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  • 21 March 2013 March

    21 March 2013 12:30

    Giuliano Torrengo

    Time Travel and Circular Explanations

    Room: Sala Direzione

    What counts as an explanation seems to depend on many contextual factors. The exchange “Why do you think Peter is a good guy?” — “Well, because I like him” may be an acceptable explanation in an ordinary context, but if it is followed by the exchange “And why do you like him?” - “Well, because I think he’s a good guy”, we are likely to ...

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  • 09 May 2013 May

    09 May 2013 14:30

    Ian Phillips

    Perceiving the passing of time

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Duration distortions familiar from trauma present an apparent counter-example to what we might call the naïve view of duration perception. Such distortions constitute a counter-example to naïveté only on the assumption that we perceive duration absolutely. This assumption can seem inevitable if we think of the alternative relative view as limiting our awareness to the relative durations o...

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  • 10 May 2013 May

    10 May 2013 12:30

    Francesco Pavani

    La plasticità del cervello tra mito e realtà

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Il concetto di plasticità cerebrale è quasi entrato a far parte del linguaggio comune, comparendo ormai frequentemente tanto nelle comunicazioni scientifiche quanto nei mezzi di comunicazione di massa. Viene usato genericamente per indicare il fatto che il cervello cambia durante l'arco della vita e che può essere plasmato dall'apprendimento; e viene usato per promuovere tecniche di appr...

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  • 14 May 2013 May

    14 May 2013 14:30

    Jesse Prinz

    Where and When Does Consciousness Arise in the Brai

    Room: Room 104 FdP

    There has been an ongoing search to find the psychological and neural correlates of consciousness. To do this when must ask both where consciousness arises in the flow of information and when it arises. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, this presentation argues that consciousness arises at a particular stage of information processing ("the intermediate level") and it arises when and o...

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  • 21 May 2013 May

    21 May 2013 08:30

    Emiliano Ricciardi

    Una rappresentazione sopramodale e topografica delle azioni nel cervello umano

    Room: Sala Paci

    Il recente sviluppo di sofisticate metodologie di esplorazione funzionale del cervello, quali la risonanza magnetica funzionale (fMRI), ha permesso di esaminare i correlati neurali delle attività cerebrali in maniera non invasiva direttamente nelluomo, in condizioni fisiologiche o in presenza di patologie mentali. Mediante paradigmi sperimentali sempre più raffinati si è cominciato a stud...

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  • 22 May 2013 May

    22 May 2013 12:30

    Pier Francesco Ferrari

    Development of the Mirror System under the Lens of Intersubjectivity and Evolutionary Theory

    Room: Sala Paci

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  • 24 May 2013 May

    24 May 2013 12:30

    Roberto Cordeschi

    Metafore, paradigmi e programmi di ricerca: come interpretare l’evoluzione dell’Intelligenza Artificiale?

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Spesso l’evoluzione dell’Intelligenza Artificiale, e della Scienza Cognitiva che si dice da essa ispirata, è stata interpretata come un succedersi di metafore contrapposte (per esempio, quella del calcolatore, quella della rete, quella dei sistemi dinamici). Questa interpretazione ha suggerito una ricostruzione della sua storia in termini di “paradigmi” incommensurabil...

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  • 21 June 2013 June

    21 June 2013 14:30

    William Ramsey

    Reconsidering representations

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 03 July 2013 July

    03 July 2013 14:30

    Richard Menary

    Neural Plasticity, Neuronal Recycling and Niche Construction

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: Neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and constrains what the brain can learn. Dehaene contrasts neuronal rec...

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  • 04 July 2013 July

    04 July 2013 12:30

    Marco Nathan

    An Epistemic Model of Scientific Integration

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of theory unification in terms of theoretical reduction. Reductive models, however, cannot explain the occurrence of unification in areas of science where successful reductions are hard to find. The goal of this talk is to present a concrete example of unication in biology - the Developmental Synthesis - as a general model of scientic unication, ...

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  • 05 July 2013 July

    05 July 2013 12:30

    Sara Parmigiani

    Coordinating Minds: When Contingency Matters more than Synchrony

    Room: Sala Direzione

    In our daily-life we are often engaged in mutual coordination and we are able to match our own movements and minds with others’ movements and minds at different levels of complexity. Coordination encompasses very different kinds of situations, ranging from low-level sensorymotor entrainment (see, for instance, Butterfill,Sebanz, 2011) to high-level deliberation, based on mutual expectations...

