Social dialogue in welfare services

Employment relations, labour market and social actors in the care services

Project financed by the European Commission

DG Employment, Social Inclusion & Affairs

Agreement number no. VS/2020/0242

WP1, WP2, WP3 (SPAIN)

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WP1: Governance, provision and labour market

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1. The labour market in Spain

1.1. The main general characteristics of the labour market at the national level

Labour market segmentation has been on the agenda of governments and social partners in Spain since the early 1990s. There is a shared view among all relevant actors that segmentation constitutes the main problem to be tackled in the labour market. However, the debate around the causes of these inequalities remains strongly polarized into two positions (Banyuls and Recio, 2017). According to some authors, the main reason for high levels of unemployment and precarious employment is the existence of institutions imposing rigidities to companies (wage, hiring and firing stringencies) (Bentolila and Jimeno, 2003). This view is rejected by those who argue that the main factor explaining persisting segmentation in Spain has to be found in the characteristics of the economy and business strategies, including its sectoral composition and firm size as main factors. In addition to these two perspectives, demographic factors and immigration more specifically have become important drivers of inequalities in recent years in Spain.

The extension of temporary employment in Spain since the mid-1980s (Dolado et al, 2002) has become the main cleavage in the labour market (Toharia, 2002). The introduction of "flexibility at the margins" that occurred in the 1980s is at the same time re-enforced by the existence of a dualized production structure. Temporary contracts are more frequent among young workers, women and immigrants and have accordingly become a major source of divisions. According to Polavieja (2005), institutional features interact with high degrees of business uncertainty, hence providing stronger incentives for employers to use this type of contracts. In order to solve these problems, in recent years there have been several voices advocating for the introduction of a single contract (contrato único) in order to reduce dualization (Dolado and Felgueroso, 2010). In addition to regulations, the industrial relations system has also been blamed for imposing wage rigidities and protecting labour market insiders vis-a-vis outsiders (Bentolila et al, 2012; Villalón, 2015).

The dual character of the Spanish labour market has a multiplicity of manifestations and impacts, but four of them are particularly important. First, a persistently high unemployment rate. Since the late 1970s, the unemployment rate in Spain has been above the EU average. Following the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis, the unemployment has experienced a remarkable increase, reaching a peak of 27% by the end of 2013, almost three times higher than the EU-15 average (Alos, 2015). Unemployment in Spain is characterised first of all by a high persistence (Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995) but also by an uneven distribution across regions and different groups of population (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998). Young workers, women, immigrants and low-skilled workers were disproportionally affected by high unemployment rates (García, 2011; Torns and Recio, 2012; Medina et al., 2010; Miguelez and López-Roldán, 2014). Following the 2008 financial and economic crisis, there has also been an increase in long-term unemployment, particularly among the younger and older groups in the labour market (De la Rica and Anghel, 2014).

Second, earnings' inequalities in Spain have increased very significantly in recent years, a process that has accelerated in the context of the 2008 economic and financial crisis. Thus, Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) find that earnings' inequalities in Spain have a strong counter-cyclical component. The rise of inequality during the economic crisis is explained by the fact that cyclical employment fluctuations mostly affected the lower parts of the income distribution. In other words, the worst off in the labour market disproportionately suffer from unemployment and an erosion in working and employment conditions compared to those who were better off (Serrano and Arranz, 2013). Ramos et al. (2015) point to the increase in part-time employment during the great recession and the post-crisis period as an additional factor aggravating the existing earnings' inequalities. As the extension of low paid non-standard jobs is no longer concentrated in the early career stages, but has spread to other age groups, high levels of earnings' inequalities have become an entrenched feature of the labour market.

The third problem is the high prevalence of temporary employment among young workers as well as women and immigrants. Even though the rate of temporary employment in Spain has a seasonal component, it has nonetheless fluctuated around 25-35% since the late 1980s, with little success of government attempts to reduce it (Conde-Ruiz et al, 2010). High levels of temporary employment explain high turnover rates and related costs, whilst having negative effects on productivity levels due to less investment in training (Alba-Ramirez, 1994). Moreover, there is evidence that temporary employment does not work as a steppingstone towards open-ended employment and has significant career scarring effects (Cebrián and Moreno 2018; López-Andreu and Verd, 2016). Temporary employment is also behind the extension of unstable or precarious careers for some groups (young, women and immigrants) in the labour market (Verd and López-Andreu, 2012).

Finally, there are significant gender inequalities in relation to occupational segregation and upward mobility in the labour market. Women are more exposed to non-standard contracts and suffer from occupational segregation, thus being over-represented in the lower segments of the labour market (Torns and Recio, 2012; Serrano et al., 2019). In addition to occupational segregation, the glass ceiling also impedes many women in high skilled occupations to reach higher/better jobs.

1.2. The main characteristics and structure of the labour market, at the national level, in the ECEC and LTC sectors (approx. 5 pages)

Long-term care labour market characteristics

Long-term care workers services represent around 1,8%, increasing basically according to the relative weigh of informal care (INE microdata, 2020). Other studies point out that 155 thousand persons were employed specifically by nursing homes. That is, the 40% of the commercial banking sector (PwC, 2020). Long-term care occupations are mostly female dominated: 69.5% of care workers in social care centres and 94.2% of domiciliary care workers. This is a common trend in activities in which there is a transfer of skills from the domestic to the productive sphere (e.g., cleaning, contract catering, and care services) (Godino, 2017). Therefore, the female-domination of LTC services results of that transfer of the dynamics of the sexual division of labour that generates an unequal sectoral and occupational distribution between men and women (Carrasquer et al., 2004; Carrasco, 2004).

The data on activity, employment and unemployment follow similar patterns to other female-dominated activities and occupations: lower activity rates than men (with a marked decline during the crisis) and relatively higher unemployment rates, with certain similar percentages during the most harmful recession period. In any case, as aforementioned, it is important to highlight that the LFS micro-data can be problematic to calculate these rates in relation to certain occupations and activities. Nevertheless, it is interesting to highlight the differences between each service: unemployment affects less to residential services, which have a greater capacity to plan their activity in the medium term, allowing workforce stabilisation. However, domiciliary care tends to be more flexible in its provision, which increases the level of temporariness. In addition, the profile of those employed tends to be more vulnerable, even more in the case of undeclared home care, that is highly common in Spain, increasing instability and the risk of unemployment.

Graph 1. Age groups within LTC services



Source: Own elaboration using EPA microdata (2020).

The age composition of residential care services shows that workers older than 45 increased in the period 2012 – 2018 (from 52.3% to 57.7%), but decreased drastically in 2020 (47.1%), probably with amounts of older workers retiring before and in the early stage of the pandemic. Similar rends to home-help service, although with a greater number of 30-45 years of age workers (Graph 1). Beyond the risks of performing intensive care tasks for older workers, the pandemic meant a significant risk for these aged workforces considering the impact of COVID-19 in activities such as residences.

Graph 2. Nationality of workers (2020)



Source: Own elaboration using EPA microdata (2020).
Note: Double nationality includes Spanish nationality. Spanish nationality excludes these with double nationality.

About the nationality of workers, residential care and home-help services count with less foreign workers (8.7% and 10.2%) than the national average (11.9%). Although, if we also consider workers with double nationality (8.7% and 8.1%), it seems that residential care is a common activity for those workers (many coming previously from informal care) who have obtained the citizenship. That is, care work is a bridge for many migrant women to settle in Spain. Very different to the case of Hospitals, with much less foreign people (4.6%) and very determined by credentials and qualifications to participate in the activity. And domestic work, which informality is linked with a much greater percentage of foreign workers (41%). The educational attainment of LTC workers also shows analogous trends. That is, lower levels of workers with higher education to the national average. Those highly qualified workers in residential care are mostly doctors, nurses and other health professionals working in residences and in home-help services.

Graph 3. Educational attainment of LTC services workforce



Source: EPA microdata (2020).

Moreover, workers of residential care are mostly composed of nursing professionals and assistants (53.36%, being 47.45% assistants), followed by cleaning personnel (10.28%), other health pharmacy and emergency health care technicians and other health care workers (7.26%), and other health professionals (4,09%). Doctors represent only the 1.01% of the residential care workforce, lower than other occupations such as structural construction workers, receptionists, and legal and social services support professionals (Annex 1).

Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) labour market characteristics

Early childhood care includes ECEC services and domestic care services. Workers within these services represent around 1.1% in 2020 according to Spanish LFS microdata. ECEC services include early childhood care and education workers (0-2 and 3-5 levels) in educational centres (i.e., early childhood education in NACE classification). In this activity most of workers are teachers and early childhood educators (79.2%), following of other staff as childcare workers, cooks, cleaners, etc. (Annex 2). By contrast, according to available data of Spanish labour market, data on domestic care workers (NACE 8891 Child Day care activities) are problematic, due to in this activity there is a wide range of occupations beyond the focus of the project (e.g., it includes home care workers, workers on social education, babysitters, etc.). In this activity teachers and early childhood educators are only the 11.6% (Annex 3 shows the diversity of occupations within this activity).

ECEC sector (i.e., early childhood education services) is mostly female dominated, even more than primary education sector: in early childhood education 93.7% of ECEC workers are women (Graph 4). In terms of nationality, in both early childhood and primary education there are very few foreign workers (in 2020 the Spanish workers were 99.3% in early childhood and 97.5% in primary). If we differentiate between public and private sector, we observe that in 2020 in the private sector in early childhood education 2.1% are foreign workers (so a few more foreign workers that the sector average).

Graph 4. Men and women distribution within early childhood and primary education (2020)



Source: EPA microdata (2020).

In terms of age groups (Graph 5), workers in early childhood education (0-5 level), between 2012 and 2020, have a higher percentage of young workers than in primary education. These data, and according to some interviewees, suggest that in many cases the 0-5 level is a transition stage of their workers towards jobs in primary education. Older workers have a lower weight than in primary education, probably due to the greater demands of the 0-2 level with respect to education and childcare.

Graph 5. Age groups within early childhood and primary education



Source: EPA microdata (2020).

Data on educational attainment (Graph 6) show that educational workers have higher level to the national average. Most of the workers are teachers with high level of education (university graduates with ISCED 6 level) and early

childhood educators with medium level (VET trainings with ISCED 5 level). Graph X shows the greater weight of medium levels of education in early childhood in comparison to primary education. Within ECEC workers in the private sector there is a higher percentage of medium levels of education (10.8%) than in the public sector (6%). Therefore, there is a greater use of the profile of early childhood educators in the private sector (see WP2 report for further detail on working conditions of this profile in relation to teachers). The lowest levels of education levels refer to other professionals such as cooks, cleaners, etc. (for further detail on occupations within early childhood education see Annex 2).

Graph 6. Educational attainment of ECEC workforce (public-private) and primary education workers (2020)



Source: EPA microdata (2020).

2. The ECEC and LTC services in Spain.

Social services in Spain were highly centralized during the dictatorship period in terms of regulation, funding, and management. The political and territorial articulation of competences after the approval of the Spanish Constitution (1978) decentralized many policies and services such as health, education, social services and care services to guarantee regional grounded public provision. The Local regime Law (1985) enhanced this approach, obligating to local entities of more than 20,000 inhabitants to provide social services. Moreover, the approval of regional statutes and social services laws have established an heterogenous map of social services regulation (Ministerio de Derechos Sociales, 2021) and provision (Álvarez et al., 2020). That is, 17 different regional systems and contexts. However, the central Government establishes a general framework, regulated according to each activity and delimiting the funding, while allowing regional and local complements. This heterogeneity is also present according to the specific social services activity and those sectors to which it is linked. Thus, ECEC is strongly influenced by the regulatory framework of education in general in general terms. And LTC has links at the professional level with the health sector and with domestic work at the provision level, where informal care is provided in a substantive way.

2.1. LTC definition, governance, expenditure, and providers

The 2006 Dependency Law reform distinguishes clearly between non-professional care services, those provided in households theoretically by family members (counting with economic aids currently between 153 and 387€, depending on dependency degree), and professional services, provided by public entities or independent

professionals in households or specialized centres. Nevertheless, the law considers both types adequate for the entitlement of care services. Residential care is not always the most relevant in terms of beneficiaries (Graph 7), but in terms of hours of care provided and employees among professional services, followed by domiciliary social work, although domestic informal care is particularly significant (Torns et al., 2014).

Graph 7. Share of LTC system beneficiaries according to type of service (2020)



Source: IMSERSO secondary data (2020)

In terms of governance, long-term care services in Spain are in the intersection between the health sector and the social services. Health care counts with a basic national framework, but regional governments are fully responsible of its management, funding it with their own budgets, although with the national government contributions through the general regional funding system (Moreno Fuentes, 2009; Arlotti and Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2017). The health care system is only responsible for long-term health care, health care during convalescence, and functional deficit rehabilitation. However, there are big differences of interpretation between regions about its entitlement and provision, due to the blurry boundaries between long-term health and social care (Arlotti and Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2017).

In the other hand, social services system(s) articulate part of the LTC activities, mostly the domiciliary care, day-centers, and some telecare programs. These services are very fragmented, so National government provides a basic regulatory framework and partial funding, slightly greater than in health care due to the individual entitlement recognised at national level (Arlotti and Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2017). But its management is much divided between regional and local authorities. Although regional level is expected to replace too small municipalities, they are usually providing LTC services simultaneously at the same place (Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2013).

The LTC regulatory reform during the endless Great Recession period

The key regulatory framework of long-term care services in Spain is the 'Law reform to promote the personal autonomy and the care of dependent people' (2006), also kwon as LAPAD. The 2006 Dependency Law reform was originally founded on the crisis of the traditional model of care of dependent people, traditionally based on

the informal caregiving of women within the family. The changes in the family model and the women inclusion in the salaried labour market motivated to the reform of the social care system in order to entitle to dependent people through public services. The new legislation introduced the possibility to create a social care model being the public sector the care services provider or at least financing a certain social organization of daily care (Torns et al., 2012). Thus, the approval of this law was a turning point to recognize subjective rights such as the entitlement of access to support to daily life activities depending on three dependency scales (moderate, severe, and serious). The access to these services disassociated to income and personal or family assets.

The preamble of the LAPAD establishes the political will to professionalize the long-term care sector. For that purpose, the law determines several LTC services to guarantee that right. First, requesting the access to public LTC services: residential care, day-centers, telecare, and domiciliary care services. Alternatively, requesting financial benefits for the hiring of professional caregivers, access to private centers or, even, to compensate caregivers within the family. The law also regulates the validation of professional qualifications of caregivers with proven long experience but lacking credentials. Most of these initiatives were very expected within the sector (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 2007) However, the categorization of caregiving by family members (registering them in the social security system) as adequate care service was an impediment for the professionalization of the sector, aggravating even more the negative social perception of residential care.

Although dependent people are officially the economic beneficiaries of these aids, the family is in fact who get paid. Considering the traditional family-based model of caregiving in Spain, this aid scheme reinforces the role of families, and subsequently of women, for the care of elder and/or dependent people. Moreover, the law did not indicate how to fund these services, counting with the state coffers in general terms. However, the great recession impacted just one year after its approval, with budgetary cuts to fund the coverage of these services. These austerity policies obstructed this possible professionalization (Torns et al., 2012; Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2020). Such budgetary cuts did not cause major protests, in contrast to health and education, services generally conceived as consolidated universal rights. This may confirm the lack of importance of care services, reinforcing the sexual division of care work. Such cuts increase the unequal distribution of the total workload between men and women, as well as the growth of informality for migrant women care workers (Torns et al., 2012).

It seems clear that the reform has failed due to the budgetary constraints precisely when it required increasing expenditure and expanding services to deeply change the care model as initially expected. However, there are other reasons beyond the economic hardship during the recession: while the National Government presented the reform as the driving force of a national system of care services, the actual provisions meant setting minimum elements for 17 different regional systems (Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2020). Likewise, this new set of priorities was set at National level, but the National Government has very limited control over the care service system, largely in the hands of regions and local authorities, arising governance problems (Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2020). Nevertheless, the failure of this reform to professionalize long-term care is also due to the institutional approach understanding LTC activities as assistance rather than professional services to cover essential rights, but also to the family-based sociocultural values in Spain (Torns, 2014).

LTC provision, coverage and expenditure

The 2006 Dependency Law reform initially aimed to professionalize the sector, although including several gaps like the informal family support within the portfolio of services of the sector. After this reform, National and regional Governments increased substantially the long-term care expenditure due to the bigger number of people entitled to these services. Although the initial years of the economic crisis did not imply an expenditure decrease, first steps of budgetary cuts were applied in 2011 by the Socialist Government. Moreover, the new People's Party Government approved in 2012 the National Reform Program, including some restructurings for the long-term

care services: adapting the implementation schedule to the available funding, reducing allowances for family care, increasing the beneficiary co-payments, and fostering the expansion of the private sector (Deusdad et al., 2016), together with the cancellation of contribution payments to register family caregivers in the social security system. With the implementation of these measures, the National Government reduced expenditure by €599 million in 2012 and expected to reduce €1,108 million for 2013 (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2013). Therefore, its expenditure was reduced until 2013 and only recovering the expenditure prior cuts in 2016 (Graph 8). The arrival of the Pedro Sanchez's Socialist Government in 2018 recovered measures as the social security payment for informal carers.[1]

Graph 8. Long-term care expenditure change (2007=100)



Source: Eurostat data (2021). Note: Unit of measure=Euro per inhabitant.

