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  • 09 May 2013 May

    09 May 2013 14:30

    Ian Phillips

    Perceiving the passing of time

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Duration distortions familiar from trauma present an apparent counter-example to what we might call the naïve view of duration perception. Such distortions constitute a counter-example to naïveté only on the assumption that we perceive duration absolutely. This assumption can seem inevitable if we think of the alternative relative view as limiting our awareness to the relative durations o...

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  • 14 May 2013 May

    14 May 2013 14:30

    Jesse Prinz

    Where and When Does Consciousness Arise in the Brai

    Room: Room 104 FdP

    There has been an ongoing search to find the psychological and neural correlates of consciousness. To do this when must ask both where consciousness arises in the flow of information and when it arises. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, this presentation argues that consciousness arises at a particular stage of information processing ("the intermediate level") and it arises when and o...

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  • 22 May 2013 May

    22 May 2013 12:30

    Pier Francesco Ferrari

    Development of the Mirror System under the Lens of Intersubjectivity and Evolutionary Theory

    Room: Sala Paci

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  • 21 June 2013 June

    21 June 2013 14:30

    William Ramsey

    Reconsidering representations

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 03 July 2013 July

    03 July 2013 14:30

    Richard Menary

    Neural Plasticity, Neuronal Recycling and Niche Construction

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: Neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and constrains what the brain can learn. Dehaene contrasts neuronal rec...

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  • 10 October 2013 October

    10 October 2013 14:30

    Bence Nanay

    Pragmatic Representations versus Motor Representations (versus Intentions)

    Room: Room 111 FdP

    The standard way of thinking about actions appeals to intentions. Recently, alternative accounts have been offered that replace (or supplement) this intention-based picture with one that posits a much simpler kind of representation. I examine two such accounts, one that stresses the importance of pragmatic representations: the (often perceptual) representation of objects as having action-properti...

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  • 22 October 2013 October

    22 October 2013 12:30

    Sebo Uitho

    ntentions Are Explanations, not Brain States

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. I argue, however, that adopting the folk notion of ‘intention’ or one of its philosophical de...

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  • 22 November 2013 November

    22 November 2013 14:30

    Dan Zahavi

    Sociality and Self-hood: the Case of Shame

    Room: Room 422 FdP

    On many accounts, shame is an emotion that targets and involves the self in its totality. In shame, the self is affected by a global devaluation: it feels defective, objectionable, condemned. The basic question I wish to raise and discuss is the following: What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-i...

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  • 21 March 2014 March

    21 March 2014 09:30

    Luciano Floridi

    The Synthetic Uninformative

    Room: Sala Direzione

    It is well-known that information, understood as a good, has three main properties that differentiate it from other ordinary goods, such as cars or loaves of bread: a) it is non-rivalrous: Alice holding or consuming the information that p does not prevent Bob from holding or consuming the same information at the same time; b) tends to be non-excludable. Some information – such as intellec...

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  • 15 April 2014 April

    15 April 2014 08:30

    Julian Kiverstein

    Social Intelligence as an Embodied Skill

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 03 June 2014 June

    03 June 2014 14:30

    Joel Smith

    Do We See Emotions by Seeing their Expressions?

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 28 October 2014 October

    28 October 2014 14:30

    Ellen Fridland

    Motor Control: Handling Conditions Vary

    Room: Sala Direzione

    When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-causal responses. In this essay, I will argue that this picture of...

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  • 15 December 2014 December

    15 December 2014 12:30

    Alfred Mele

    Free Will and Neuroscience

    Room: 205M

    A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes

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  • 16 December 2014 December

    16 December 2014 14:30

    Chris Gauker

    The Role of Imagination

    Room: Sala Direzione

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  • 08 March 2015 March

    08 March 2015 14:30

    Shaun Gallagher

    Seeing without an I

    Room: 435 FdP

    One can argue that the principle of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is contingent or de facto if one associates it with specific forms of access (introspection or proprioception) or aspects of experience (sense of ownership or sense of agency). All of these aspects can break down in pathologies or be manipulated through experimentation. I’ll review some of these instance...

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  • 20 March 2015 March

    20 March 2015 14:30

    Edouard Machery

    Yes You Can! A Plea for Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuroscience

    Room: Sala Direzione

    Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this talk, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of trea...