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  • 10 October 2013 October

    10 October 2013 14:30

    Bence Nanay

    Pragmatic Representations versus Motor Representations (versus Intentions)

    Room: Room 111 FdP

    The standard way of thinking about actions appeals to intentions. Recently, alternative accounts have been offered that replace (or supplement) this intention-based picture with one that posits a much simpler kind of representation. I examine two such accounts, one that stresses the importance of pragmatic representations: the (often perceptual) representation of objects as having action-properti...

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  • 22 October 2013 October

    22 October 2013 12:30

    Sebo Uitho

    ntentions Are Explanations, not Brain States

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. I argue, however, that adopting the folk notion of ‘intention’ or one of its philosophical de...

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  • 22 November 2013 November

    22 November 2013 14:30

    Dan Zahavi

    Sociality and Self-hood: the Case of Shame

    Room: Room 422 FdP

    On many accounts, shame is an emotion that targets and involves the self in its totality. In shame, the self is affected by a global devaluation: it feels defective, objectionable, condemned. The basic question I wish to raise and discuss is the following: What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-i...

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  • 04 February 2014 February

    04 February 2014 08:30


    Cognition and Coordination

    Room: Sala Paci

    Corrado Sinigaglia: "Cognition for low-level coordination" & Francesco Guala: "Cognition for high-level coordination"

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  • 21 March 2014 March

    21 March 2014 09:30

    Luciano Floridi

    The Synthetic Uninformative

    Room: Sala Direzione

    It is well-known that information, understood as a good, has three main properties that differentiate it from other ordinary goods, such as cars or loaves of bread: a) it is non-rivalrous: Alice holding or consuming the information that p does not prevent Bob from holding or consuming the same information at the same time; b) tends to be non-excludable. Some information – such as intellec...

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  • 15 April 2014 April

    15 April 2014 08:30

    Julian Kiverstein

    Social Intelligence as an Embodied Skill

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 17 April 2014 April

    17 April 2014 12:30

    Antonio Lieto

    Concepts: on the Need of an Integrated Perspective in A

    Room: Sala Direzione

    The study of concept representation concerns different research areas, such as Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. In this talk, by arguing against the anti-cognitivist approach to AI, I will suggest that the insights coming from the philosophical and psychological debate about concepts can be beneficial for the realization of artificial systems showing some simple forms of ...

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  • 20 May 2014 May

    20 May 2014 12:30

    Lorenzo Cammi

    Il ruolo della mediazione

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 27 May 2014 May

    27 May 2014 12:30

    Istvan Aranyosi

    Explanatory Role Functionalism

    Room: Sala Direzione

    I to put forward a new version of analytic functionalism, based on an apparently minor change regarding what the commonsense component of the view is supposed to ascribe. In particular, I will call this new version “explanatory role functionalism” instead of “causal role functionalism”, thus indicating that it is the explanatory role mental state types play between stimulu...

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  • 03 June 2014 June

    03 June 2014 14:30

    Joel Smith

    Do We See Emotions by Seeing their Expressions?

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 06 June 2014 June

    06 June 2014 12:30

    George Northoff

    Philosophy and the Brain – Do we need a Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy?

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 10 June 2014 June

    10 June 2014 12:30

    Matteo Colombo

    Bayesian Cognitive Science, Inference to the Best Explanatory Framework, and the Value of Specialization

    Room: Sala Paci

    It is widely assumed that the Bayesian framework enjoys special epistemic virtues over alternative frameworks for representing and dealing with uncertainty. If this framework enjoys these epistemic virtues, then cognitive scientists have reason to privilege it for explaining phenomena whose production involves uncertainty. However, it is far from obvious that the Bayesian framework actually enjoys...

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  • 28 October 2014 October

    28 October 2014 14:30

    Ellen Fridland

    Motor Control: Handling Conditions Vary

    Room: Sala Direzione

    When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-causal responses. In this essay, I will argue that this picture of...

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  • 15 December 2014 December

    15 December 2014 12:30

    Alfred Mele

    Free Will and Neuroscience

    Room: 205M

    A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes

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  • 16 December 2014 December

    16 December 2014 14:30

    Chris Gauker

    The Role of Imagination

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 08 March 2015 March

    08 March 2015 14:30

    Shaun Gallagher

    Seeing without an I

    Room: 435 FdP

    One can argue that the principle of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is contingent or de facto if one associates it with specific forms of access (introspection or proprioception) or aspects of experience (sense of ownership or sense of agency). All of these aspects can break down in pathologies or be manipulated through experimentation. I’ll review some of these instance...

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  • 20 March 2015 March

    20 March 2015 14:30

    Edouard Machery

    Yes You Can! A Plea for Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuroscience

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this talk, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of trea...