These measures implemented during the crisis reduced drastically long-term care subsidies and implied a large decline in LTC services provision. For example, the reduction of the number of delivered home care hours (Costa-Font, 2017), the initial decrease of people generally entitled to LTC services and the consequent increase of waiting lists while the number of beneficiaries remained similar (Graph 9). These figures did not change substantially until the increase of the percentage of beneficiaries covered in 2018. Moreover, compared with other EU countries, the share of long-term care expenditure in Spain is particularly low, only 0.7% of GDP, while other countries such Netherlands or Sweden dedicate around 2.7%. (PwC, 2020). In that regard, Spain has a shortage of places to reach the coverage ratio recommended by the WHO (5 places for every 100 persons over 64 years of age), which only 7 autonomous communities comply with (PwC, 2020).

Together with the general crisis effects, these budgetary cuts reinforced the demand of informal care and reduced the affordability of home and residential public care (Costa-Font, 2017). Considering the existing lack of access to public professional LTC services due to the ineffective implementation of the 2006 Dependency Law reform, the socio-economic gap to access to private professional care services simply raised during the economic crisis (Torns et al., 2014). Therefore, the number of financial beneficiaries for informal carers within the family increased during the initial period of the crisis, being greater in 2009 (51,2%) and remaining similar or decreasing slightly until 2014

[1] For further information on LTC system funding, consult "Financiación del SAAD" (IMSERSO, 2021): https://www.imserso.es/imserso_01/autonomia_personal_dependencia/fin_saad/index.htm

(Graph 10). These financial benefits are often used to hire home caregivers (mostly immigrant women), promoting informal economy and undeclared work (Moreno-Colom et al., 2016).

Graph 9. Coverage and waiting lists for services or economic aids for dependency support.



Source: DEC index and IMSERSO secondary data (2021).
Note: Data about 2019 and about coverage in 2011 not available.

Graph 10. Evolution LTC system beneficiaries according to type of service (2008-2021).



Source: IMSERSO (2021). Every annual data referred to December. 2021 data referred to October.

Despite of the increase of the number of beneficiaries of professional services, financial aids for informal care remains the most important service requested within the LTC system (31,57%) if comparing with each professional service: telecare (17,84%), domiciliary care (17,74%), residential care (10,96%), day and night centres (6,20%), and dependency prevention services (4,3%) (Graph 9). Moreover, the LTC system recognises other economic aids aimed to contract directly private professional services in order to reduce waiting lists. The low percentage of

residential care illustrates a previous trend of the service initiated in 2010, although with a recuperation in 2014 in terms of beneficiaries (Graph 10). The pandemic has just accelerated this decrease due to its negative perception: 19,228 deaths with symptoms compatible with COVID-19 (unconfirmed) in Spanish nursing homes out of a total of 27,121 in the period from March to June 2020 (70% of deaths due to COVID-19). Barrera-Algarín et al. found that there was a correlation between the number of COVID-19 deaths in nursing homes during the first wave and two variables: the public-private nature and the size of the nursing homes. Specifically, there was a higher mortality in private and larger residences (especially those with more than 100 beds), while the least lethal type of residence were public residences with less than 25 beds during the first wave (Barrera-Algarín et al., 2021). In that regard, the COVID-19 crisis has resulted in a significant number of deaths of residential care users, but also many leavings due to relatives' fear. Thus, despite the fact that there are vacancies to be filled, occupancy has not accelerated in the past two years. In any case, there is currently a waiting list of around 434 days from the date of application for a place, service or benefit (according to IMSERSO data) for the recognition of the right of access to care. The waiting list for subsequent access to these care service may be even longer (Marina del Corral, representative of CEAPs).

In relation to that, the Great Recession has resulted in the decrease of public care provision in the sector. The private sector clearly dominates service delivery, with an increasing role of profit-making agencies and extremely weak forms of public control and regulation (León et al., 2021). Official data usually shows a 70% of residential care provided by nursing homes of public ownership (IMSERSO, 2020). However, key informants interviewed from employer organizations and unions state that the public-private share is the opposite in relation to its provision: 70% of the residential care provision being private. That is, outsourced residential care (public ownership and private provision) represents the most common pattern within nursing homes (around 40%). Moreover, Barrera-Algarín et al. (2021) found that almost three out of four nursing home places were private in 2020. This significant privatisation of residential care in Spain describes a global trend that has necessarily affected the way elderly care is provided (Barrera-Algarín et al., 2021).

Nevertheless, recent events are showing institutional attempts at national level for a further strengthening of professional home care (or telecare), a higher ratio of care professionals per citizen, and a new model of nursing homes to make them as homelike as possible. More specifically, the Ministry of Social Rights is designing together with regional governments a plan to reduce the capacity of the residential care centres to create small living units that allow for greater integration and comfort for the elderly: small living units, with a maximum of 15 people simulating shared houses (commonly known as cohousing). In the framework of the Recovery Plan, the Spanish Government has already announced a €800 million scheme to fund these projects among others focused on social economy and care (Romero, 2022; Gobierno de España, 2022).

The informal long-term care and the undeclared work

As aforementioned, the percentage of (legally recognized) dependent people accepting economic benefits for their family-based caregiving, instead of professional services, raised to 51% in 2009 and remained above 40% until 2014 (Graph 10). This benefit was an important economic support for many families during the recession. However, it meant a blockage for the elderly care professionalization, reinforcing even more the family-based model of care. As already mentioned, many poor families counted with their dependent members to increase their incomes during the crisis: the retirement pensions of residential care users are generally transferred directly to residential centers to pay its service. During the 2008 economic shock, families got their elderly members (these mostly with lower dependency scales) back to their households to get their pensions together with the public aid to care them. Consequently, nursing homes kept users with higher dependency scales, deteriorating the content and the pace of work. Families started to bring these dependant members gradually back to nursing homes since

the economic recovery. But these dependant people turned back to nursing homes very deteriorated due to the lack of adequate care services for years. That is why there was a general reversion of care services professionalization.

Beyond the LTC institutional system, the long-term care arrangements of dependents and elderly people show a general North–South gradient in utilization of this informal care across Europe, particularly for the case of Spain (57%) and Italy (62%), in contrast to Netherlands (14%) and Sweden (27%) (Barczyk & Kredler, 2019). Literature explains these figures generally emphasizing the combined effect of family-based models of care and the lack of professionalization (and funding) of LTC services (Moreno, 2016; Barczyk & Kredler, 2019). More recently, there are some institutional attempts to revert this panorama: the €800 million scheme to fund projects on social economy and care are also officially aimed also to professionalise care work, usually done informally by women, by recognising their non-professional work experience. This would also entail remunerating many of these informal caregiving jobs, although the Spanish Government has not provided further details (Ricart, 2022).

2.2. ECEC definition, governance, expenditure, and providers

ECEC in Spain has been developed in a relevant way since the 70s. ECEC has gone from a basically assistance approach to an educational approach, implementing and regulating educational objectives, improving the training and qualifications of the professionals involved, developing teaching methodologies and increasing requirements of educational centres. Currently, ECEC is divided into two levels, 0-2 and 3-5. The first is to three years and the second level from three to six years. Both levels are voluntary and have an educational nature. The first level has no free of charges, with an enrolment rate of 41%. The second level is free of charges and the educational administrations must guarantee a sufficient supply of places in public centres. This level has an enrolment rate of 98%. Therefore, we can affirm that the 3-5 level is a legal entitlement for children in Spain (European Commission-EACEA-Eurydice, 2019). This situation represents a significant gap between the end of the parenting period and the beginning of 3-5 level where children are legally entitled (guarantee of access to public places). Therefore, there is no compulsory ECEC in Spain, having to wait until the primary level (6 years and older).

In terms of regulation, while there is a framework standard on minimum requirements for schools and another on the curriculum for the second level, in the 0-2 level the Autonomous Communities are the responsible of determine these requirements. Thus, Royal Decree 1630/2006 defines the objectives, aims and general principles of 3-5 level. The curriculums must be developed by the Autonomous Communities. On the contrary, in 0-2 level both the contents and the minimum requirements of the centres are regulated by the Autonomous Communities (Vélaz de Medrano, 2020). In this the first level, the respective educational administrations of Spanish regions must establish the contents and regulate the requirements that the centres must meet to teach the level, as well as the numerical ratios pupils-teacher, the infrastructures and equipments and the number of school places, without any specific national basic regulation about these issues. Even so, there have been changes in the legislation in the last 15 years.

The Education Law of 2002 (LOCE) of the *Partido Popular* established two levels, preschool education (*educación preescolar*) and early childhood education (*educación infantil*), the first being of a welfare and educational nature. The Education Law of 2006 (LOE) of the socialist party (PSOE) defined early childhood education for the first time in its current format, but with limitations. First, LOE leaved regulation of 0-2 level in hands of regional governments, differentiating it from the rest of educational levels. In second place, there were no requirements or educational inspection for this level. Finally, it defined with ambiguity in the staff involved: 'staff with appropriate qualifications to attend these children' (Art. 92.1). This poor definition had negative effects on professional recognition and qualification of workers in this level (SPROUT Project, n.d).

We had to wait until the Education Law of 2020 (LOM-LOE) of the socialist party (the previous Education Law of 2013, LOMCE, of the *Partido Popular* did not make any substantial changes to ECEC) to see changes. This law

attempts to drive the 0-2 level. Although it is still non-compulsory, the objective is to make it universal, guaranteeing a "public, sufficient and affordable" offer of places (European Commission, 2020). On the other hand, the LOM-LOE recovers part of the educational character of the stage, which the LOMCE defined as welfare, based on the obligation to define a pedagogical proposal elaborated by the educational centres. In the absence of a general regulatory framework, all regions, in their respective education laws, establish in detail the contents of 0-2 level. Only the Community of Madrid collects the contents of this level in a more general way (Vélaz de Medrano, 2020).

Coverage and enrolment

As we noted above, the evolution of the coverage of the early childhood education is very important in the last three decades (European Commission, 2020; Lazzari, 2017). The net enrolment rate for the first level went from 3.3% in 1990-1991 to 57.4% in 2019-2020. In the case of the second level, at age 3, the enrolment rate went from 38.4 in 1991-1992 to 94.1% in 2020-21. The table 1 shows this evolution according to the ages within 0-2 level and the age 3 (first year of 3-5 level). The differences in coverage between the two levels and the practically universal nature of 3-5 level compared to 0-2 level can be clearly observed. Within this last level, it can be observed how the enrolment rate increases as the age of the children increases. This enrolment rate has been developed both in public and private centres. The following graph shows the progressive extension of early childhood education with a stable proportion among public and private centres from beginning of 21st Century, but with an increase of private centres: 34% in 2000-2001 and 37% in 2019-2020.

Table 1. Trends in early childhood education net enrolment rates (Children up to age 3)

	2010-2011	2015-2016	2020-2021
Less than one year old	8.8%	10.1%	11%
Age 1	29.9%	36.7%	37.8%
Age 2	46.3%	57.2%	56.4%
Age 3	95.6%	96.2%	94.1%

Source: Facts and Figures. 2021/2022 School year, Ministry of Education: 58.

Graph 11. Evolution of pupils in ECEC centres by public-private



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Spanish Ministry of Education

Considering that the regions are responsible for developing the two levels of early childhood education, differences can also be seen in the provision of public and private services according to regions (Graph 11). For Spain, we can observe the greater weight of public education (in number of pupils enrolled) at 3-5 level than at 0-2 level, although there are some regions with more proportion of pupils in private centres as Andalucía, Madrid, Canarias, and Region of Valencia in 0-2 level. In 3-5 level all regions have most of their pupils in public centres (Graph 12). Only some regions as Basque Country and Madrid have a proportion of pupils in private centres near the 50% (48% and 45% respectively).

Graph 12. Pupils in ECEC centres by level, sub-sector and regions (2019-20)



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Spanish Ministry of Education.

ECEC through social transfers and tax incentives: definitions, coverage, expenditure

In Spain, private centres can carry out their activity completely privately or with certain types of subsidies or fundings from the public administration. Subsidies for private education (*conciertos educativos*) are intended to guarantee the provision of compulsory and free basic education in private centres, through the allocation of public funds for this purpose by the Administration. Private centres that can receive public grants must meet specific requirements:

- The centre must be authorized to teach the educational levels required for the funding
- Teachers in the centre must have the required academic qualifications
- Ratio of pupils cannot exceed the level established by educational regulations.

The subsidies have as a general framework the current general education law, as well as the different regional education laws of each Autonomous Community. Therefore, the Autonomous Communities are responsible for granting and managing these subsidies. The current education law (LOM-LOE), approved in 2020, modifies some of the conditions to receive subsidies from private centres. Among them, the following stand out:

- There should be a more balanced distribution of pupils between public centres and State-funded centres.

- State-funded centres will not separate pupils by gender.
- In State-funded centres, fees for complementary activities (not compulsory) are prohibited, not being able to be used as a covert instrument for selecting pupils.

In Spain, the level of public expenditure on private grants in ECEC in 2019 was 14.8% of all private grants. As can be seen in the table 2, expenditure on ECEC varies according to the Autonomous Communities, Asturias being the highest (17%) and Extremadura the lowest (12.8%).

Table 2. Publics transfers to whole private education and ECEC by administration level (thousand euros and percentages)

	Transfers to private education	Transfers to Early Childhood Education	
Total transfers	6,652,598.3	982,022.5	14.8%
Ministry of Education	19,962.9	3,460.1	17.3%
Andalucía	843,942.6	111,313.5	13.2%
Aragón	179,799.3	29,602.2	16.5%
Asturias	90,428.0	15,338.7	17.0%
Balears	175,129.0	28,274.0	16.1%
Canarias	157,098.0	26,125.0	16.6%
Cantabria	93,773.3	12,308.8	13.1%
Castilla y León	312,661.0	44,880.0	14.4%
Castilla-La Mancha	159,343.7	25,162.0	15.8%
Cataluña	1,248,020.2	190,123.8	15.2%
Comunitat Valenciana	733,637.5	101,348.8	13.8%
Extremadura	89,525.5	11,425.9	12.8%
Galicia	276,403.5	40,879.9	14.8%
Madrid	1,104,236.4	167,013.6	15.1%
Murcia	248,677.5	37,017.4	14.9%
Navarra	135,596.2	18,530.4	13.7%
País Vasco	729,011.2	111,208.2	15.3%
La Rioja	55,352.5	8,010.3	14.5%

Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training

These subsidies (*conciertos educativos*) are grants awarded with the aim of financing the staff and/or operating expenses of the centre during the period considered. The objective is to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to free education, at those levels and areas established by law. There are two kinds of subsidies or grants: general grant and singular grant. In the first case, they are the transfers made by the Public Administrations corresponding to the payment of wages of teaching and management staff. In the second case, they are transfers made by the Public Administrations on a partial basis and do not cover the item "Other expenses" (administrative staff, services, maintenance, etc.). These "other expenses" can be covered directly by the fees of the families of the centre. This type of transfers is intended for non-compulsory education levels and in which, it may be the case that the grant is granted only to certain units of the same level (e.g., to a specific line of VET). As can be seen in the following

graph, public expenditure on private transfers has increased in the last two decades. In the ECEC and Primary sector, the increase is observed at the beginning of the 21st century, remaining relatively constant until 2019 (Graph 13).

Graph 13. Public expenditure on transfers (*conciertos y subvenciones*) to private education



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training

Finally, there is a third type of grants (*Transferencias*) destined to finance investments. Depending on their origin, these transfers can be of public origin (from the Central, Autonomous, Local Administration or other public bodies) or transfers of private origin (from individuals, non-profit institutions, companies and abroad). According to the interviews carried out, some unions warn of the increase in public expenditure destined to the creation of infrastructures and equipment that are later transferred to private companies for their management.

Expenditure for the ECEC services: public and private shares.

According to data from the Ministry of Education, Spanish public expenditure on early childhood education has a similar weight to expenditure on other educational levels, except for the tertiary education. In 2018, annual expenditure per pupil in public institutions on early childhood education was 26.6% of GDP per capita, higher than that of primary education (22%), like lower secondary education (26.3%), but lower than tertiary education (35.3%).

Compared with the SOWELL countries and the EU27 average (Graph 14), in Spain the expenditure per pupil in PPS euros in public early childhood education institutions is lower than in most countries (except Slovakia). On the other hand, expenditure per pupil as percentage of GDP per capita is similar to the EU27 average, being lower than in countries such as Germany, Italy or Denmark.

Graph 14. Annual expenditure in public institutions in ECEC per pupil and as percentage of GDP per capita (2018)



(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (2018).

From a diachronic perspective, public expenditure on early childhood and primary education has had a positive progressive trend since the 1990s, with the economic crisis of 2008 as a trend reversal (Graph 15). Public expenditure on education decreased in 2009, increasing again in 2015. Data on public expenditure on early childhood and primary education in relation to total public expenditure show a downward trend in the whole series. Here we see more clearly the 2008 crisis effect with a decline from 2008 onwards, followed by another decline in 2021. This is explained by the positive trend in total public expenditure that was broken from the 2008 crisis onwards, maintaining public expenditure levels with a sharp increase in 2012, due to the national accounting effect of the 2012 bank bailout. The Covid-19 crisis also shows a decrease in the expenditure ratio, due to the greater effort of the State in public health expenditure.

Regarding public expenditure per pupil as percentage of GDP per capita by ECEC levels, in 3-5 level there has not been excessive changes (Graph 16). In contrast, in the 0-2 level there has been a continuous decrease until 2017 (with an expenditure of 13.4%), with a relevant increase of 11.19% in 2018 (reaching an expenditure of 14.9%) With the current Education Law of 2020 (LOM-LOE), the increase is expected to be even higher. In terms of public expenditure per pupil in PPS euros, it has a positive trend for 3-5 level from 2013, while for 0-2 level fluctuations are observed in the series. Beyond these trends, currently public expenditure per pupil in PPS euros at 0-2 level is 4,191.5 € while at 3-5 level it is 4,440.6 €.