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  • 30 May 2015 May

    30 May 2015 16:30

    David Pitt

    Phenomenal Compositionality and Context Effects

    Room: Sala Paci

    If there is a “phenomenology of cognition” – a sui generis conceptual, or propositional, kind of phenomenology that constitutes the content of conscious occurrent thought – then one would expect that it is compositional. That is, one would expect that thought content is compositional – that the content of a complex concept or thought is a function of the contents o...

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  • 25 February 2016 February

    25 February 2016 14:30

    Nico Orlandi

    Bayesian Perception is Ecological Perception

    Room: Sala Paci

    There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of Bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that Bayesian o...

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  • 14 March 2016 March

    14 March 2016 12:30

    Simone Schütz-Bosbach

    Self and Other in the Human Sensorimotor System and Beyond

    Room: Sala Paci

    People experience and think of themselves as individuals or as a “self” that forms a coherent entity and is clearly distinct from other persons and the world that surrounds them. Recent theories emphasize the sensorimotor experience of the body as the basis of self-awareness. Here intentional actions make a key contribution to the sense of self by allowing the interaction with the worl...

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  • 03 October 2016 October

    03 October 2016 16:00

    Andy Clark

    Perceiving as Predicting?

    Room: Sala di Rappresentanza

    According to an emerging vision in computational and cognitive neuroscience, perception (rich, full-blooded, world-presenting perception of the kind we humans enjoy) depends heavily on prediction. To perceive, if this schema is correct, is to meet incoming sensory information with a set of matching ‘top-down’ predictions, where these amount to the brain’s best guesses about the...

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  • 15 November 2016 November

    15 November 2016 12:30

    Sofia Bonicalzi

    Free will and causation

    Room: Sala Paci

    The problem of mental causation lies at the core of the interaction between neuroscience and philosophy of mind. However, one might doubt whether the two disciplines are dealing with the same conceptual issues. In philosophy of mind, the interest for mental causation often grows from the dispute between compatibilist and incompatibilist perspectives about metaphysical determinism and free will. In...

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  • 22 November 2016 November

    22 November 2016 12:30

    Sam Clarke

    Don’t Fail the Module! On the assessment of Fodor’s modular/non-modular distinction

    Room: Sala Paci

    Abstract Jerry Fodor has famously, and persistently, argued that the human mind is made up of modular and non-modular cognitive systems. Typically, this is understood as the claim that some (but only some) cognitive systems (the modular ones) display a cluster of properties to some interesting extent (e.g. informational encapsulation, inaccessible processing, shallow outputs, and so on). But this...

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  • 08 May 2017 May

    08 May 2017 14:30

    Neil Sinhababu

    Experientialism about Moral Concepts

    Room: Sala Paci

    I present an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about when moral feelings represent objective facts. For example, guilt represents wrong actions while admiration represents virtuous character. Experientialism is suggested by an elegant empirical model of moral psychology. It fits into a cognitivist, externalist, and Humean picture of moral judgment, pro...

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  • 26 April 2018 April

    26 April 2018 14:30

    Pierre Jacob

    How to Solve the Developmental Puzzle

    Room: Aula Paci

    Most preschoolers have been shown to fail explicit false-belief tasks where they are directly asked to predict the action of a mistaken agent. However, findings based on implicit false-belief tasks show that preverbal infants expect an agent to act in accordance with the content of her belief (whether true or false). How to reconcile these discrepant findings? This is the developmental puzzle abou...

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  • 24 May 2018 May

    24 May 2018 14:30

    Ophelia Deroy

    The Perception/Cognition Divide in Predictive Models of the Mind

    Room: Aula Paci

    According to predictive models, perception is a hierarchical and predictive process : instead of sensory signals being processed in a bottom-up fashion, they are compared to inner predictions at different levels of processing. Many, such as Andy Clark, but also Friston, Frith, or Lupyan, point out that such a model “makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy … In plac...

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  • 20 September 2018 September

    20 September 2018 14:30

    Dan Sperber

    Human Rationality in an Evolutionary Perspective

    Room: Sala Paci

    For any item that has a function, one can ask: How well does it perform its function? In other terms any such item can be evaluated normatively. What then is norm in terms of which one can evaluate cognitive mechanisms the function of which is to perform inferences? It is, I will argue, a norm of rationality in a broad sense. Inferential mechanisms are evolved in all animals that locomote, and hen...

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