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  • 30 May 2015 May

    30 May 2015 16:30

    David Pitt

    Phenomenal Compositionality and Context Effects

    Room: Sala Paci

    If there is a “phenomenology of cognition” – a sui generis conceptual, or propositional, kind of phenomenology that constitutes the content of conscious occurrent thought – then one would expect that it is compositional. That is, one would expect that thought content is compositional – that the content of a complex concept or thought is a function of the contents o...

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  • 14 December 2015 December

    14 December 2015 10:30

    Guido Barchiesi

    Motor Responses to Action Observation: a Dual-Route Account

    Room: M205

    Motor Simulation is thought to be a mechanism allowing automatic mapping of the observed actions from visual to motor domain, i.e., the visual information activates correspondent motor representations of the action observed, as the observer was to perform the action himself. However In light of these considerations how is it possible that we can perform actions that are different from those observ...

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  • 25 January 2016 January

    25 January 2016 10:30

    Marta Bortoletto

    TMS-EEG: A Novel Technique to Study Cortico-Cortical Connectivity

    Room: Sala Paci

    In the past, the major focus of research defining the brain-behavior relationship was to identify the segregated brain regions recruited by a given task. More recent developments have emphasized the importance of distributed networks at all levels, from individual neurons to neural populations and brain regions. Defining the human brain connectome has become one of the major goals of neuroscience,...

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  • 15 February 2016 February

    15 February 2016 10:30

    Olivier Collignon

    Space without Sight

    Room: Sala Paci

    Vision typically provides the most reliable information about our surrounding space. What happens when you cannot rely on this sensory input due to blindness? I will explore the behavioral and brain reorganizations that occur in blind people for the processing of space. Aside from quantitative differences, I will demonstrate that congenitally blind individuals have a qualitatively different way of...

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  • 25 February 2016 February

    25 February 2016 14:30

    Nico Orlandi

    Bayesian Perception is Ecological Perception

    Room: Sala Paci

    There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of Bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that Bayesian o...

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  • 29 February 2016 February

    29 February 2016 12:30

    Zaira Cattaneo

    From Symmetry Perception to Neuroaesthetics.

    Room: Sala Paci

    ilateral symmetry is a prominent feature of the visual world. Not only are human faces and bodies symmetric, but most other living organisms have at least one axis of symmetry, as do manufactured items, such as tools and buildings. I’ll present the results of a series of experiments that shed light on the neural correlates of visual (and haptic) symmetry detection, also considering the case...

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  • 14 March 2016 March

    14 March 2016 12:30

    Simone Schütz-Bosbach

    Self and Other in the Human Sensorimotor System and Beyond

    Room: Sala Paci

    People experience and think of themselves as individuals or as a “self” that forms a coherent entity and is clearly distinct from other persons and the world that surrounds them. Recent theories emphasize the sensorimotor experience of the body as the basis of self-awareness. Here intentional actions make a key contribution to the sense of self by allowing the interaction with the worl...

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  • 31 March 2016 March

    31 March 2016 12:30

    Max Cappuccio

    What are skills, and what does disrupt skillful performance? A portable dynamic EEG study on choking effect

    Room: Sala Paci

    What are embodied skills, how do we learn them, and what psychological factors disrupt them? The study we are conducting at the Interdisciplinary Cog Sci Lab of UAE University addresses these issues by complementing behavioral experimentation with the data collected through a portable dynamic wireless EEG system. Our approach targets skill disruption (aka “choking effect”) as a way int...

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  • 18 April 2016 April

    18 April 2016 10:30

    Aikaterini Fotopoulou

    Bodily Sense and Sensibility: Anosognosia, Asomatognosia and Anorexia

    Room: Sala Paci

    According to the ‘embodied cognition’ approach several facets of selfhood are causally related to the physical body and its properties. In cognitive neuroscience, primary sensorimotor signals are thought as integrated and re-represented in various levels of the neurocognitive hierarchy to form a number of neurocognitively distinct bodily models, including unconscious and conscious fac...

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  • 09 May 2016 May

    09 May 2016 10:30

    Thomas Brochier

    Cortical Networks for Hand Dexterity

    Room: Sala Paci

    The dexterity of the hand in grasping and manipulating objects is one of the distinctive properties of human and non human primates. Grasping movements involve transforming the visual properties of the object into the coordinated activation of arm and hand muscles to move the upper limb in a coherent way. The cerebral cortex, with its descending outputs to the brainstem and the spinal cord is the ...

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  • 16 May 2016 May

    16 May 2016 08:30

    Garrett Mindt

    The Problem with the ‘Information’ in Integrated Information Theory

    Room: Sala Paci

    Giulio Tononi’s proposed theory of consciousness – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness – presents an interesting advance in the scientific study of consciousness. Tononi suggests that consciousness is quantifiable in both quantity and quality in terms of integrated information. Accordingly, information is one of IIT’s two foundational pillars (alongside...