Graph 15. Public expenditure in early childhood and primary education



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training

Graph 16. Change on annual public expenditure in ECEC per pupil as percentage of GDP per capita (2012=100) by levels



Source: Eurostat data.

If we consider the total expenditure on early childhood education as a whole and differentiate by public and private institutions, we observe a similar trend since 2012: a decrease in 2013 and 2014 with a subsequent recovery of expenditure until 2018. In this period the percentage of expenditure between public and private educational institutions has been around 70/30 being 70.4/29.6 in 2018 (8,939.6 million euros in public institutions and 2,644.1 million euros in private institutions).

Presentation of the main service providers in ECEC

The main service providers in ECEC are early childhood and education centres (*Centros educativos infantiles*). These centres make up the majority of ECEC services and are regulated by the Autonomous Communities (and by the Ministry of Education for the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla) according to the general education framework. In addition to these centres there is also home-based provision, although it is a minority option. This last provision is only regulated in two Autonomous Communities: Comunidad de Madrid and Comunidad Foral de Navarra. In Madrid there are "mothers during the day" (*madres de día*), while in Navarra there are options such as *Asociación Casas Amigas*, *Manos Amigas* and *Cuidándote*. Home-based providers offer more reduce school day schedules, lower ratios and they are used by specific profiles of families. Compulsory qualifications of workers in this kind of provision are the minimal required in ECEC (usually, higher technician of early childhood education, corresponding with the profile of early childhood educator, ISCED 5).

Informal home-based care in early childhood is mainly provided by families (own fathers, usually mothers, or grandparents) according with the Sping-Andersen's Mediterranean welfare model. Thus, informality is a minority option in Spain. Informal home-based provision for other persons is used in punctual cases (care model of few-hours or exceptional days by illness of children).

There are also special educational centres, particularly in rural areas. Among them, we can find children's houses (C*asas de niños*) in Madrid, rural nurseries (*Guarderías rurales*) in Catalonia (Vélaz de Medrano, 2020). Finally, we can also find toy libraries (*ludotecas*). These day-care centres do not respond to the general framework of the ECEC services and are not centres authorized by the Autonomous Communities. Even so, in some cases they can be used as childcare services, outside the regulatory framework of education.

Returning to the main service providers, in Spain there are differences in early childhood and education centres depending on whether they are integrated or non-integrated centres. The former are those centres that include both levels (0-2 and 3-5) in the same centre. In these cases, it usual to find also primary and secondary levels in the same centres. Non-integrated centres are those that only include 0-2 level. According to Vélaz de Medrano (2020), the most usual formula in Spanish regions is non-integrated centres for 0-2 level. Regarding 3-5 level, it is more common to find this level in an integrated way with the primary level (for public centres) and with the primary and secondary levels (for private centres) (Vélaz de Medrano, 2020).

Moreover, there are specific differences about providers among levels (Table 3). In 0-2 level, the centres are classified according to the public-private nature of the centre's ownership (infrastructures and equipment) and who manages the service (service provider). Thus, we have three types of providers: 1) Public direct management centres or Pure public centres, with public infrastructure and management; 2) Private direct management centres or Pure private centres, with private infrastructure and management; and 3) Indirect management centres, with public infrastructures and private outsourced management. The first and third are usually non-integrated centres, while for the second type we can find both integrated and non-integrated centres. In some minority cases, pure private centres may receive some subsidy from the central Administration.

Table 3. Types of providers in 0-2 level

Public centres		Private centres
Public management (*Pure* public centres or Public direct management centres)	Outsourced management (Indirect management centres)	Without State fundings[1] (*Pure* private centres or Private direct management centres)
Non-integrated centres		Integrated and non-integrated centres

[1] In come Spanish regions there are private centres with public fundings.

The 3-5 level is mainly included in primary and secondary schools, both in public and private centres (Table 4). In this level the main difference is among private centres without State fundings and private centres with State fundings. So, we have also three types of centres: 1) Public centres, usually within schools with primary education level; 2) Private centres without State fundings; and 3) Private centres with State fundings. In both last types, they are usually within Primary and Secondary Schools. As you can see, all three types are integrated centres. State-funded centres must meet the minimum requirements established by regional governments in order to receive public subsidies.

Table 4. Types of providers in 3-5 level

Public centres	Private centres	
Within Primary Schools (in some regions Primary-Secondary Schools, *Institutos-Escuela*)	Within Primary & Secondary Schools	
	Without State fundings	State-funded centres (*escuelas concertadas*)
Integrated centres		

Another difference between both levels is the ratio between public and private centres. In 3-5 level there is a greater weight of public centres (67.5% of centres in Spain), while in 0-2 level the weight of public centres is 52%. The following graph shows the increase in the weight of public centres in the first level of ECEC, while 3-5 level has remained relatively constant, although with a slight reduction since 2011-212 (Graph 17).

These differences between public and private centres can also be observed according to regions. The Annex 4 and 5 show the diversity of situations between Spanish regions in 2018-2019. Annex 4 shows the greatest disparity of situations between Spanish regions. A greater weight of private centres can be seen in 0-2 level in relation to 3-5 level. Madrid, the Canary Islands and Andalusia are the communities with the greatest relative weight of private centres (with or without public fundings), with Madrid and Andalusia being the ones with the largest number of centres. Among the communities with a greater relative weight of public centres we have small regions such as Extremadura, Asturias, Navarra and Cantabria. Among the communities with the most population, the Basque Country and Catalonia are the regions with the highest weight of public centres. Annex 5 shows the greater weight of public centres in 3-5 level and, within private centres, the greater weight of State-funded private centres. Madrid and Andalusia are the communities with the highest proportion of private centres, while Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and the Canaries are the communities with a greater weight of public centres.

Graph 17. Weight of public centres by 0-2 and 3-5 levels



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training

An important issue to consider is the role of the local Administration in the management of ECEC centres for 0-2 level, especially when we talk about non-integrated centres, where there is only this level. For instance, 73.7% of public centres for the 0-2 level belonged to the local Administration in 2016-2017 (Graph 18). In this sense, it is interesting to highlight the differences between public and private centres according to the size of the municipality. The following graph shows how as the size of the municipality increases, there is a greater supply of private centres. On the contrary, in small municipalities, ownership is practically only public. Here we must bear in mind that a part of these public centres outsource the management of the service, with which we can also find the indirect management centres mentioned above.

Graph 18. 0-2 level centres by size of municipality (2016-2017)



Source: Vélaz de Medrano, 2020: 69.

Social dialogue in welfare services

Employment relations, labour market and social actors in the care services

Project financed by the European Commission

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WP2 (Spain): Employment and industrial relations

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1. The employment relations system in Spain

Employment relations in Spain exhibit three distinctive features compared to other EU countries. First, a fragmented and weak trade union movement from an associational point of view. Second, a pervasive role of the state in regulating industrial relations and collective bargaining (Molina, 2014). Finally, a collective bargaining system with high coverage levels due to the automatic extension of agreements and the predominance of sector level negotiations.

The trade union movement that emerged during the transition to democracy in Spain is an attenuated duopoly of two large national confederations (UGT – Unión General de Trabajadores and CCOO – Comisiones Obreras), along with some small professional and/or regional confederations. CCOO was close to the Communist Party (PCE – Partido Comunista de España) in the transition to democracy, whilst UGT maintained close links with the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). Both confederations account for 70% of elected representatives in works' councils and define themselves as class trade unions, therefore covering all sectors of the economy.

The crisis has aggravated some of the structural weaknesses of trade unions, whilst posing new challenges for them (Barranco & Molina, 2014). In this vein, some authors have pointed out a process whereby trade unions have lost both the muscle as well as the social legitimacy to force governments to incorporate them into the policy making process (Culpepper & Regan, 2014). This is not only explained by declining membership, but also to the identification in some countries of trade unions as part of the political system, and hence of the causes of the economic crisis, not as part of the solution to it. These two faces of the crisis have placed trade unions in a different scenario compared to previous crisis episodes as their monopoly in channelling social discontent has been contested. New social movements and other civil society actors have played a more prominent role in gathering and organizing anti-austerity movements (della Porta, 2015). In doing so, they've relied upon mass protests and demonstrations where trade unions have very often been excluded or have been the target of protests as part of the political status quo. Increasing membership and regaining social legitimacy constitute major challenges for trade unions nowadays, that are trying to develop strategies to gain members and representativeness.

State's role in industrial relations is also a distinctive feature of the Spanish industrial relations system (Molina, 2014). The consolidation of democratic institutions and the opening up of spaces for autonomous self-regulation and interaction amongst social partners characterized industrial relations developments since the early 1980s. However, this process has been characterized by a comparatively higher degree of state intervention in order to overcome some of the coordination problems among social partners that appeared in the early years of the return to democracy. This is a differentiating trait of the Mediterranean or Mixed Variety of Capitalism (Amable, 2003; Molina & Rhodes, 2007). In return for cooperation in the early stages, the state has very often provided institutional compensations to social partners and especially trade unions, including their participation in public policy making, extension mechanisms for collective bargaining, etc. Because of these, social partners achieved and institutional and political power that by far exceed their real influence in terms of membership or company level representation. Moreover, a production structure that makes it difficult to reach many of the workplaces by unions has hindered the development of a strong bargaining coordination capacity. Laws extending collective agreements have accordingly played a key role in governing industrial relations. We accordingly can expect the state to face greater incentives to adopt a unilateral approach to policy making in Spain, particularly in the context of economic crises. Even though social partners consider they enjoy considerable autonomy in relation to collective bargaining, they nonetheless agree on the need to consolidate and enhance this autonomy as will be explained in Section III.

In relation to collective bargaining, Spain is characterized by a multi-level bargaining structure, with a historically weak articulation between levels (Martin Artiles & Alos Moner, 2003). Collective bargaining occurred at several levels, with negotiations at territorial (provincial) sector level being the most significant in terms of workers covered. In the early years after the transition to democracy, collective bargaining occurred at several levels, with

negotiations at territorial (provincial) sector level being the most significant in terms of workers covered. However, negotiations took place at several instances, and the issues were very often re-negotiated at lower levels, hence leading to cascading negotiations. The hierarchy principle in the Labour Code (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) made it very difficult for company level agreements to lower the conditions negotiated at higher level. Peak agreements in the early 1980s contributed to maintain a formally high level of centralization, but after its abandonment since the mid 1980s, a process of gradual de-centralization occurred due to the lack of a clear articulation between bargaining levels. Bargaining took place at several levels, but the main bargaining locus became the sector at provincial level. The limited presence of unions at enterprise level hindered the efficacy of collective negotiations at higher levels because only occasionally they affected workers in small and medium-sized establishments. As a consequence of the above, collective bargaining was very sensitive to changes in the strategies, preferences and power of actors, hence lacking stability and becoming a source of permanent conflict, as showed by the comparatively high conflict rates.

Peak cross-sectoral agreements since the mid-1990s have contributed to govern and coordinate collective bargaining in Spain and to maintain a formally high level of centralization. Despite this, a process of de-centralization has been in place since the early 1990s, as a consequence of changes in collective bargaining regulations. The trend towards collective bargaining decentralization has accelerated in the context of the crisis and has adopted a clear bottom-up, disorganised character. This has eroded the regulatory capacity of sector level agreements. We may expect this to reduce the incentives for governments to engage in tripartite concertation with social partners due to their lower capacity to govern industrial relations developments.

Strengths and weaknesses of employment relations in Spain

The main strengths of the industrial relations system in Spain are its institutionalization, on the one hand, and the strong consensus among the most representative social partners around its key features, on the other. The second aspect is well reflected in the peak bi-partite cross-sectoral agreements on employment and collective bargaining. These are signed every two years and provide general guidelines and orientations for collective bargaining. The strong institutionalization of the industrial relations system can be observed at all levels and dimensions of the system, and consists in an intense legal regulation; from the rules for representativeness of social partners, to the 'erga omnes' extension of collective bargaining, trade union workplace elections or the articulation between levels in the collective bargaining structure. Together, these two characteristics explain the resilience and stability of the industrial relations system in Spain.

There are however some developments that pose important challenges for the future of the system. Four of them are particularly important for Spain according to actors interviewed:

The first one is the role of the state in industrial relations and the autonomy of social partners, an aspect that is a matter of concern for trade unions and employer organisations' nowadays. Even though since the transition to democracy the state, particularly during periods of economic crisis had intervened unilaterally, this trend seems to have become stronger since the Great Recession. Even in a context of economic recovery and with a left-wing government since June 2018 that made clear its commitment with social dialogue, social partners have expressed their discomfort with some decisions, including the unilateral increase in the minimum wage, the unilateral approval of a law for registering working time or their limited involvement in the most recent phase of the European Semester process. Social partners consider that governments from different colours often intervened in policy issues that should be dealt through tripartite social dialogue. To a certain extent, these developments show the fragility of collective self-regulation in countries with statist traditions under the external pressures of economic adjustment. The state still plays the role of coordinator and regulator of last resort as has become clear in the recent economic crisis and its aftermath.

A second challenge for the industrial relations system is the low levels of union membership, particularly for younger groups and the trend towards fragmentation in the trade union landscape (Alos et al., 2015). Low levels of union membership and the decline in citizens trust on trade unions can also be considered a weakness and challenges the capacity of trade unions. Even though low membership levels have been a historical feature of trade unions in Spain, the decline in trust experienced since the great recession constitutes another matter of concern for trade unions, as it might make even more difficult to recruit new members, whilst eroding its legitimacy. Trade unions consider that there is a strong cyclical pattern in this indicator and it is already recovering from the low levels reached in the worst years of the Great Recession, but in any case it confirms the need to make greater efforts at reaching new groups of workers. Moreover, there has been a growth in recent years in occupational, regional and yellow trade unions. Even though this could be interpreted as a sign of vitality of the trade union movement, it nonetheless will pose important challenges for the future governance of the system. Thus for instance, it can lead to an increase in conflicts levels, or to growing difficulties to implement collective agreements.

A third risk facing industrial relations in Spain is the trend towards disorganised de-centralisation and enhanced power of employers that was inherited from reforms implemented during the Great Recession. The objective of this reforms was to enhance employers' capacity to adjust collective agreements or simply to opt out of them, therefore pushing labour relations closer to the market (Rodríguez-Gutiérrez et al., 2016). This may also further erode the capacity of social partners to govern industrial relations in the future, in the context of the digital transformation and the extension in number and types of outsourcing practices.

Finally, a fourth challenge refers to the impact of the digital economy on industrial relations and collective bargaining. Even though the digital economy is a multi-dimensional concept, the discussion here focuses on two aspects that are currently on the agenda of social partners and / or government. First, the use of digital mechanisms for monitoring and surveillance at workplace. Secondly, the extension of platforms and platform work and the challenges associated to it.

1.2. Employment in the ECEC and LTC services: structure and features from a diachronic perspective: qualitative and quantitative perspective

Employment in ECEC

The employment in education has increased since nineties, with more intense increase in public centres than private centres, according to extension of public expenditure in 0-5 level (and specially in 0-2). From the mid-1990s until the economic crisis of 2008, there was a similar positive trend in the teaching staff in both sectors. The 2008 crisis led to a reduction in the increase of non-university teaching staff, with a greater recovery in the private sector (Graph 1). The COVID-19 crisis led to a reduction in the increase in the teaching staff in the private sector. The public sector, more protected, recovered the positive trend. The two main occupations present in 0-5 level are teachers (ISCED 6) and early childhood educators (ISCED 5)[2] (European Commission, 2016; European Commission-EACEA-Eurydice, 2019; SPROUT Project, n.d). These profiles are defined in the current general education law (LOM-LOE).

[2] In section 2.1 there is more detail about the different occupations in ECEC when the professional groups included in the main collective agreements in private sector are presented.

Graph 1. Teaching staff in non-university education by public and private sectors



Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training.

The training of the first of them takes place in the university level, while the second takes place in the field of VET (Table 1). In recent decades the vocational training system in Spain has been developed and modernized, creating specific training in the field of ECEC. In this sense, the VET of early childhood education stands out (*Ciclo Formativo superior de educación infantil*) that gives access to the diploma of Advanced Vocational Training of early childhood education, corresponding with the occupation of early childhood educator (ISCED 5).

Table 1. Education for workers in early childhood level

EDUCATION LEVEL	PROFESSIONAL FIGURES	TRAINING AND DIPLOMA	LENGTH
Early Childhood Education (0-5 years)	School Teacher of Pre-Primary Education (3-5 level)	University Bachelor in School Teacher of Pre-Primary Education (ISCED 6)	4 years 240 ECTS (30-60 ECTS of the qualifying mention)
	Early childhood educator (basically, in 0-2 level)	Advanced Vocational Training in early childhood education (*Ciclo Formativo Superior en Educación infantil*) (ISCED 5)	2 years (2000 hours) 120 ECTS

Source: Adapted from SPROUT Project (n.d.) Output 7: ECEC educator in Europe. Educator and teacher in ECEC services: a European comparative survey.

According to the interviews carried out and the documentation analysed, these two profiles coexist in 0-2 level. In 3-5 level there is a greater presence of teachers. In public 3-5 the presence of early childhood educators is minimal or non-existent (basically at the 3-years level and as support workers). In private 3-5 there are still these educators, but their presence is lower in comparison to the 0-2 level. In 0-2 the percentages of both profiles are different depending on the Autonomous Community or even the local level.

