic experience of food is a considerable shortcoming. Two themes are particularly fitting in explaining how philosophical views about

hunger can inform our aesthetic appreciation of food: the first is the role played by hunger in defining gastronomic perspectives, which will be illustrated through the case of *nouvelle cuisine*; the second is the disembodied mindset of a certain contemporary gastronomic criticism. The two themes will be examined in order.

Implicitly, it seems that most cooks do think of their work as a dialogue with the hunger of diners. *Nouvelle cuisine*, famous for its parsimonious portions, seems to be the case that most evidently exhibits such an implicit ideal; other excellent examples would be *kaiseki* meals, evolved around food shortages and proper ceremonials, and *omakase* meals, where the cook tailors a meal to the diners. In 1972, Henri Gault and Christian Millau, two culinary journalists actively engaged in promoting *nouvelle cuisine*, published an influential manifesto in *Vive la Nouvelle Cuisine Française*, containing ten commandments (evidently inspired to the political protests of 1968). Of particular interest for present purposes is the seventh commandment: “*Thou shall not ignore dietetics*. The postwar times of malnutrition are over” (cf. Rao et al. 2003: 817). Although the commandment does not explicitly mention hunger (a term probably never employed in a modern or contemporary food manifesto), it gestures to it through the words “dietetics” and – most remarkably – “malnutrition.” For proponents of *nouvelle cuisine*, a broad consideration of the hunger levels of diners suggested rethinking portions, with the aim of elevating the aesthetic worth of a dining experience. The responsibility of the cook is, thus, to think of the dining experience as a dialogue with the hunger of the diner.

Most contemporary cooks and culinary movements have not explicitly theorized the ways in which cooks should adjust their dishes based on diners’ varieties of hunger. A reflection on hunger in contemporary aesthetics and food criticism would arguably facilitate such theorization.

Moving to the second theme, an important trend in contemporary gastronomic criticism and cooking regards digestion and hunger as accessory companions to our gastronomic experiences. *Tasting for tasting’s sake*: this seems to be the underlying assumption. For instance, the practice

of evaluating wines by observing, sniffing, swirling the liquid in the mouth, and then spitting it out has moved from a shortcut taken by wine producers and connoisseurs to a standard of judgment. Obviously, some of the liquids tasted by producers and connoisseurs are forms of wine in the making (such as must), which do not agree with digestion; also, the occasions or amounts of wines tasted do prudentially call for spitting. But, matters are different for consumers, including critics: it is unclear why consumers should separate digestion from the aesthetic dimensions of wine. Thus, the score assigned to a wine by influential critics such as Robert Parker is not based on an analysis of the digestive and intoxicating powers of the wine. Granted, from the alcohol content, the phenolic properties, and the method of production of the liquid, one could try to guess its digestive and intoxicating powers. But if this matter were of any importance in the judgment, guessing would not be enough (cf. McCoy 2006).

Moving from beverages to food, in high-end gastronomy and in the vast majority of food shows, it is common to find a total neglect of (or even a dismissive attitude toward) metabolic processes. For instance, the starting proposition of cooks of the caliber of Ferran Adrià is that dining at a restaurant has little to do with hunger. People don't go to restaurants because they are hungry. They go to restaurants because they are looking for a tasting experience, which will occasion their aesthetic appreciation of certain foods. To substantiate the idea that metabolism is, as a component of our gastronomic experiences, a mere accessory, we could cite the increasingly near possibility of feeding ourselves with pills or other sorts of products of the pharmaceutical industry. Were such practices to become routine for humans, going to a restaurant would turn into an activity as superfluous to our existence as visiting the Metropolitan Museum or a night at the opera. Hence the idea that the aesthetic worth of a meal rests not at all on its relationship to digestion.