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  • 26 September 2016 September

    From 26 September 2016 08:30 To 27 September 2016 08:30


    Acting Together: Coordination, Collective Goals, and Cooperation

    Room: Sala Paci

    nvited Speakers: Alexandra Battaglia, Olle Blomberg, Steve Butterfill, Dimitrios Kourtis, Tom Smith Many of the things we do are done together with others. We play duets, move pianos together and drink toasts together. Acting together in these and other ways raises three questions, which are the focus of this workshop. First, acting together often requires our actions, yours and mine, to be coo...

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  • 03 October 2016 October

    03 October 2016 16:00

    Andy Clark

    Perceiving as Predicting?

    Room: Sala di Rappresentanza

    According to an emerging vision in computational and cognitive neuroscience, perception (rich, full-blooded, world-presenting perception of the kind we humans enjoy) depends heavily on prediction. To perceive, if this schema is correct, is to meet incoming sensory information with a set of matching ‘top-down’ predictions, where these amount to the brain’s best guesses about the...

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  • 10 October 2016 October

    10 October 2016 10:30

    Cosimo Urgesi

    Top-Down Modulations of Motor Resonance to Social Stimuli

    Room: M205

    Several previous studies have shown a muscle-specific facilitation of cortico-spinal excitability during observation of others’ actions (motor resonance). While motor resonance has been shown to be automatically triggered independently from the observer’s effort to simulate the actions, high-level aspects of actions, including the actor’s intention and context, can modulate it...

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  • 25 October 2016 October

    25 October 2016 12:30

    Francesca Forlè

    Movement in Music. An Enactive Account of the Dynamic Qualities of Music

    Room: Sala Paci

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  • 08 November 2016 November

    08 November 2016 12:30

    Antonella Tramacere

    Mirror neurons in the tree of life: A mosaic evolution hypothesis of the social brain

    Room: Sala Paci

    I will approach the evolution of the social brain, by focusing on the properties of mirror neurons (MNs), which constitute one of its important parts. I will offer a novel, unifying, and testable account of MNs evolution according to the available data, integrating a substantial amount of apparently discordant research, including the plasticity of MNs during development, their adaptive value and t...

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  • 15 November 2016 November

    15 November 2016 12:30

    Sofia Bonicalzi

    Free will and causation

    Room: Sala Paci

    The problem of mental causation lies at the core of the interaction between neuroscience and philosophy of mind. However, one might doubt whether the two disciplines are dealing with the same conceptual issues. In philosophy of mind, the interest for mental causation often grows from the dispute between compatibilist and incompatibilist perspectives about metaphysical determinism and free will. In...

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  • 22 November 2016 November

    22 November 2016 12:30

    Sam Clarke

    Don’t Fail the Module! On the assessment of Fodor’s modular/non-modular distinction

    Room: Sala Paci

    Abstract Jerry Fodor has famously, and persistently, argued that the human mind is made up of modular and non-modular cognitive systems. Typically, this is understood as the claim that some (but only some) cognitive systems (the modular ones) display a cluster of properties to some interesting extent (e.g. informational encapsulation, inaccessible processing, shallow outputs, and so on). But this...

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  • 29 November 2016 November

    29 November 2016 12:30

    Janko Nesic

    Ego as an individual substance

    Room: Sala Paci

    Abstract According to Gurwitch’s (1941) canonical distinction there are egological and non-egological theories of consciousness. An egological theory would maintain that, when I watch a film, there is a self or ego being aware of itself as an ego watching a film, it is a metaphysical and phenomenological truth that every experience is for a subject. Non-egological theory sees this experien...

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  • 13 December 2016 December

    13 December 2016 12:30

    Andrea Polonioli

    The adaptive rationality of confabulation(s)

    Room: Sala Paci

    In 2011, the Edge Foundation posed the following question to dozens of academics, writers, and intellectuals: ‘What scientific concept would improve everybody’s cognitive toolkit?’ They received nearly 200 responses on a variety of topics, ranging from evolutionary biology and theoretical physics to economics and psychology. Interestingly, cognitive psychologist Fiery Cushma...

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  • 20 December 2016 December

    20 December 2016 12:30

    Émile Thalabard and Matthias Michel

    The overflow argument and the global workspace theory of consciousness

    Room: Sala Paci

    We argue that one can accept the rich view of consciousness while still considering that consciousness is the result of a global process in the brain, and that cognitive access is constitutive of consciousness. In other words, our thesis is that the overflow argument does not imply the falsity of the global workspace theory of consciousness. In order to defend such view, we argue that one must di...