These two profiles have different levels of qualification, working hours and wage level. Graph 2 shows the greater use of early childhood educators by the private sector than by the public sector. As noted above, one of the strategies of local administrations when it comes to improving working conditions is to reduce the number of educators in early childhood education. In some local cases such as Barcelona, for pure public centres a minimum of 50% of teachers is mandatory. These types of regulations are not observed with the same frequency in private centres. The situation is more heterogeneous in the case of indirect management centres (publicly owned centres with a private service provider). The different weight of early childhood educators among the public and the private sector can be seen in the different data of educational attainment among these sectors included in the report of WP1.

Graph 2. Teachers and early childhood educators in public and private sector (available data)[1]



[1] It includes staff in early childhood and primary education.
Source: Statistics of non-university education, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training.

In Spain there is a higher number of hours spent by early childhood educators compared to teachers, especially in 0-3 level (Table 2). In the case of the VII National collective agreement of State-funded centres, the level of 3-5 and upper levels, the shortest number of hours (1,180 hours) is regulated by the corresponding general education law.

Table 2. Annual workdays by professional groups in private collective agreements

XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres	X NCA of Private Education	VII NCA of State-funded Centres
Group I. Classroom Staff: Teacher (1,398h) Early childhood educator (1,661h) Support assistant (1,704h)	**Group I. Teaching staff:** Teacher (1,376h)[1] Early childhood educator (1,376h)[1] Instructor (1,376h)[1] [1]It includes 50h for mandatory training.	**Group I. Teaching staff (only 0-3) [2]:** Teacher (1,362h) Early childhood educator (1,620h) [2]For all the levels: 1,180h

Wages

Wages among these two profiles are also different (Table 3). The wages level of early childhood educators is especially problematic, in the case of the XII National collective agreement of childcare and education centres, where is near to the national minimal wage (NMW). This low wage level has been the objective of negotiations between social partners to establish a minimum differential due to the latest increases in the national minimal wage by the central government. In the next table you can see the differences on wages among teachers and early childhood educators in the three main private collective agreements. The reduced wage margin of the less qualified professional groups is also observed in the case of the XII National collective agreement of childcare and education centres. In 2020, the national minimal wage was 950 euros, which represents a margin of less than 10 euros in relation to the profile of early childhood educators (ISCED 5). For 2021, the collective agreement had planned an increase to 958.09 euros. The increase of the national minimal wage to 965 euros gave way to new negotiations to increase the minimum margin for this profile, currently settling at 968.09 euros, a margin that unions continue to consider insufficient, taking into account the level of qualification required for this profile.

Table 3. Monthly wages by professional groups in private collective agreements

XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres	X NCA of Private Education	VII NCA of State-funded Centres
September 2021 Wages table: Teacher (1,411.66€) Early childhood educator (968,09€) Support assistant (NMW)	**2020 Wages table:** Teacher (1,559.95€)[1] Early childhood educator (1,085.38€)[1] Instructor (1,073.33€)[1] [1]Includes a complement of 106.45€ for workers with a 60% or upper workday	**2021 Wages table:** <u>Levels with funding (only 3-5):</u> Teachers (1,633.07€) <u>Levels without funding:</u> *0-2 level:* Teacher (1.711,27€) Early childhood educator (1,306.60€) *3-5 level:* Teacher (1,711.27€)

In the public sector wages are higher than in the private sector, although these wages have a high disparity by Spanish regions, due to territorial bonus in them: for teachers, the Basque Country as the region with highest wage (2,557.64€) compared to Catalonia with the lowest wage (2,165.96€) (UGT-FeSP, 2021). Between 2010 and 2021 the wages of public education workers have had a positive trend (UGT-FeSP, 2021), although the loss of purchasing power suffered by public workers between 2010 and 2017 (between 14% and 18%, depending on the body and seniority) must also be taken into account (CCOO, 2018).

Other working conditions

Beyond wages, there are other differences among public and private sectors in terms of working conditions (Table 4). Particularly noteworthy is the high weight of temporary employment in the public sector. According to CCOO (2019), the number of temporary workers in the public education sector in 2019 has increased by 59,491 people since 2009, an increase of 62%. In pre-primary education between 2012 and 2020, the temporary employment is slightly reduced (from 43.1% to 38.3%). But in all years analysed, temporariness in the public sector is higher than in the private sector. This situation coincides with the progressive reduction of civil servants since 2011 in educational sector.

Part-time work has grown between 2012 and 2020, being higher in the private sector (from 25.6% in 2012 to 28.6% in 2020). There are also differences in relation to the main reason of ECEC workers for their part-time situation: in the private sector 25% of workers cite the impossibility of finding a full-time job compared to 5.9% of workers citing this reason in the public sector.

Within part-time work, the growth of marginal par-time is noteworthy, being also higher in the private sector (11.9% in 2020). In contrast, long working days have been reduced since 2012, being non relevant in 2020. Overtime has also been reduced, especially in the private sector. Work shift system is not relevant in ECEC services.

Another aspect to highlight is the greater weight of workers in the private sector who have a second job or are looking for one, which reinforces the idea of the private sector employment in ECEC services as a transition stage towards jobs with better working conditions.

Table 4. Working conditions within ECEC services

	2012		2018		2020	
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
Temporary rate	43.1%	30.5%	33.3%	18.1%	38.3%	36.2%
Part-time	6.9%	25.6%	16.1%	13.1%	13.2%	28.6%
Marginal part-time (less than 20 hours)	2.4%	6.8%	2.5%	6.3%	6%	11.9%
Long working day (More than 40 hours)	6.8%	14.8%	3.3%	10.1%	0%	2.1%
Overtime	3.7%	18%	2.6%	0.9%	2.9%	7.2%
Occasional evening shift	0%	6.7%	1.9%	0%	7.7%	0.8%
Frequent evening shift (more than half of the days)	0%	0.6%	0%	5.3%	0%	3.1%
Second job	0%	3.9%	6.8%	7.2%	0.5%	1.5%
Looking for other job	1.4%	9.7%	1.3%	12.5%	3.5%	6.3%

Source: EPA microdata.

Looking at the overall trend between 2012 and 2020, we observe the effects of COVID-19 on some employment conditions. Within this period some working conditions had improved (temporary employment, part-time, log working days, overtime, etc.). With pandemics (2020) the trend is reversed, although they have not returned to post-economic crisis levels (2012).

Employment in LTC

Undeclared work is common in home LTC services. This situation implies not only the precariousness of the absence of employment contract but also the inaccuracy on the content and schedules of the work or, or when it is concreted, it implies generally overtime and workload pressure (Torns, 2014). The economic recession affected directly working conditions of social workers, placing great pressure on them to solve generalized social problems. Another consequence of the crisis has been that social work practices have changed enormously; the increasing needs and the lack of resources force social workers to depend on community resources, volunteers, and NGOs (Deusdad et al., 2016).

Wages

Multilevel wage-setting is common in long-term care activities (as in social services), with the co-existence of sectoral agreements at national, regional, and provincial (sub-regional) level, together to some others at company level. However, the agreement with the highest coverage in the sector is the national agreement of care centres and services for people with disabilities (2018), covering 180,000 workers at national level. That is, the 60% of around 300,000 workers in residential care in Spain. The gross minimum yearly (full-time) wage for LTC workers covered by that agreement for adult workers with 10 years of experience is 15,356.88€ (990.00€ of salary plus 106.92€ of 10 years of seniority in 14 monthly payments). Indeed, the minimum salary of the lowest category in the agreement is 800€ per month (11,200€ per year) that increase to 904€ per month (12,656€ per year) after assisting to specific training courses in a maximum period of three years. In the particular case of home-help service, wage-setting is much more fragmented, with several regional and provincial agreements, besides its regulation also in the agreement aforementioned. Thus, agreed monthly wage (extra pay prorated) varies from 1,135.13 at national level, 1,181.14 in Madrid, 1,414.24 in Balearic Islands and 2,010.08 in Vizcaya. Nevertheless, most of agreed wages are lower than 1,200€ (Sánchez-Mira et al., 2021).

Beyond wage-setting and focusing on actual wages (particularly using official social security figures), net salaries in 2018 were 948€ for low qualified occupations (representing the 79.6% of the sector), 1,110€ for middle qualified and 1,380€ for high qualified occupations (Codorniu, 2020). Therefore, the salaries in Spain are below national average. Specifically, residential care workers earnings per hour are 31% below national average and 27% below in the case of home-help service workers (Graph 3). Similar figures to social services (30% below), but far from other activities such as health care (37% above national average salary). That places Spanish long-term care average salaries in the bottom of European countries with higher differences to national averages, just above Italy (32% below), Estonia (36%), Bulgaria (38%), Letonia (40%) and Chipre (45%) (Dubois, 2021). Nevertheless, the main expenditure of nursing homes in Spain is labour costs (almost 60% of their income goes to pay salaries), consisting of a multidisciplinary team performing core and ancillary activities, high and low qualified tasks, care and facility services, etc. Therefore, nursing homes in Spain spend 2.2 times more on staff costs than the service sector average as a proportion of their income (PwC, 2020).

Graph 3. Hourly earnings as a share of national average earnings (2018)



Source: Dubois, 2021 (Eurofound analysis of SES extraction provided by Eurostat on 26 February 2021).

Other working conditions

In terms of employment conditions, the high frequency of temporary work in residential care services is particularly relevant. That is especially important in the public sector, where there has always been a high rate of temporary work (42.1% in 2012 and 39.9% in 2018), but which increased significantly in 2020 (52.8%). A rise linked to the increase of reinforcement staff during the COVID-19 crisis: most of these temporary contracts are justified to cover partial or total absences of other workers (29.1%), while only 8.4% are project-bound contracts of works and services (the most common form of temporary contract that tends to be used fraudulently for structural activities). Temporariness is also high for employees of private providers (27.2%), having grown since 2012 (Table 5), although close to the 24.1% national average across all sectors in 2020 and with a lower percentage of temporary workers covering absences (9.8%).

Tabla 5. Working conditions indicators of residential care employees in public and private sector

	2012		2018		2020	
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
Part-timers	6.8%	17.2%	13.4%	21.9%	5.8%	14.4%
Temporary rate	42.1%	22.2%	39.9%	32.0%	52.8%	29.0%
Overtime	0.0%	2.8%	0.4%	3.7%	4.0%	3.6%
Work shift system	67.3%	47.2%	59.0%	47.2%	63.0%	52.5%
Work on Saturday	85.3%	68.9%	78.6%	70.2%	70.6%	75.5%
Work on Sunday	82.0%	67.2%	78.9%	66.3%	67.9%	71.6%
Evening shift	54.4%	46.2%	58.2%	46.6%	54.0%	48.8%
Night shift	32.7%	16.6%	27.3%	21.0%	32.5%	24.6%
Second job	2.1%	2.1%	0.7%	5.3%	0.6%	4.0%
Looking for other job	7.8%	9.7%	2.9%	9.1%	3.2%	4.8%

Source: EPA microdata.

We find opposing trends with respect to part-time work, with a greater presence of part-timers in private providers. However, the growing trend of part-time work before the pandemic was contained during 2020 (Table 5), presumably due to the composition effect derived from the increased hiring of full-time temporary workers during the health crisis. In any case, the low percentage of part-timers in the public sector stands out, although its evolution is irregular: a notable increase in the period of economic recovery (2018) and then a larger decline during the COVID-19 crisis (Table 5). Most part-timers tend to cite the impossibility of finding a full-time job as a reason for their part-time employment. This contrasts with other activities such as hospitals, in which childcare responsibilities tend to appear more often as a cause. If we pay attention to the usual number of hours worked per week (Table 6), we will see a higher degree of part-timers in home-help services (40%) and the private sector (as aforementioned), with an important disparity between public (14.5%) and private sector (42%). Moreover, private home-help service registers higher rates of marginal part-time (3.9%).

Table 6. Proportion of usual hours of work per week in LTC services (2020)

		Residential care	Home-help service	National average
Public sector	Less than 20 hours	2.00%	0%	2.2%
	20 - 34 hours	3.80%	14.50%	6.9%
	35 - 40 hours	91.70%	71.90%	85.0%
	More than 40 hours	2.50%	13.60%	5.9%
Private sector	Less than 20 hours	1.50%	3.90%	4.9%
	20 - 34 hours	15.30%	38.40%	14.3%
	35 - 40 hours	77.90%	48.70%	71.6%
	More than 40 hours	5.30%	9.00%	9.2%
Total	Less than 20 hours	1.60%	3.60%	4.3%
	20 - 34 hours	13.10%	36.40%	12.8%
	35 - 40 hours	80.60%	50.70%	74.4%
	More than 40 hours	4.80%	9.40%	8.5%

Source: EPA microdata (2020).

The 24/7 necessities of nursing home users explain the high participation of residential care workers in shift systems. with regular working hours in the evenings, nights, and weekends, especially for public employees (Table 5). However, the lower percentage of this type of working hours in private companies may show a lower coverage of care for elderly and dependent users on those times which, in terms of regulations, entail a higher labour cost for employers. On the other hand, private sector employees have tended to resort to second jobs as an additional source of income in recent years, undoubtedly associated with higher levels of part-time work in private companies. Precisely, there is also a higher percentage of employees in private providers looking for a new job, with the aim of working longer hours and improving working conditions (EPA microdata).

This is related to the poor occupational health conditions in the sector. According to the Spanish Strategy of Health and Safety at Work for the period 2015-2020 (INSHT, 2015). residential care was one of the four activities with the highest incidence of occupational accidents with sick leave (together with Food, Construction and Metal manufacturing), always considering those activities with the highest number of workers. Mutual insurance companies generally do not consider these absences as occupational accidents but as common absences, reducing the salary to be received. However, Irene Álvarez (CCOO union representative in the sector and expert in Health and Safety) denounces that sick leave is usually caused by a lack of mechanical means and prevention measures. In

addition, workers on sick leave spend their money on physiotherapy rehabilitation sessions to deal with musculoskeletal injuries resulting from their work activity. In addition, even before the pandemic, an increase in psychosocial risks due to the high emotional demands of the activity was detected. This leads to an increase in the regular use of drugs and psycho-pharmaceuticals (analgesics, anti-inflammatory drugs, and opiates) among nursing home and home care workers. In the context of COVID-19, one of the main problems in terms of occupational health was the lack of PPE. According to CCOO. employers in the sector have always refused to acknowledge the existence of biohazards in nursing homes. In that regard, Marina del Corral (General Manager of the EO CEAPs) asses that COVID-19 should not be consider an occupational hazard (as some unions have demanded) but a pandemic affecting every social interaction. Yet, the CEAPs representative consider clear the requirement to establish protocols and contingency plans to prevent and manage at company level this and other infectious diseases.

2. Employment relations in the ECEC and LTC services in Spain

Employment relations in ECEC

The structure of employment relations and mechanisms of coordination among actors is similar in public and private sector of ECEC, but with some differences in the mechanisms of labour regulation. In both public and private, there are a first centralized level of definition and negotiation of working conditions: in public sector, the general negotiating tables of the public authorities, and in private sector, the bargaining commissions of the main collective agreements. From here, we find differences.

Employment relations in public ECEC

As we pointed in the WP1 report, in public sector there is no regulation at national level on the 0-2 level. In 3-5 level, the current national educational law (LOM-LOE) is the general framework. The RD 1630/2006 includes the regulation of the minimum curricula for all the country. Then there are different regional educational and public employee laws that define working conditions. In public sector the structure of the employment relations is very hierarchical with a combination among centralized and decentralized level of definition and bargaining of working conditions (García Blasco, 2019). This double level of employment relations is characterized by the logic of national and regional level in Spain, due to the transferred competences in education to Spanish Autonomous Communities.

The Law on the Basic Statute of the Public Employee is the main regulation instrument of working conditions of public workers in ECEC sector. It defines the general framework of working conditions. After this, each Autonomous Community defines specific working conditions (wages complements, specific leaves, etc.) through regional laws according to regional trade unions in the corresponding bargaining tables (for civil servants) and in the corresponding collective agreements for employees (non-civil servants) in public education.

All the workers within public centres (pre-primary, primary and secondary schools) are cover by these regional agreements. There are few differences among civil servants and employees (temporary workers, interims) in wages, work leaves, etc. In the last decade, some improvements have equalized other working conditions among them. The working conditions of public workers are better than those of private workers (wages, workdays, work leaves, vacations, etc.).

In public sector, at national and regional level, there are different bargaining tables. As a general framework there is the General bargaining table of the public authorities. This body deals with common issues affecting all the

employees of public authorities, especially regulation issues susceptible to be regulated at State level (e.g., the increase of wages of public staff). These common issues are linked with the Law on the Basic Statute of the Public Employee, and they are related to civil servants and non-civil servants. The general table is composed by present representatives of all the public authorities, the most representative unions at state level, the most representative unions in each autonomous community and the unions that have obtained 10% or more of the representatives in union elections. There is also a Joint Commission that monitor the agreements approved in the meeting of these tables.

Then, the sector of non-university education has its own general bargaining table, at national and regional level (for each Autonomous Community). At national level there is the National table for teaching staff of non-university educational institutions chaired by the Ministry of Education and composed by the main unions in public education: cross-sectoral unions (CCOO, UGT), sectoral or professional unions (ANPE, CSIF,). In this table main social partners negotiate working conditions for civil servants. These working conditions are incorporated in the regional tables for each Autonomous Community for discussion them.

At regional level there is the Bargaining tables for teaching staff of non-university educational institutions (civil servants) and the Works Council of employees in public education (non-civil servants) of each autonomous community, chaired by the regional Education Authority and constituted by the main unions in each region. In these regional tables, beyond the general working conditions negotiated in the bargaining tables at national level, specific working conditions are negotiated, as complements in wages or specifics leaves, etc.