Yet the shortcomings of a gastronomic perspective that limits itself to what happens in the mouth are serious. Chief among these is its implied conception of gastronomic pleasure. The suggestion is not that hunger is a sufficient

condition for the aesthetic worth of a gastronomic experience. Rather, hunger is a key ingredient in providing a gastronomic experience with aesthetic worth. In some cases (probably in the majority of dining occasions), hunger is a necessary condition for assuring that the aesthetic worth of the gastronomic experience is properly appreciated; you would not want to visit the Metropolitan Museum with conjunctivitis, and you would not want to try out an important restaurant after a wedding feast. Similarly, thirst, mild intoxication, and craving for a refreshing beverage seem to be necessary conditions for appreciating the aesthetic worth of several beverages. Granted, there are gastronomic experiences that do not require the consumer to be hungry, thirsty, and the like. Some such experiences may be crucial in the development of our gastronomic taste. Yet it is difficult to see how even such experiences could be meaningful if we were not also comforting and entertaining our hunger, thirst, and the like in a lighthearted way. To dine and to drink ultimately mean to *consume*, and the practice of consuming foods and beverages ultimately rests on our need to metabolize. Compare the significance of eating a piece of freshly baked bread (delivered by a local shop to your apartment) in the following two situations: you have been going without food for days; you have just come out of a wedding feast. It is not only the ethical worth of the gestures that is hardly comparable but also their aesthetic worth, because the two situations involve two distinct ways of being hungry.

Hunger – broadly understood to encompass thirst and specific food and beverage cravings – is the place from which to begin our evaluation of the aesthetic worth of gastronomic experiences. Pleasure from the palate is, then, an activity that acquires meaningfulness in dialogue with hunger. In such a perspective, food aesthetics is a discipline centered on the body of the consumer, on a dialogue between hunger and consumption experiences. This insight is both what has been missing from the contemporary debate on the aesthetic worth of gastronomy and what approaches such as Parker's and Adrià's cannot account for; it is what a philosophy of hunger can help to develop and theorize. (Work for this entry

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## Summary

The entry is concerned with the array of physiological and psychological states that distinctively promote, accompany, and follow the human act of eating; this array is referred to – in a technical way – as “hunger.” Each natural language has a wide range of expressions signifying (some of) the states correlated with the human act of eating; these expressions have not been systematically studied to date. We have evidence that children learn a subset of them early in their linguistic development, along with expressions referring to inner physiological states; other expressions, typical of specific subcultures or *milieus*, are learned only during adulthood. The first section of the entry approaches hunger from an existential point of view, as a defining aspect of the human condition. Hunger is a primary mode of being, and it is correlated with a wide-ranging spectrum of pleasures. Yet hunger cannot be equated with pleasure, for at least two reasons. First, hunger is deeply entangled in our relationship to what is not us, while pleasure is not. Second, hunger is part of the lives of those that may not feel pleasure or may do so in a far different manner, such as early-stage fetuses or humans in a vegetative state. In this sense, one could contend that hunger is more

fundamental than pleasure for the human condition. The second section approaches hunger in its relation to the study of malnutrition, undernutrition, and famine. Here we encounter philosophical questions pertaining to the ethics and politics of food access and dieting, which are at play in humanitarian efforts, theoretical psychology, and clinical practice. Finally, the third section studies the relevance of hunger to the aesthetic value of a dining experience. To dine and to drink ultimately mean to *consume*, and the practice of consuming foods and beverages ultimately rests on our hunger. Pleasure from the palate is an activity that acquires meaningfulness in dialogue with hunger. In this perspective, food aesthetics is a discipline centered on the body of the consumer, on a dialogue between hunger and consumption experiences.

## Cross-References

- ▶ [Fasting](#)
- ▶ [Food Security](#)
- ▶ [Food Security and International Trade](#)
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- ▶ [Food Waste](#)
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- ▶ [Gustatory Pleasure and Food](#)
- ▶ [Human Rights and Food](#)
- ▶ [Peter Singer and Food](#)
- ▶ [Waste and Food](#)

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