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  • 10 January 2017 January

    10 January 2017 12:30

    Valentina Petrolini

    Are Mental Disorders Continuous with Healthy Functioning? A New Proposal for a Dimensional Model in Philosophy of Psychiatry

    Room: Sala Paci

    In this talk I put forward a novel approach to psychopathology that aims to describe and classify mental disorders in a dimensional way. This step proves crucial in providing a defense of what has recently come to be known as the Continuity Thesis (CT) in philosophy of psychiatry (see Bortolotti 2009). I believe a convincing defense of CT should be two-fold. First, it has to provide a model of men...

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  • 17 January 2017 January

    17 January 2017 12:30

    Gabriele Ferretti

    Visual Representations in Action

    Room: Sala Paci

    Perceptual Representations in Action It is easy to claim that the hottest debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and of perception is about whether the mind perceptually represents the properties of the world and, provided that a positive answer is possible, the question is about which properties of the world are represented in perception (Siegel 2006; Nanay 2013). That said, several philoso...

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  • 21 March 2017 March

    From 21 March 2017 08:30 To 22 March 2017 08:30


    Workshop Culture, Cognition and Action

    Room: Sala Paci

    Program Tuesday 21/3 16:00 – 17:00 Richard Menary (Sydney): Did social cognition culturally evolve? 17:00 – 17:30 Break 17:30 – 18:30 Vivian Bohl (Tartu): Social relationships and shared emotions Dinner: if you would like to join the speakers and organizers, please email anika.fiebich@unimi.it (in advance!) Wednesday 22/3 09:30 – 10:30 Francesco Guala...

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  • 21 April 2017 April

    21 April 2017 17:00

    Raamy Majeed

    The Cognitive Impenetrability of Recalcitrant Emotions

    Room: Sala Paci

    Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that conflict with your judgements, e.g. fearing flying despite judging that it is safe. Much of the present controversy concerning these emotions has to do with spelling out the precise nature of this conflict, and determining what this, in turn, tells us about a theory of emotions. This debate, however, leaves unexamined a crucial feature of these emotions, viz...

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  • 08 May 2017 May

    08 May 2017 14:30

    Neil Sinhababu

    Experientialism about Moral Concepts

    Room: Sala Paci

    I present an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about when moral feelings represent objective facts. For example, guilt represents wrong actions while admiration represents virtuous character. Experientialism is suggested by an elegant empirical model of moral psychology. It fits into a cognitivist, externalist, and Humean picture of moral judgment, pro...

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  • 26 April 2018 April

    26 April 2018 14:30

    Pierre Jacob

    How to Solve the Developmental Puzzle

    Room: Aula Paci

    Most preschoolers have been shown to fail explicit false-belief tasks where they are directly asked to predict the action of a mistaken agent. However, findings based on implicit false-belief tasks show that preverbal infants expect an agent to act in accordance with the content of her belief (whether true or false). How to reconcile these discrepant findings? This is the developmental puzzle abou...

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  • 15 May 2018 May

    From 15 May 2018 10:00 To 15 May 2018 12:30


    Questioni di coscienza

    Room: Aula 113

    Società Italiana di NeuroEtica & Università degli Studi di Milano Milano, 15 maggio 2018 Aula 113 – 10.00 Via Festa del Perdono 5, Milano Questioni di coscienza Marcello Massimini (Università degli Studi di Milano) Coscienza versus intelligenza. Eraldo Paulesu (Università Milano-Bicocca) Dissezionare la coscienza motoria: un approccio neuroscientifico-cognitivo Pietro Piet...

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  • 24 May 2018 May

    24 May 2018 14:30

    Ophelia Deroy

    The Perception/Cognition Divide in Predictive Models of the Mind

    Room: Aula Paci

    According to predictive models, perception is a hierarchical and predictive process : instead of sensory signals being processed in a bottom-up fashion, they are compared to inner predictions at different levels of processing. Many, such as Andy Clark, but also Friston, Frith, or Lupyan, point out that such a model “makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy … In plac...

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  • 20 September 2018 September

    20 September 2018 14:30

    Dan Sperber

    Human Rationality in an Evolutionary Perspective

    Room: Sala Paci

    For any item that has a function, one can ask: How well does it perform its function? In other terms any such item can be evaluated normatively. What then is norm in terms of which one can evaluate cognitive mechanisms the function of which is to perform inferences? It is, I will argue, a norm of rationality in a broad sense. Inferential mechanisms are evolved in all animals that locomote, and hen...

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