Employment relations in private ECEC

In the private sector, there are three national collective agreements according to the three types of services provided in ECEC sector. These three collective agreements are the XII National Collective Agreement of Childcare and Education Centres for non-integrated centres (only for pre-primary level); the X National Collective Agreement of Private Education and the VI National Collective Agreement of State-funded Centres for integrated centres (both of them for pre-primary, primary and secondary levels). These three collective agreements are applicable throughout Spain. In the case of the VI National Collective Agreement of State-funded Centres, some Autonomous Communities have their own regional collective agreements (e.g., the case of XI Regional Collective Agreement of State-funded Centres in Catalonia).

<u>The XII National Collective Agreement of Childcare and Education Centres</u>

Valid until December 31, 2021. Currently denounced and in process of negotiation of the XIII National Collective Agreement. It covers the workers within non-integrated private centres for early childhood care and education, authorized and registered by the competent autonomous administration. Non-integrated centres are understood to be those that exclusively provide early childhood education.

<u>X National Collective Agreement of Private Education</u>

Valid until December 31, 2020. Automatically extended, but currently in process of negotiation of the XI NCA. In this collective agreement are included all the private education centres of regulated education without any level funded with public funds. These centres include any of the following educational levels: early childhood education (integrated), primary education, compulsory secondary education, baccalaureate (non-compulsory secondary education) and vocational training education. An integrated educational centre is understood to be one in which more than one educational level is included. The companies that include the first level and/or second level of early childhood education, in order to be affected by this agreement, must be part of an integrated educational centre

that include, in addition to 0-2 and/or 3-5 level, one of the levels listed above (usually, primary and secondary levels).

VII National Collective Agreement of State-funded Centres

Recently approved. Valid until December 31, 2024. In this collective agreement are included all the private centres of non-university education, integrated or non-integrated centres, which at least include an educational level supported totally or partially with public funds, and which are authorized by the competent educational Administration by reason of their territorial location. These educational centres include any of the following educational levels: early childhood education (integrated), primary education, compulsory secondary education, baccalaureate (non-compulsory secondary education), vocational training education, and other educational activities (special education, adult education, residential centres for students). The companies that include the first level and/or second level of early childhood education, in order to be affected by this agreement, must be part of an integrated educational centre that include, in addition to ECEC level, one of the levels listed above (usually, primary and secondary levels).

It is important to note that although the scope of this agreement is national, in those Autonomous Communities with educational competences transferred, others collective agreements may be negotiated for their application in their territorial scope. If, during the period of the national collective agreement, other regional agreements are reached between the most representative social partners and the corresponding regional educational authority, or changes are made in the legislation, the signing actors may meet to adapt the agreement to the new situation.

Coordination mechanisms in private ECEC

The coordination and bargaining mechanisms are based on the existing collective agreements in private ECEC. For non-integrated centres, there is the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres; and for integrated centres, there are the X NCA of Private Education and the VII NCA of State-funded Centres (in some Spanish regions there are also corresponding regional collective agreements). These collective agreements are negotiated at national level. In some specific cases there are company-based collective agreements and regional collective agreements. Working conditions are discussed and negotiated among the social partners with the minimal level of representativeness required. The agreements signed are extended for all workers that work in the educational centres involved in these collective agreements. For each collective agreement, there are two bargaining and supervision commissions with the social partners that sign the correspondent collective agreements or social partners with the minimal union representativeness (more detail in the section 2.1).

In private sector the formal mechanisms of coordination among actors are basically two: the Joint Commissions and the Bargaining Commissions. These two mechanisms are bipartite bodies with a national scope. The first ones are technical bodies, composed by the social partners that are signatories of the corresponding collective agreement. Their general functions are the interpretation of the text of the collective agreement (articles and clauses), the mediation in labour conflicts, and the monitoring of the corresponding collective agreement. Ordinary meetings are quarterly. Extraordinary meetings can also be held at the request of its members. Joint Commission also have the function of communicate the mistakes identified in the text of collective agreements to the corresponding Bargaining Commission.

The second mechanism of coordination is the different Bargaining Commissions linked to each of the three main collective agreements. In this case the social partners involved are those with the minimal representativeness required. Here we can find some unions and employers organizations that have not signed the collective agreements and are not in the corresponding Joint Commission. The functions of this body are to discuss, negotiate

and review wages tables, identify changes in the legislation during the term of the collective agreement and that should be included, identify possible improvements of the agreement. It is also the body in charge of bargaining the following collective agreement.

Coverage level and renewals of collective agreements

The three collective agreements cover all the employees who provide their services in the centres outlined in each collective agreement (ECEC private non-integrated centres, ECEC private integrated centres and ECEC private integrated and State-funded centres).

Table 7. Professional groups of workers by national collective agreements in ECEC sector

XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres	X NCA of Private Education	VII NCA of State-funded Centres
Group I. Classroom Staff (only ECEC): Teacher, early childhood educator, support assistant **Group II. Complementary services staff:** Specialized employees: speech therapist, psychologist, nurse, doctor, pedagogue, social worker, ... **Group III. Administration and services staff:** administrative staff, kitchen staff, cleaners, maintenance staff **Management Staff**	**Group I. Teaching staff (only ECEC):** Teacher, early childhood educator, instructor **Group II. Complementary services staff:** Subgroup a (specialized employees): speech therapist, psychologist, nurse, doctor, pedagogue, social worker, ... Subgroup b: extracurricular activities monitor, educator vigilant **Group III. Administration staff** **Group IV. General services staff:** kitchen staff, concierge, maintenance staff, etc. **Management Staff**	**Group I. Teaching staff (only ECEC):** Teacher, early childhood educator **Group II. Administration staff** **Group III. General services staff:** kitchen staff, cleaners, maintenance staff, concierge **Group IV. Complementary services staff:** Specialized or advisory functions on students or company **Management Staff**

Source: National collective agreements register, Ministry of Work and Social Economy.

The three collective agreements in the private sector are automatically renewed once the expiration date of each of them arrives unless social partners previously denounce the agreement. This complaint must be made two months before the end of its validity period or its extensions. The non-complained agreements will be extended from year to year.

The three collective agreements have similar classification of occupations or professional groups (Table 7). In the specific case of ECEC level, there are three figures: teachers, early childhood educators and support assistant (or similar). The qualifications and wages level of these figures are different. Teaches are university graduated (ISCED 6) and early childhood educators are VET graduated (ISCED 5). Support assistants need a lower qualification of ISCED 3. The level of wages is in relation to their level of qualification and responsibility in the classroom. For more detail about the use and wages of these three figures please read the section 1.3.

Below we highlight the main characteristics of the three collective agreements in ECEC sector, attending the level of territorial scope, the type of centres involved in each collective agreement, the level of coverage and the dynamics of renewals (Table 8).

Table 8. Summary of the main private collective agreements in ECEC sector

	XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres	**X NCA of Private Education**	**VII NCA of State-funded Centres**
Territorial scope	National scope	National scope	National scope Regional scope in the case of corresponding regional CA
Functional scope	Non-integrated centres on ECEC sector (0-2 and 3-5 levels)	Integrated centres (ECEC, primary, compulsory and non-compulsory education, VET)	State-funded integrated centres (ECEC, primary, compulsory and non-compulsory education, VET)
Coverage	All the employees working in the centres (teaching staff, administration and services staff, specialized services staff, management staff)		
Renewals	Automatically year-renewal after the expiration of the CA		

Source: National collective agreements register, Ministry of Work and Social Economy.

Social dialogue bodies in ECEC

The first social dialogue body is the State School Council (*Consejo Escolar de Estado*). It is a national institution for the participation of the sectors most directly related to education. The Council also carries out consultative, advisory and proposal work to the Government in relation to the different issues of the educational system. The Council proposes the draft regulations on educational matters, which then can be approved by the Spanish Parliament, the Government or by the Ministry of Education. In addition, it approves the Annual report on the educational system (*Informe sobre el estado del sistema educativo*), which includes the proposals for improving education that achieve the support of its members. The Council includes until 107 members among social partners, family's associations, students' associations, other entities, and renowned personalities in education. Social partners included are the following: on the union side, CCOO (FE-CCOO), UGT (FeSP-UGT), CSIF, ANPE, FSIE, STES-Intersindical, FE-USO, CIG and ELA; on the employer side, ACADE, CECE, EyG, FERE-CECA, CEOE and CEPYME.

Other social dialogue body can be the Sectoral Committee for Education (*Conferencia Sectorial de Educación*). It is the body for cooperation among the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities in non-university education. It is considered an instrument of the Spanish educational system and is one of the sectoral committees provided in the basic legislation of the public administrations. It is a periodic meeting where the Spanish Ministry of Education and the corresponding Regional Education Departments of Autonomous Communities discuss about different issues and establish agreements in education. Social partners do not have the capacity to participate in it, but they can have influence in some issues to discuss.

Employment relations in LTC

The national bargaining process of the long-term care services is the most important of the sector. Its last agreement was reached in 2018 and its coverage period is currently extended. Although CC.OO. is the largest union in the sector, they share equal representativeness with UGT in the union side of the negotiation table (50%-50%). As afore mentioned, largest unions use to invite ELA and CIG to take part of the negotiation table as a recognition of their representativeness at regional level, although only CIG use to sporadically participate. The real representativeness of the employer side is difficult to measure because most of EOs are reluctant to share their real figures on number of firms and employees of their members. In that regard, bargaining processes required previous consensus between employers. Before, that was quite easy due to positive relations between FED, AESTE and ASADE. However, the irruption of CEAPs has put a strain on the employer table, because older EOs does not recognize the representativeness of the new one. This is blocking negotiations with unions and extending the application of the 2018 collective bargaining, because traditional EOs prefer this impassable situation rather than to professionalize the sector. Although its activity is blocked, the negotiating table for the new agreement is made up of two members from LARES, five from CEAPs and eight, jointly, from AESTE, FED and ASADE, on the business side. And seven members from CCOO, seven from UGT, and one from GIG on the trade union side.

Table 9. Main collective agreements and actors in the long-term care sector

	Residential care	**Home-help service**
National	One collective agreement covering both activities at national level: VII CA on care services for dependent persons and development of the promotion of personal autonomy (2015-2018 (extended)).	
Regional	3 CAs (Catalonia, Navarra and Aragon)	3 CAs (Catalonia, Madrid, and Castilla-Leon)
	1 CA (Region of Valencia)	
Province	2 CAs (Zaragoza and Alava)	
	3 CAs (Palencia, Guipuzkoa and Vizcaya)	
Company	26 company level agreements (only one covering workers at national level)	29 company level agreements (only one covering workers at national level)

Source: Collective agreements register and deposit (Ministry of Work and Social Economy, 2022).

However, there is also disagreements in the union side. Differing negotiation priorities and strategies give rise to tensions within the workers' representation, as illustrated by the fact that only the union with the largest representativeness (CC.OO.) has signed all agreements, while the UGT was absent from the third, the fifth and the seventh collective agreements (Sánchez et al., 2021). The reason behind of UGT not signing the last collective agreement (2018) due to disputes on the range of functions of eldercare providers category ("gerocultor" in the original Spanish). UGT considers that the agreement permits assigning heterogeneous tasks to this professional category (e.g., cleaning activities) On the contrary, CC.OO. assumes that this multiple-tasks regulation of eldercare providers category is the only option to cover users' needs before labour shortages and the lack of appropriate professional skills certification regulatory frameworks. Moreover, both CC.OO. and the employer side considers this is one of the reasons why the current collective bargaining process of the sector at national level is blocked. Besides the sectoral bargaining process at national level, there are other regional and provincial agreements (Table

9). That is the case of the regional agreement on nursing homes, which has appeared in the context of the national agreement blocking. The main Catalan EO (regional member of CEAPs) has promoted this negotiation process together with CCOO and UGT unions with a special focus to promote professionalization in the sector.

3. The actors of the employment relations in the ECEC and LTC services in Spain

3.1 Presentation of the main actors. characteristics. relevance in the employment relations system, power

Actors in ECEC

In the ECEC sector, we find some differences about the main actors involved in it. The main differences are in relation to the public and private dimension of the ECEC. In addition, there are differences among levels, especially in relation to the social partners linked to the main collective agreements involved in the private sector of ECEC. In the public sector (non-university education, including pre-primary, primary and secondary education) the social partners are distributed among unions and public authorities (Table 10). On the union side, we can find cross-sectoral unions and professional unions, and also regional unions with an important weight in national and regional collective bargaining. The main unions are CCOO (FE-CCOO) and UGT (FeSP-UGT), following by ANPE, USO and CSIF. There is also CIG that is a regional union (from Galicia) with more than 15% of union representation, which allows it to be at the national education sector table. In some Autonomous Communities, there are also regional unions with a relevant weight, thus being in the corresponding regional education sector tables of their regions. This is the case of USTEC in Catalonia or ELA in the Basque Country. The cross-sectoral unions are CCOO, UGT and USO. These unions are present in the ECEC sector (both public and private) through their corresponding union sectoral federation: FE-CCOO (CCOO Teaching Federation) and FeSP-UGT (UGT Service Employees Federation). There also are CIG (Galician Intersindical Confederation) and ELA (Solidarity of Basque Workers) that are regional cross-sectoral unions. The professional unions are ANPE, CSIF and USTEC. ANPE (National Association of Teaching Professionals) is a union only for teachers. CSIF (Independent Trade Union Centre and Civil Servants) is a union of workers of public administration. USTEC (Union of Education Workers of Catalonia) is regional cross-sectoral union, but with a specific sectoral federation of education workers (USTEC-STEs). On the employer side in the public sector, there are the public authorities. On the national level, there is the Spanish Ministry of Education. On the regional level, there are the different regional educational departments of each Autonomous Communities.

Table 10. Main social partners in public ECEC sector

Union side	Employer side
National and regional level: CCOO (FE-CCOO), UGT (FeSP-UGT), ANPE, USO, CSIF, STE, CIG, ELA	National level: Spanish Ministry of Education
Only regional level: USTEC, etc.	Regional level Educational Departments of Autonomous Communities

In the private sector, the main unions are CCOO (FE-COO), USO, UGT (FeSP-UGT) and FSIE (Federation of Independent Teaching Unions) (Table 11). This last union is present in the integrated private education, and it is

the main union in State-funded education. On the employer side, the main organizations are CECE, ACADE and EyG. CECE (Spanish Confederation of Teaching Centres) is an employer organization of private and State-funded centres. It includes also religious and non-religious centres in their partners. CECE is member of CEOE (Cross-sectoral employer organization for large companies) and CEPYME (Cross-sectoral employer organization for SMEs). ACADE (Association of Autonomous Private Education Centres) includes only private centres among its partners, and it is member of CEOE. EyG (Education and Management) is the employer organization of the Spanish catholic education centres. It includes private centres but overall State-funded centres. EyG is present in all the Autonomous Communities except in Catalonia, whose role is developed by APSEC.

Table 11. Social partners signing the main national collective agreements

	Unions	**Employers**
XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres[1]	FeSP-UGT, FSIE, USO	ACADE, CECE, CECEI, EyG, FCIC
X NCA of Private Education[1]	FSIE, FeSP-UGT, USO	ACADE, CECE
VII NCA of State-funded Centres	FSIE, FE-USO, FeSP-UGT, FE-CCOO	EyG, CECE, FED-ACES, APSEC

[1] FE-CCOO is not present in the signature of these collective agreements due to it denounced them.

CECE sign the three main collective agreements in private ECEC (XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres, X NCA of Private Education and VII NCA of State-funded Centres). ACADE sign the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres and the X NCA of Private Education. EyG sign XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres and the VII NCA of State-funded Centres. CECE and ACADE are the main actors in the X NCA of Private Education. In the VII NCA of State-funded Centres the main employer organization is EyG. In the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres there are more actors on the employer side (until six employer organizations) and their weight is more distributed among them, although we can identify ACADE as the main employer organization in this collective agreement.

Table 12. Social partners involved in bargaining mechanisms (private ECEC)

		XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres	**X NCA of Private Education**	**VII NCA of State-funded Centres**
Joint Commission	**Employers**	ACADE, CECE, CECEI, EyG, FCIC	ACADE, CECE	EyG (70%), CECE, UECOE, APSEC
	Unions	FeSP-UGT, FSIE, USO	FeSP-UGT, FSIE, USO	FeSP-UGT, FSIE, USO
Bargaining Commission	**Employers**	ACADE, CECE, CECEI, EyG, FCIC, SALVEM 0-3	ACADE, CECE	EyG (70%), CECE, UECOE, APSEC
	Unions	FeSP-UGT, FE-CCOO, FSIE, USO, CIG	FeSP-UGT, FE-CCOO, FSIE, USO, CIG	FeSP-UGT, FE-CCOO, FSIE, USO, CIG

There are also other employer organizations with less bargaining weight in the different collective agreements. They are FCIC (Early Childhood Education Centres of Catalonia), FED-ACES (Federation of Social Economy Teaching Centres), UECOE (Spanish Union of Teaching Cooperatives), APSEC (Professional Association of Educational Services of Catalonia) and SALVEM 0-3 (Association of early childhood education centres of the Valencian Community). As aforementioned, the actors that sign the collective agreements in private ECEC are included in the corresponding Joint commission. Beyond these bargaining bodies, we can find other actors involved in the Bargaining tables of the three main collective agreements (Table 12).

Actors in LTC

The industrial relations system of the long-term care sector shows substantial differences at regional level. although there are important common patterns about its actors. structure. and agreements. For the union side. its main actors are the following:

- Working Committees (CC.OO.). The largest union in the sector, organizing the representation of the long-term care workers through two different sectoral federations at national level: the health and social care federation (having a specific unit for Dependency organizing residential care workers) and the Citizens services federations (with a unit dedicated to local public entities organizing domiciliary care workers).
- General Union of Workers (UGT). The second largest union in the sector organize workers through its public services federation, counting with a unit dedicated to Health, social and dependency services.
- Galician Interunion Confederation (CIG) is one of the largest unions in the sector in the region of Galice. It organises LTC workers through its public administration federation and also through its health federation. The union does not sign national agreements, although they are generally invited to the bargaining process, and they even participated in some of the negotiation tables.
- Basque Workers Solidarity (ELA). It is the largest union in the Basque Country, also in the care sector. The union organises care workers through its public services federation (Gizalan). The union does not sign national agreements, although they are generally invited to the bargaining process.
- General Confederation of Workers (CGT). It is a marginal union of anarchist ideology present in many sectors. This union represents workers in LTC activities mostly at local level in professional home-help service.

The weak position of LTC workers in the LM is generally reflected in main trade unions. Even so, there are some professional strategies such as the association of family workers that arises to face the low recognition of the profession at social and union level (Torns et al., 2014). In the case of the employer side, the main actors are:

- Care Business Circle (CEAPs) is a recent employer organization at national level that was a split of FED. It organizes other sub-sectoral, regional. and local long-term care EOs. CEAPs counts currently with more than the 60% of the representativeness in the activities of the sector (residential care. daycentres. domiciliary care, and tele-care). organizing employers in 14 of the 17 regions of Spain. The organization represent companies having 180,000 employees, 200.000 residential users and 370,000 daycentres and tele-care users. According to CEAPs general manager, the EO was created to prioritise the professionalization of the sector and new strategies to increase the quality of the service (something ignored by previous EOs from their point of view).
- Business Federation of Dependency Assistance (FED) was the most representative EO in the sector until the last sectoral agreement. However, many of their previous members are now affiliated to CEAPs. They also cover most of the activities of the sector, although, according to unions, it is disappearing step by step.

- LARES federation is a EO with a membership composed of regional 17 EOs and 15 residential care providers. Its members are mostly catholic non-profit private entities. Thus, residences managed by the Church or regional EOs organizing them.
- Business Association of Dependency Services (AESTE) is a EO organizing directly private 13 large private companies providing mostly residential services (but also, home-care services) at national level, but also (e.g., Eulen and Ilunion).
- State Association of Domiciliary Care Services Entities (ASADE) is a recently created EO of the private companies providing domiciliary care. Its main member is the Spanish facility management multinational company Clece (one of the largest public procurement providers at national level).
- Catalan Association of Assistance Resources (ACRA) is the current member of CEAPs in Catalonia. organizing private companies and non-profit entities operating in the region. It has reached the first regional agreement of the sector covering all activities, including residential care.

Moreover, there are many flexible strategies of employers. For example, being member of AESTE at national level but affiliating to CEAPs at regional level. LARES is maintaining its representativeness because, although catholic entities are decreasing in the sector, third sector companies are growing in Europe. Thus, LARES tries to position as the reference of the European LTC non-profit entities in Spain. Indeed, the EO has recently joined to the Counselling Body of Dependency, a tripartite body of the Ministry of Social Rights on the long-term care regulation.

3.2 Role played by the actors, organizational dilemmas and strategies

Relationships among social partners and social dialogue in ECEC

In the public sector, relationships are with the central government in the corresponding national tables (sectoral table for teaching staff, national table for public employees) and with the regional governments in each Spanish region. The relationships vary depending on the Autonomous Community. According to the interviews done, no correspondence is observed between the political ideology of the regional government and the type of relationship. Some regions like Madrid are especially troubled. The 2008 crisis and COVID-19 have generated tensions between unions and Regional Authorities, due to cuts in public spending. Regarding social dialogue, some unions point out that with right-wing governments there are usually more direct confrontations, while with left-wing governments there is a danger of paternalism. In any case, at the regional level, this correlation does not always exist. Relations between social partners and regional governments are very uneven and vary in each territory.

In public sector, relations between unions seem fluid between majority unions (CCOO, UGT) and more competitive between majority unions and professional unions (ANPE, CSIF). It is also necessary to differentiate the relations between unions depending on whether we are talking about civil servants or non-civil servants. There are bargaining spaces where all the unions are included. However, there are other bargaining spaces where this is not the case. Therefore, we can find different dynamics and objectives of the unions depending on the professional status of the workers.

In private sector, relations are not always fluid between unions. UGT, USO and FSIE generally accept more agreements than CCOO. CCOO is more belligerent, using judicialization as an instrument of pressure to negotiate. It would also be necessary to add the relations of the unions at the regional level, where different regional unions appear depending on the Autonomous Community. Regarding the relations between social partners, the unions interviewed point out that there are conflictive relations with some employers (ACADE), although they seem fluid with most employers (taking into account the obvious bargaining relationship between both actors). Some unions point to very different relationships between bargaining tables. Relations in the bargaining tables of private education and State-funded education collective agreements are more fluid because there are fewer actors,

especially on the part of employers. Bargaining in State-funded education is especially fluid, due to it is more regulated (public subsidies imply compliance with requirements regulated by public authorities). On the other hand, the bargaining table for XII National collective agreement of Childcare and Education Centres is more conflictive. As there are more actors (up to 11 actors between unions and employers), it is difficult to reach agreements. In this collective agreement, there have been conflicts between the employers themselves when it comes to agreeing on their level of representativeness. It is also the agreement with the worst working conditions and whose last negotiations are especially conflictive in relation to wages and the increase in the national minimum wage.

COVID-19 and relationships among actors

Pandemic has generated tensions between social partners, especially between unions and employers in private sector. In public sector, unions have come together more when it comes to making demands on the central government and regional governments in the corresponding Autonomous Communities.

COVID-19 in Spain with the lockout period and the maintenance of subsequent restrictions has generalized the use of videoconferences as an alternative for communication and negotiation. The extension of the use of videoconferencing has limited the development of informal bargaining actions. Those negotiations carried out by videoconferencing were too rigid according to unions interviewed.

Objectives and strategies of unions in ECEC

There are differences among the aims of unions by sectors (public and private) and levels. These differences are presented below.

Union objectives in public sector

The 2008 economic crisis led to the reduction of scholar places in public ECEC. In some regions such as Madrid there was an increase in places in funded private centres and direct management centres, based on the construction of funded centres and the transfer of public land to these centres. During the pandemic, the Central Government forced all the Autonomous Communities to make adaptations in a very short time, without enough staff and infrastructures. In most Autonomous Communities, the teaching staff increased with temporary reinforcements, although with differences between regions. Even so, unions interviewed consider insufficient these reinforcements. However, infrastructure limitations were more problematic. In general terms, the school centres were the same, so the centres had to adapt their available spaces to the public health requirements approved by the central government and regional governments. In some cases, this led to an increase in the ratio of students per classroom, an increase in teaching hours, etc. All staff reinforcements were temporary workers, so the decrease in restrictions and the positive evolution of the pandemic have led to the non-renewal of most of these workers for the current school year (CCOO, 2020; CEE, 2021).

Unions have as a general objective the commitment to a pure and free public model for the 0-5 level. Thus, they are against the increase in private centres and the outsourcing of the ECEC services. The objective is to "universalize" the 0-2 level, making it equal to the level of compulsory education in Spain (primary and secondary levels). Unions also advocate a reduction in the ratios of pupils per classroom and an increase in the teaching staff and support staff, especially the resources of staff specialized in attending to specific needs. In relation to staff, one of the main objectives of unions is the reduction of temporary workers in public education (CCOO, 2018). In this sense, the current stability agreement between the central government and Spanish unions includes the

reduction of temporary staff from 25% to 8%. It should be noted that in some Autonomous Communities this proportion of temporary staff exceeds 50% of the teaching staff. Unions argue that this high level of temporary employment affects the professional career of workers, but also affects the continuity of the educational project of the centres and the pupils themselves.

Another demand of unions is the increasement of training for all ECEC workers. It is worth highlighting the fewer training resources available at 0-2 level with respect to other educational levels. It is evident that the non-universal character of this level negatively affects this less training. In this sense, one of the main novelties of the current general education law (LOM-LOE) is the assumption of the exclusively educational character of the 0-2 centres (when they previously had an educational but also assistance character) (European Commission, 2020; Vélaz de Medrano, 2020). This will imply that 0-2 centres must present an educational project that must be approved by the corresponding public authorities. The adaptation period for these centres, included in the law, is 8 years.

Another demand of unions is the equalization of working conditions between Autonomous Communities. Even so, in some cases the usefulness of the diversity of conditions by regions is recognized when negotiating better working conditions. In some cases, when better working conditions are identified in a Spanish region (higher salary supplements, better working leaves, better conditions in the workplace, etc.), they are used by the unions at the national level to request the extension of these better working conditions for the rest of the Spanish regions.

In relation to 0-2 and 3-5 levels, some specific differences are observed in the demands of unions. These are summarized below:

- 0-2 level: increase in pure public centres; measures against burn-out; more specialized training for staff; greater professional recognition of the staff.
- 3-5 level: increase public coverage to 100%; more qualified teachers (today 8 teachers for 7 classrooms and 3 teachers are requested for 2 classrooms)

Union strategies in public sector

The strategies used by unions are basically active participation in the bargaining mechanisms with the central government and in the corresponding mechanisms of each Autonomous Community. In this sense, an increase in the frequency of these bargaining tables has been requested, a frequency that has been reduced since the COVID-19.

Media dissemination mechanisms and lobbying actions with some political parties are also used. The mobilization of workers is also used as a measure of pressure against the corresponding public authorities. Finally, some unions more frequently use legal actions against Administrations for non-compliance with current regulations, although this mechanism is more common in the private sector.

Union objectives in private sector

The 2008 economic crisis and the COVID-19 implied a significant economic impact on the private sector of ECEC (CCOO, 2016; Consejo Escolar de Estado, 2021; European Commission, 2021; Giménez Sánchez & Gutiérrez Jugo, 2021). This impact was greater at 0-2 level than at 3-5 level, implying a loss of economic activity and employment. As an example, in 2020 20% of private centres have ceased their economic activity. Among these, the smallest pure private centres are the most affected within the private sector of ECEC. The decrease in these small centres has allowed the increase of school units in large pure private centres and indirect management centres.

In private sector, there are also differences on employment relations between 0-2 level and 3-5 level. 3-5. The later is more regulated, especially the State-funded centres that are regulated by the requirements included in the regional agreements on educational subsidies in each Autonomous Community. It is 0-2 level and in non-integrated centres where more attention is paid by the unions.

In general terms, unions in private sector are committed to an increase in public centres and to the commitment of the educational and non-welfare nature of the 0-2 level. Therefore, a greater universalization of the ECEC is also sought. This would allow greater regulation and improvement of working conditions and educational requirements for the centres. Unions also defend a greater control over the indirect management model (outsourced ECEC services), within the framework of Law 9/2017 on public sector contracts. Within the indirect management model, there is particular attention to "pirate companies" that offer services with lower economic conditions than those included in the XII Collective Agreement of Childcare and Education Centres. These conditions tend to affect the working conditions of workers (lower wages, longer working hours, etc.). These companies are also denounced by companies in the sector for being unfair competition. Another of the main demands of unions at 0-2 level is the improvement of wages, particularly of the early childhood educator profile, with a wage slightly upper than the national minimum wage, despite being a profile with an ISCED 5 qualification. With the latest increases in the national minimum wage in Spain by the PSOE-Podemos coalition government, the increases in the national minimum wage have been used as a pressure mechanism to update and improve wages tables. Beyond these main demands, there are also others to take into account: measures against burn-out; more specialized training for staff; higher professional recognition, lower level of job rotation (less use of temporary contracts, trial contracts, etc.).

Union strategies in private sector

The union strategies are mainly the participation in the different bargaining mechanisms of the collective agreements and the application of the recognised conditions in these agreements. Another strategy is the active surveillance of the agreements of the local administrations with private ECEC providers (indirect management centres), with the aim of identifying and reporting "pirate companies" and other irregular situations.

In the case of small and widely dispersed centres in the territory, the unions also dedicate resources to greater communication and assistance with the workers of them. In this sense, one of the objectives is to increase union membership among private ECEC workers and, particularly, those within the 0-2 level. Campaigns have also been carried out on social networks to get closer to these workers, as well as to recognize their rights and their professional status. In some cases, there have been major mobilizations, such as the strike by child workers after the signing of the XII Collective Agreement of Childcare and Education Centres, which involved a mobilization of 80% of the workers and with a high coverage of media. Finally, some unions have used legal complaints as a pressure mechanism to activate the negotiation of wage increases in the sector.

Employers' objectives and strategies in private sector

By the side of employers, the main objectives are the improvement in public funding to private centres, Particularly, they are interested in the promotion of the "school voucher" to families for 0-2 level that let the families to choose among private centres, or the increase in the maximum price of public funding of free age-2 places in some Spanish regions (e.g. Galicia, etc.). Other demands by the employers' organization are direct financial aids, and tax incentives to fight against the closure of private ECEC centres as a result of the latest crises (2008 economic crisis and COVID-19) (e.g. demand of VAT reduction, etc.). In addition, employers' organizations claim against unfair competition from centres not authorized by the corresponding educational administrations as "mothers during the

day" (*madres de día*) and toy libraries (*ludotecas*). These centres are in the minority, but they can be certain weight in some specific local cases. In relation with the State-funded private centres, their main demand is the maintenance of public subsidies (*conciertos educativos*), especially against the current general education law (LOM-LOE) that stablish more requirements to private centres to obtain these subsidies. Finally, all the employers' organizations demand a greater representation in mechanisms for social dialogue (with Central Government) on Spanish education.

The strategies of employers' organizations to accomplish these objectives are similar to unions in public sector. They are committed to bargaining mechanisms in collective agreements, but especially media dissemination actions, lobbying actions.

Visual map of the actors and relationships among them in ECEC

As we pointed above. there are differences in the level of representativeness of unions and employers among public and private sector. Even these differences are present among private collective agreements. Beyond theses particularities. next visual map shows the main actors in the whole ECEC in Spain.

Union side in the ECEC sector	Employer side in the ECEC sector
FES-CCOO	Public authorities (National, regional and local level)
FeSP-UGT	ACADE
USO	CECE
FSIE (only private)	EyG
ANPE (only public)[1]	APSEC
CSIF (only public)[1]	FCIC
STEs (only public)	SALVEM 0-3
Regional trade unions as CIG. ELA. USTEC. …	Regional employers in some Spanish regions

[1] Unions for only civil servants.

Role played by the actors, organizational dilemmas and strategies in LTC

As aforementioned, both union and employer side are currently facing internal conflicts among actors, although due to different causes. In the employer side, cooperative relations between FED, LARES and AESTE were common, usually maintaining a joint position in negotiations with unions. But the emergence of CEAPs has raised new conflicts as far as older EOs (particularly FED) does not recognize the representativeness of this new organization (that has indeed become the most representative in the sector). This is blocking negotiations for the new national agreement with unions, extending the application of the 2018 collective bargaining. Although according to CEAPs and CCOO representative, traditional EOs prefer this impassable situation rather than to face professionalization challenges in the coming sectoral agreement, it seems clearly that the employer side faces an evident actors' power-based conflict.

On the other hand, differing negotiation priorities and strategies causes disagreements in the union side. In particular, UGT did not sign the last collective agreement (2018) due to differences on the range of tasks of eldercare providers category (*gerocultor* in Spanish). As aforementioned, UGT considers that the agreement opens the door to flexible assignment of tasks to this professional category (e.g., cleaning activities) On the contrary, CC.OO. assumes that this multiple-tasks regulation of eldercare providers category is the only option to cover users' needs before labour shortages and the lack of appropriate professional skills certification regulatory frameworks. Thus, union side conflict is much more substantial than in the employer side. That is, disagreements are focused on actual fields of negotiations rather than clear power-based conflict. Both unions collaborate in other fields of the sector and are maintaining a joint position towards the collective bargaining process of the new agreement at national level. For example, establishing in 2020 a permanent bi-partite table in Castille-Leon region to monitor problems on nursing homes related to quality of service and work issues.

About unions demands and proposals, UGT requests audits to inspect working conditions in the sector. Specifically, the union demands stronger mechanisms to prevent outbreaks during the pandemic and, beyond the pandemic, to carry out more inspections, reinforce health care for the elderly, to increase human resources and the ratios of geriatric care workers in nursing homes (to provide better quality care in nursing homes), and to ensure the right to access to care service for dependent elderly people. Moreover, one of the main demands of the UGT is to correct the "multi-tasking" aspects of geriatric workers in the new collective agreement.

About CCOO demands, the union proposes a better diagnosis of occupational hazards in the sector, both musculoskeletal and psycho-social, so that they can be more easily recognised as occupational accidents. The union also proposes that workers affected by these illnesses should have access to physiotherapy services that each company provides to users. Furthermore, one of CCOO's main demands during the pandemic was the recognition of COVID-19 as an occupational disease, which is why it has held meetings with the Social Security.

Spanish employers' organisations, mainly CEAPs, share the objective of professionalising the sector to improve the quality of work. The employers also complain about the lack of cooperation from the Spanish government in this respect, although a tripartite social dialogue was held to deal with these issues in LTC. The necessary steps that CEAPs has identified for the improvement of employment and services in long-term care are as follows:

First, increase in public funding due before the rise in the number of users. Secondly, subsidisation of places in private nursing homes for those patients on the waiting list who are already recognised as entitled to LTC services, or at least a VAT payment reduction. Furthermore, the financial benefit should not be less than the budget for a public place, which is currently the case. Last, the provision of the exact number of places funded by public budget in private residences to maintain the quality of the service.

Visual map of the actors and relationships among them in LTC

The visual map of actors in the sector shows a greater role of the two main unions, although a bit more relevant role for CCOO as far as they signed the last collective agreement at national level. Moreover, CEAPS is currently the main actor in the employer side, although other EOs are still maintaining certain representativeness.

Union side in the LTC sector	Employer side in the LTC sector
CCOO	CEAPs
UGT	LARES
CIG	AESTE
ELA	ASADE
	FED

Social dialogue in welfare services

Employment relations, labour market and social actors in the care services

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WP3 (Spain): Local case studies

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1. Introduction

The selected cases relate to innovative practices that lead to improvements in the working conditions of the workers involved. According to the results of WP1 and WP2, one of the most problematic aspects of early childhood education and care in Spain was the working conditions of workers in private nurseries covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres. This agreement contains the worst working conditions of all agreements related to ECEC services. One of the most problematic working conditions is the low pay for educators. In addition, and according to the results of WP2, this agreement had the worst industrial relations dynamics, with a high diversity of social partners and conflicting relations between trade unions and employers' associations.

In the case of ECEC services, the same innovative practice was chosen under two different implementation strategies. The chosen practice is the reinsourcing of outsourced nurseries. A practice that implies a change in the management of the service, but also a change in the collective agreement under which the educators are covered. As we shall see, these changes implied a general improvement in the working conditions of the workers involved, particularly in terms of pay. The selected cases are a large city like Barcelona and a small town like Arenys de Munt. The first was a pioneering case in Spain for the recovery of outsourced educational services. The second case shows a strategy to overcome the budgetary limitations of small towns in recovering outsourced services. The choice of these cases allows us to compare different territorial sizes, different types of relationships between local actors (in particular the relationship between workers, trade unions, local associations and the local administration) and different strategies for recovering outsourced services.

In the case of long-term care, cases selection has a dichotomic logic. The first case is focused on an innovative model of home care service promoted by the City council of Barcelona and a cooperative company providing the service. That is, a top-down initiative. Its innovation on organizing work processes implied also a positive impact on working conditions. The second case study is focused on the collective actions of the home care service workers of the Vitoria city council and Alva provincial council. Their demands were aimed at unblocking the provincial collective bargaining process to increase wages. That is, a bottom-up strategy.

3. Case 1 ECEC: Barcelona

2.1. The case study: the context, service governance and the employment relations at local level

As noted in the WP1 report, at the 0-2 level, both the content and the minimum requirements of centres are regulated by the Autonomous Communities (Vélaz de Medrano, 2020). In the case of Catalonia, nurseries are regulated by DECREE 101/2010 of 3 August on the organisation of the teaching of the first cycle of early childhood education. This regulatory framework defines the minimum content of the curriculum. The decree grants ECEC centres autonomy in aspects such as the organisation of timetables, premises, etc. The working conditions of the staff employed in these centres are regulated by different collective agreements depending on the type of centre. Private centres (without state funding) are regulated by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres. State-funded centres are regulated by the VII NCA of State-funded Centres XI. In Catalonia, these centres are also regulated by the XI Regional Collective Agreement of State-funded Centres. Public ECECs are regulated by the respective collective agreements for public employees. In the case of Barcelona, ECEC workers are covered by the Collective Agreement for Public Employees of the City of Barcelona.

The relationship between the national and local levels of employment relations is articulated through collective agreements. The existence of these national agreements is the reference for the social partners to negotiate working

conditions. There is no trade union representation at local level. Trade unions are represented at the regional level: 1) in autonomous communities with regional collective agreements, in some cases; and 2) in *comarcas* (intermediate level between autonomous communities and municipalities), where there is trade union representation. At the local level, there are unions in companies and public organisations as part of the works council. In some local cases there may be specific employers' associations.

The outsourced centres selected for this case were covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres. According to Médir (2019), in a sample of 212 municipalities, 41.51% have an outsourced early childhood centre, a figure that is consistent with the data collected by Vélaz de Medrano (2020) and by CEE (2020) for the 2018-2019 school year in Catalonia (see the WP1 report for more details).

The selected case, Barcelona, has a population of 1,636,193 inhabitants. It has a network of 103 public nursery schools, with a coverage lower than that of other cities with smaller populations. All these schools are managed by the *Institut Municipal d'Educació de Barcelona* (Barcelona Municipal Institute of Education) (hereafter IMEB).

In Barcelona, there are no mechanisms or institutions that allow for the participation of the social partners beyond the works council of the Barcelona City Council. In Barcelona, the social partners appear to be linked to the works council of the City Council, in this case the IMEB.

At the pre-primary level, each school has a School Council (*Consell Escolar*). They are the mechanism for the participation of the school community in the governance of the centre. All the groups involved in the educational community are represented in the school council: the headteacher, the city council, teachers, family associations, administrative and service staff.

In public schools, the main function of the School Council is to participate in the decision-making process on matters of importance for the functioning and organisation of the school: the educational project, general planning, financial management, etc. In state-funded private schools, the school council discusses, evaluates, analyses and takes decisions on matters proposed by the headmaster. The members of the School Council are elected for a term of four years, half of which are renewed every two years.

In the case of Barcelona, there is also the *Consell Educatiu Municipal de Barcelona* (CEMB). The existence of this body is not common. It is a municipal advisory body to the Barcelona City Council and the IMEB. It acts as a municipal school board. It has consultative, advisory and information functions. It is chaired by the mayor of the city and is made up of members of the city council, directors of public and state-funded private schools, teachers of public and state-funded private schools, pupils of public and private schools, family associations, administrative and service staff, local associations, trade unions, etc.

2.2. The case study: the issue. Description aimed at illustrating why the case is an example of an issue, previously identified at national level

The selected case is the recovery of the service of three outsourced nursery schools (0-2) in Barcelona. The centres Caspolino (87 pupils), Enxaneta (140 pupils) and Els Patufets de Navas (87 pupils) were the only early childhood centres still managed by external companies. These are indirect managed centres (see the WP1 report for more details), where the infrastructure is public but the management of the service is private, according to a service contract between the city council and the provider company. Workers in these centres are covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres, which is the collective agreement with the worst working conditions. These include low pay and long daily and annual working hours.

> *With regard to the nurseries in Barcelona, there were different conditions in the indirectly managed nurseries. We had the state agreement for private nurseries. The salary was different. The working conditions were different. It was very, very blatant. There was a big difference in working conditions. (Interview 2)*

> *What we kept demanding was pay and working hours. (Interview 1)*

> *We had worked for eleven years and earned a salary of around 900. That is what you earn in the private sector, which is very little, and with much more precarious working conditions [than in the public sector]. We only had one month's holiday, we started on 1 September and finished on 31 July. (Interview 3)*

> *I did nine to five with half an hour for lunch. There was half an hour for lunch and that was it. The thing is, we only had August as a holiday. (Interview 3)*

> *Many days we took turns putting the children to bed. We didn't have time and the meetings started at five. Of course, to hold meetings from five to seven o'clock, to get paid around nine hundred, to get home at nine o'clock in the evening, when you left home at seven in the morning. (Interview 1)*

From the exploratory phase, the unions contacted highlighted the case of Barcelona as a pioneering case in Spain. It was the first municipality to recover the outsourced early childhood education service, setting a precedent for a strategy that has been extended, with varying degrees of success, to other municipalities in Spain.

The selected case is a strategy of drastic improvement in working conditions, based on the recovery of the service and the workers involved, who went from being covered by the agreement with the worst working conditions (the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres) to being covered by the Collective Agreement for Public Employees of the City of Barcelona (as civil servants). This change meant, among other things, improvements in pay, better daily and annual working hours, more holidays, better leaves, and greater contractual security. The coverage and quality of the service do not seem to have changed significantly, according to the interviews conducted.

> *And there was a lot of difference in terms of labour and economic aspects, from indirect to direct management, but a lot. I can tell you that the educators suddenly increased their salaries by 105%. This means that before they were paid 105% less for the same work. (Interview 2)*

The recovery of the outsourced services of the three ECEC centres took place during the left-wing *En Comú-Podem* government, led by Ada Colau, whose term of office began in 2015. Prior to this government, the right-wing *Convergència i Unió (CiU)* government of Xavier Trias had, since 2011, implemented a model of privatisation of services and deterioration of the working conditions of ECEC workers (increase in the teacher-pupil ratio, outsourced schools, loss of educational support staff, increase in transfers to private schools, etc.).

> *It was a way to save money, to save management costs. (Interview 3)*

> *So we worked longer hours, we worked more days and we were paid less than the direct management [public ECEC centres]. The aim was to save money. To give more for less: more hours, more timetable, for less money. (Interview 2)*

> *Trias was a person who wanted to privatise absolutely everything to do with education, early childhood and the whole social world (social services, social educators, etc.). He wanted to do it through management companies simply for economic and management reasons. (Interview 4)*

During the term of this right-wing government, there have been mobilisations and platforms in defence of public early childhood education. In 2012, the 0-3 Catalunya platform was created, which includes family associations, trade unions and political parties from all over Catalonia (Blasco, 2017). At the same time, the *Escoles Bressol Indignades* platform (Outraged nurseries) was created, made up of workers from the city's nurseries. They joined forces with family associations, trade unions and political parties to form the Barcelona 0-3 Platform.

> *When Convergència [CiU political party] decided to outsource, relations with the unions deteriorated. I think we had 14 strikes in three years. The government did four things: they outsourced the new schools, they decided to increase public prices, they increased the ratios and they decided to reduce the auxiliar staff [the extra educational support that schools have]. All this was forced by the economic crisis and by the ideology they had, which was what it was. (Interview 5)*

The new government of Ada Colau, on the other hand, was committed to a model of defending public services. One of the objectives of its electoral programme was to bring back outsourced services. This objective was defended by unions in Catalonia.

> *Then Ada Colau arrived and said no, that things should be public. (Interview 4)*

> *The ideology of the Comuns [En Comú-Podem political party] had nothing to do with that of Trias. They wanted to internalise the service. (Interview 3)*

> *The reinsourcing, the reduction of ratios, the increase in the number of auxiliar staff and the freezing of public prices, that is to say the other side of the coin, was in the electoral programme of the Comuns [En Comú-Podem political party], which was written by a former trade unionist. (Interview 5)*

This created a favourable context for the recovery of the three outsourced ECEC centres, which led to a significant improvement in the working conditions of the workers involved.

2.3. The process

At the end of the 2015-2016 school year, the service contracts with the two service providers expired. The City Council, which was governed by the *En Comú-Podem*, then decided to bring back the outsourced services of these three ECEC centres. At the beginning of the school year, the City Council, in a situation of subrogation, incorporated the workers of the three centres, which became fully public. This situation of subrogation made it possible to keep the same workers (31 educators) from the three centres with the same working conditions as before. The terms of the subrogation were negotiated between the City Council and the main unions, UGT and CCOO, and initially improved some working conditions.

> *I don't know exactly who started the movement, but from the beginning there were people who said that [the ECEC centre] would go public. It was when the trade unions came and said that it would be made public. (Interview 1)*

> *And we started to be subrogated by the city council with the new timetable in September, but we didn't get the same salary until April. (Interview 1)*

> *It was at the beginning of the school year. At the beginning they were subrogated with the same economic conditions, with a much lower salary than the public municipal educators. (Interview 5)*

> *There were several tables where different issues were negotiated. At these tables were the IMEB with its lawyers and the trade unions. The last thing they discussed was salaries. (Interview 3)*

In February of the same school year, the city council reached an agreement with the unions to improve certain economic conditions for educators (who were already public sector employees) that had not been improved. The main point of negotiation was to bring educators' salaries in line with those in the public sector.

> *This lasted from September to February. In February an agreement was reached with the trade unions. They also defended the equalisation of wages, which was achieved after a few months. It went quite quickly. And from then on the educators got an open-ended contract. (Interview 5)*

The workers with open-ended contracts continued to work until the posts they occupied were put out to public tender (as required by public administration regulations). Thus, the educators had to go through a selection process and access the public offer like any worker that want to become civil servant. This process of becoming civil servants led to some conflicts between the unions. On the one hand, some unions felt that these workers had more advantages than the rest of the interim staff who had previously been in the public education employment pool. On the other hand, other unions supported the workers in the process of change.

> *I remember the [Union Name] coming in, but in a slightly more hostile way. They were defending the position of the other workers in the council's public education employment pool. They said that if these schools became public schools, we should not continue because we had not been part of the public employment pool process. (Interview 4)*

The transformation of these educators into public employees implies several improvements. Firstly, the main improvement is the salary of the educators, which goes from just over 900 euros to over 2000 euros. Secondly, there is a reduction in the weekly working hours. The support hours are carried out by auxiliary staff subcontracted by a leisure company. The educators have more time at lunchtime for coordination tasks, which reduces the length of the working day in the afternoon for these tasks. Thirdly, there is also a reduction in annual working hours. The centre is open until mid-July, which allows more time to organise the following school year. There is also a later start in September. The educators also have more time off at Christmas. So they have more holidays during the year. Fourthly, educators, as civil servants of the local administration, have more leaves than when they were covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres. Finally, educators benefit from a wider range of training offered by the IMEB.

> *A double pay rise, plus three special payments instead of two. That was quality of life for us. (Interview 1)*
>
> *We used to work 37 and a half hours a week. Now we work 35 hours a week. (Interview 3)*
>
> *We have more training. IMEB does a lot of work on the supply side. (Interview 2)*

2.4. The solution

The selected case is an innovation, mainly because it has not been done before. Barcelona was the first municipality in Spain to implement a strategy for the recovery of outsourced ECEC centres. On the other hand, it was a drastic improvement in the precarious working conditions of the workers covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres, which includes worse working conditions and is the agreement with the most difficulties in collective bargaining. As noted in the WP2 report, at the national level this agreement includes a wide variety of social partners, which makes collective bargaining difficult. Relations are conflictual. In many cases, negotiations have been based on trade union grievances. So this strategy of recovering the outsourced service is a way of

overcoming a stagnant situation in terms of the working conditions of the people involved. It is also a commitment to public services at the local level by recovering the outsourced centres.

2.5. The implementation

It should be noted that, as mentioned above, this is essentially a local government initiative. However, it is also worth highlighting the advisory and guidance role played by some of the trade unions that accompanied the workers through the process. These unions provided information to educators and negotiated agreements with the city council. At the beginning of the process, the City Council reached some agreements with the trade unions: an agreement to equalise economic conditions, an agreement to open an extraordinary registration period for public employees, an agreement to consider the years worked in these private centres as public merits, etc.

> *First, they reviewed working conditions such as working hours and the annual calendar. There were several tables where different issues were discussed with the IMEB, their lawyers and us. The last thing was the salary. (Interview 3)*

According to the interviews, once the process of recovery the outsourced management had begun (and the city council had informed the workers involved), the relationship between the city council and the workers was limited to strictly legal and administrative matters. There was no support from the city council. Therefore, the guidance and advice role of these unions was important for the educators.

> *The city council was willing. But they didn't give us an answer. I remember there were many questions, many emails: what is happening to us? The silence made us doubt. But the clear message they gave was that there would be no outsourced centres. (Interview 4)*

> *I just don't understand the bureaucracy.... When you ask a technician and they tell you: Madam, make an application and they'll tell you because I can't solve it. The rules and the regulations... (Interview 2)*

> *There was a lot of chaos. I think the good thing that a trade union had at that time, which was something very unknown to me, was to bring order, to follow some steps. They told us what was legal and what wasn't. (Interview 4)*

However, as mentioned above, some trade unions opposed the inclusion of these workers as civil servants. These unions felt that many people with more merit in public employment (with better positions in the public education employment pool) would be disadvantaged by this inclusion. These unions argued that once the management of the schools was restored, the workers should end their contracts and join the public employment pool, placing them at the bottom of the pool (as they had no merit for working in public schools). New workers were to be integrated into the three centres that had been recovered from the public employment pool. However, the City Council kept the group of workers in the recovered centres on condition that they had the appropriate training and passed an exam to access public employment. This situation led to tensions and conflicts between the unions and between the public employees and the workers in the reclaimed centres.

> *When they said that the city council would bring back the three schools, they said: "There are three schools and the educators who are interims will keep these places. And what were we supposed to do? Get fired? There were a lot of negative comments against us on social networks: You're going to take our jobs! (Interview 1)*

> *Everything was very much against us and I was passing around Whatsapps and saying: My God, they're going to kill us, they're going to kill us, we're going to lose our jobs! Because everyone was saying we shouldn't be there. I*

> *would even say that [Union Name] lit the fuse a bit, eh? I couldn't tell you exactly what their interest was. I would say it was because they were interested in their membership. (Interview 3)*

> *Subrogation was not free either. I liked that too. We had to take the entrance exam for the education employment pool. (Interview 4)*

But, as noted above, other unions accompanied these workers throughout the process. They gave them advice, guidance and support in dealing with existing conflicts. The workers in these centres felt helpless and uninformed. Most were afraid of the new process.

> *[Union Name] did a very good job of providing information: what happens, what doesn't happen, what your rights are and what to do. (Interview 4)*

> *Before we were quite helpless. We were quite uninformed and helpless in terms of legal aspects or trade union rights. (Interview 1)*

Family associations also supported the centre workers, although this support seems to have had less impact on the process than that of the trade unions.

> *They were very supportive because they saw us outside. There were meetings where they talked about it and many families went. They didn't want us to leave. For the families we were a project, that a school is not just a place to leave the children. (Interview 1)*

Ultimately, the key success factor in the case presented was the initiative of the local administration. Nevertheless, the process was conditioned by legal-administrative aspects. Although the initiative of the recovery process was fundamentally political, it had to be framed within the legal framework corresponding to that of the public administration. Once the process was underway, the City Council paid particular attention to complying with the legal framework, rather than guiding or accompanying the workers involved. Once the process was underway, the support of some trade unions was important in negotiating certain working conditions.

Another success factor related to the budgetary constraints of the municipalities is the type of city, Barcelona, whose budget is large enough to take on the recovery of the three outsourced ECEC centres and their staff. In smaller municipalities, budgetary constraints are more important and determine the possibility of municipalities taking back outsourced services.

3. Case 2 ECEC: Arenys de Munt

3.1. The case study: the context, service governance and the employment relations at local level

Arenys de Munt is a town in the Maresme region, in the province of Barcelona. It will have 9,278 inhabitants in 2022. The last local governments were left-wing. Currently, the town council is governed by the ERC (left-wing government). There is only one nursery school in Arenys de Munt.

As already mentioned in the case of Barcelona, the relationship between the national and local levels of industrial relations is articulated through collective agreements. When the selected ECEC centre was outsourced, the workers were covered by the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres.

In the case of small municipalities, administrations are limited in what they can do. Municipalities, especially those with small populations, have significant budgetary constraints. In the case of Arenys de Munt, Law 27/2013 of 27

December on the Rationalisation and Sustainability of Local Administration (hereafter ARSAL Law) sets limits for municipalities with fewer inhabitants (e.g. limits on the management of services in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, limits on the hiring of staff in municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, etc.). In the context of this law, a municipality like Arenys de Munt (with less than 10,000 inhabitants) cannot create jobs for educators because the law does not consider them to be essential services.

> *The ARSAL law says that as a municipality you cannot increase the wage bill. Besides, our staff is dependent on the municipal budget. The only option is the state budget law as far as public and civil servants are concerned. (Interview 9)*

> *The law on the rationalisation of the administration, known as the ARSAL law, does not allow... for example, if I wanted to create a post for an educational technician, I could not, because it is not an essential service. It is also linked to the municipal budget. And you have to make some very important adjustments to balance the budget. We are a council that does not have a lot of income or big industries. We are a small town. (Interview 9)*

On the other hand, as noted in the Barcelona case, the minimum territorial representation of trade unions is the regional level (*nivel comarcal*). The regional level is the level of organisation immediately above the local level. There is no trade union representation at the local level, except in companies or organisations in the municipality. In the selected case (the reinsourcing of the local ECEC centre), there are no mechanisms or spaces for interaction beyond the works council of the Arenys de Munt City Council and the works council of GUSAM as a public company. In the negotiation of the new collective agreement, some regional trade unions participated as advisors to the workers' representatives at the negotiating table.

At the pre-primary level, each school has a School Council. They are the mechanism for the participation of the school community in the governance of the centre. All groups involved in the educational community are represented in the school council: the headteacher, the city council, teachers, family associations, administration and service staff. Beyond this space for participation, no relevant mechanisms are identified to promote the participation of service users and the community.

3.2. The case study: the issue. Description aimed at illustrating why the case is an example of an issue, previously identified at national level

The selected case is the recovery of the outsourced service of the only nursery school (0-2 level) in the municipality (La Petjada, with 108 families). This is an indirectly managed centre where the infrastructure is public but the management of the service is private, according to a service contract between the Town Council and the provider company. Workers in this type of centre are covered permisos en empresaby the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres, which is the collective permisos en empresaagreement with the worst working conditions. It has already been noted above that low pay and long daily and annual working hours are the worst working conditions in this collective agreement.

> *It all started because a private company was running the service and the city council was paying for it. So when we took it back we had to organise the whole staffing issue. So the economic stakes were very high. (Interview 9)*

The case of Arenys de Munt has been identified as an interesting case to study for several reasons. Firstly, it is a very small municipality (9,278 inhabitants in 2022), with the economic and management limitations that a local administration of this size can have. Secondly, given the limitations of a small municipality, the actors involved opted for an intermediate strategy: the recovery of the service by a public service management company. Initially,

this recovery did not entail a drastic improvement in working conditions. Subsequently, however, negotiations began on a new collective agreement (signed in December 2022), in which certain working conditions were substantially improved compared to the previous agreement (XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres). The main improvements in the case of ECEC workers were improvements in pay, contractual security and certain leaves. In addition, in 2013 the centre was awarded the prize for the best childcare centre in Catalonia.

The recovery of the service was an initiative of the *CUP* (left-wing government), supported by all political parties in the municipality. In the following term in office, *ERC* (also a left-wing government) continued the recovery process. The other political parties also supported the continuation of the process of bring back the nursery school. There was therefore a general consensus on the will to restore the management of the ECEC centre. In addition to this political consensus, there was also the support of the centre's family association. No positions against this initiative were identified among the municipality's social entities.

3.3. The process

As mentioned above, the selected municipality had outsourced several local services, including the ECEC centre. In November 2011, the City Council commissioned the public company GUSAM to carry out an economic study to incorporate various outsourced services into this public company. GUSAM, *Gestión Urbanística y Servicios de Arenys de Munt* (Town Planning Management and Services of Arenys de Munt), was created by the Arenys de Munt Town Council on 20 January 2003. Its initial competences were the urban development management of urban and industrial areas in the municipality. Subsequently, the Town Council proposed to extend GUSAM's competences to include the management of outsourced local services. Taking into account the ARSAL law, the management of public services by a public company (and not by the City Council itself) facilitated the management of these services.

The economic report commissioned by GUSAM defended the economic viability of the management of some outsourced services. As a result, the following outsourced services were taken back: cleaning of public buildings, waste management, water management and ECEC. Following the positive evaluation of the economic study, these services were integrated into GUSAM after the termination of the service contracts. The first services to be incorporated in 2012 were those listed above. The Adult Education Centre was then included in 2016. It is currently planned to incorporate the music school.

Initially, the inclusion of these services did not lead to significant improvements in working conditions, as workers remained covered by their respective collective agreements. On the other hand, there were some improvements, such as better leave for illness or other personal circumstances. Errors in workers' salaries were also identified and corrected. It should be noted that, as a public company, GUSAM's budgets depend on the public budgets of the city council. The economic part of the company is therefore limited by budgetary constraints.

> *The limit we have encountered the most is the economic one. The money that is available, because it depends on the budget of the city council. It's good because it's the council that provides the money, but you have the limitations of any council. If some taxes are not collected now, it has an impact on the council and therefore on us. (Interview 7)*

In addition to the working conditions linked to the agreement, the recovery of the ECEC centre has made it possible to improve certain aspects of the centre (the classrooms have been enlarged, a kitchen has been added, the playground has been improved, etc.). As mentioned above, in 2013 the centre was awarded the prize for the best ECEC centre in Catalonia.

In 2022 it was decided to develop a new common and single collective agreement for all GUSAM employees (all services). The principle was "everyone must win"

> *The aim of the new agreement was that all workers should have the same rights and that we could unify them on the basis that no one would lose out. The idea is that everyone can have the best of each agreement. (Interview 9)*

En octubre de 2020 el Ayuntamiento y GUSAM iniciaron el desarrollo de un nuevo convenio

In October 2020, the City Council and GUSAM initiated the development of a new single collective agreement for all GUSAM employees. This initiative was proposed for two reasons. Firstly, because of the difficulties of managing up to six collective agreements (in addition to the outsourced services that have been recovered, there is the agreement for office workers). Secondly, because of the different working conditions of the workers in the services concerned.

> *Is it essential for GUSAM to have a new agreement? Not necessarily. But it complicates human resources management to have so many agreements. Diversity management is complex. On the other hand, we see that there are some agreements, such as the ECEC agreement or the cleaning agreement, which have very low salaries. Before the new agreement, GUSAM could not say: now I am going to increase the salary. (Interview 9)*

The agreement sought to standardise working conditions for the 58 workers in the company, which included cleaners, ECEC educators, administrative staff, etc. It was not possible to improve all working conditions for all workers, but particular emphasis was placed on the principle that "no one should lose out". Under this principle, minimum working conditions were established as a reference. For example, for wages, the agreement with the best wages (water management) was used as a reference and this wage was set for all workers. This meant a significant increase in the wages of cleaners or educators, but the same wage for wage management workers. These workers then had to improve their working conditions in other respects (working hours, holidays, leaves, etc.).

> *In most cases, the water agreement has been honoured. But not always. In other cases it was social aspects such as leaves. In the water agreement you don't improve the salary, but you improve the seniority, the leaves, etc. (Interview 9).*

> *What GUSAM does is that when they decide to unify everything in one agreement and equalise the categories, they start to draw up a draft agreement. It is not to improve an existing agreement, but to create a Frankenstein of six agreements in one, on the premise that nobody can lose out in terms of the current conditions of each service. What we are trying to do is take the best option for each service, taking into account what the company and the city council can afford. (Interview 7)*

> *The way in which an initial proposal for a collective agreement was made was to go through each agreement and look at the best terms. To look at each agreement and say Who has the best terms for this chapter? This one. So we put this one in. A sort of Frankenstein of the best cases was made and that is what was taken to the negotiations. (Interview 9)*

In the case of educators, the pay rise included in the new agreement does not reach the level of civil servants (as in the case of Barcelona), but represents an increase of 37% (from 15,708 euros per year to 21,540 euros per year). The same applies to cleaners. Workers in cleaning and early childhood education are the workers whose working conditions will improve the most with the new agreement signed in December 2022. Other aspects applicable to all workers in these services include the improvement of leaves for hospitalisation, change of address, etc.; free schooling for children (an aspect already enjoyed by ECEC workers); partial or full financing of training courses for workers and their children (English training, etc.). Another improvement is the financial recognition of seniority for all workers. Previously there were different ways of paying for seniority (five years instead of three) and even in some services seniority was not recognised.

> *The company's proposal is to go for the maximum in economic terms, to improve as much as possible. We have focused on ensuring that all services have their seniority recognised. Seniority was not paid. Everyone will have a seniority bonus every three years. The biggest increases in basic pay were in early childhood education and cleaning. These were the services with the lowest salaries of all the services. The educators are the ones with the biggest increases (Interview 7).*

The negotiation of working time was complicated by the different needs of the services involved. The issue of weekly working time has been included in a transitional article in the new agreement so that it can be negotiated in the future. Nevertheless, the annual working time has been reduced to a maximum of 1,736 hours. In services such as early childhood education and adult education, workers have worked fewer hours and this lower number of hours has been maintained with a special article for these two services. In the rest of the services, the annual working time has been reduced, which in some cases has made it possible to reduce the weekly working time.

Contractual security has also been improved. The new agreement includes a reduction in temporary contracts and an increase in permanent contracts with variations such as permanent discontinuous contracts, although these improvements are actually a consequence of the recent Spanish labour reform, which abolishes (or significantly reduces) temporary contracts.

> *The new labour reform, in which the temporary contract disappears, helps us a lot. In the case of the nursery school, this merit-based competition is now used to create open-ended contracts. The number of staff is increased and permanent positions are created, which is what the law says. (Interview 7)*

3.4. The solution

The solution is innovative because it allows a small municipality to recover a service that it considers essential, thus improving the working conditions of the people involved. Taking into account the precarious working conditions of the XII NCA of Childcare and Education Centres and the difficulties related to collective bargaining, the initiative developed is an effective strategy to improve working conditions. It is also a commitment to public services at local level and against the outsourcing of services. The recovery of the ECEC service by a public management company has made it possible to avoid the restrictions on contracting for small municipalities contained in the ARSAL law.

Another innovative aspect of the selected case concerns the formula for improving working conditions. Initially, the local administration (from the public management company) could not, for example, increase the salaries of these workers, as they were determined by the respective collective agreements. However, by creating a new collective agreement without any precedent, the local administration was free to set the initial working conditions (taking into account, of course, the budgetary constraints of the public company).

> *We were in a vacuum. Before that, GUSAM did not have its own agreement. Normally, when you have an agreement, you try to improve it by negotiating it. When you negotiate a new agreement, you compare it with the previous one and improve it. But there is no previous agreement. Since there is no previous agreement, it is now time to define the job categories and the corresponding wages, taking into account the economic limits of the company. (Interview 7)*

> *As a company with no previous collective agreement, we assumed that there were no previous wage tables. In the absence of wage tables we were able to set the wages for each job category. This made it possible to increase wages in most services in the new agreement. (Interview 8)*

> *We asked a professor of administrative law for a report on how we could touch this wage cap and he told us that when you start a new agreement you start from zero. So you don't increase salaries because you have nothing to compare yourself to. You have to define what kind of staff you want, what conditions you want. (Interview 9)*

In addition, a single collective agreement for the whole company allows better management of certain working conditions mentioned above (free schooling in the nursery school, fully or partially financed training, etc.), as these aspects are managed internally within the company and do not involve additional costs to the company.

3.5. The implementation

This is primarily a local government initiative. The unions are involved in negotiating the new collective agreement for the public administration company, but communication between the council, the company and the employees is fluid. The unions play an advisory role to the works council negotiating the new collective agreement and are part of the negotiating table for the new agreement.

> *I think the motivation was political, to take back services. For example, in water management, there are now many municipalities that want to manage water again. We have been doing that for twelve years. And the truth is that we are very satisfied. (Interview 9)*

No relevant tensions or conflicts are observed in the negotiation of the new agreement. The 'win-win' principle seems to work in maintaining an appropriate level of communication and negotiation. Important agreements are reached between the local government, workers and trade unions in the negotiation of the new collective agreement.

> *As soon as the first draft of the agreement was ready, we started negotiations. We worked chapter by chapter. We managed to change some things. In other cases I think the company's approach is already right and interesting. (Interview 7)*

> *There are many things that have been improved in the negotiations. There is a feeling that the final proposal was much improved. It is true that the company's proposal was already aimed at equalising job categories and salaries. The issue that took the longest was the economic one. But it is also true that there was a willingness to improve on the part of GUSAM. (Interview 7)*

As noted above, the size of the municipality and the proximity and knowledge of local actors also seem to have contributed to this good level of communication and negotiation.

> *We held many meetings with the families to ensure maximum stability and reassurance for the staff. Practically, it was difficult to start from scratch: you have to define a profile, a pedagogical line, etc. A lot of work was done based on dialogue and listening. (Interview 9)*

> *One Friday a month we met with the committee, each time to discuss one chapter. (Interview 9)*

The general assessment of employees is positive. The trade unions are more critical. In both cases, they recognise the difficulties of the public management company to improve the economic aspect due to the budgetary constraints that GUSAM is subject to.

> *GUSAM, as a public company, has its wage bill. And you can't increase it senselessly. There are limits. (Interview 7)*

The main demands of workers were improvements in wages, recognition of seniority and a reduction in working hours. We have already mentioned the economic improvements included in the agreement, as well as the economic recognition of seniority. Working hours were more difficult to negotiate because of the different needs of the services involved, but agreements were reached on the basis of annual working hours.

4. Case 3: The Super-blocks model of care in Barcelona

4.1. The case study: the context, service governance and the employment relations at local level

Social services in Spain were highly centralized during the dictatorship period in terms of regulation, funding, and management. The political and territorial articulation of competences after the approval of the Spanish Constitution (1978) decentralized many policies and services such as health, education, social services and care services to guarantee regional grounded public provision. The Local regime Law (1985) enhanced this approach, obligating to local entities of more than 20,000 inhabitants to provide social services. Moreover, the approval of regional statutes and social services laws have established an heterogenous map of social services regulation (Ministerio de Derechos Sociales, 2021) and provision (Álvarez et al., 2020). That is, 17 different regional systems and contexts. However, the central Government establishes a general framework, regulated according to each activity and delimiting the funding, while allowing regional and local complements. This heterogeneity is also present according to the specific social services activity and those sectors to which it is linked. Thus, LTC has links at the professional level with the health sector and with domestic work at the provision level, where informal care is provided in a substantive way.

4.2. The case study: the issue. Description aimed at illustrating why the case is an example of an issue, previously identified at national level

In relation to our case study, the city of Barcelona has 1,639,981 people in 2022, a population that has decreased slightly since the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The percentage of the population over 65 years of age is 21.3% (a similar figure since 1996), 931 of them over 100 years old. The average age of the population is 44.2 years. This is slightly above the Spanish average (44.07 years) and the Catalan average (43.32 years). Furthermore, 13.9% of the population over the age of 65 lives alone (Barcelona City Council, 2022).

It is estimated that in Barcelona 355,000 people, mostly women, receive intensive care, with a significant presence of migrant women in an irregular situation (Alonso, 2022). Regarding caregivers, 61.3% of the main caregivers were family members in 2018, 15.8% were home care service (SAD) workers, 11.8% were other formal salaried workers and 8.4% were informal caregivers. In addition, 77.1% were women (Julià, 2021).

With regard to exclusively professional care, Barcelona City Council has a home care service aimed at people who, due to age, dependency or disability, have limited autonomy to carry out basic activities of daily living or require permanent care. They include services such as: hygiene and care; physical and motor assistance; food control; medication control and health care; meals at home and cleaning at home (on an occasional basis); accompaniment outside the home; guidance in managing the household economy; and guidance and support for carers in the home. Around 60% of users of home care services in Catalonia are users of Barcelona City Council's SAD, highlighting

the high level of coverage of this service (1.62 million out of 7.5 million in Catalonia live in Barcelona). Around 74.5% of these users are women and 53.4% are over 85 years of age (Barcelona City Council, 2021).

According to Julià (2021), of the people receiving care in Barcelona, approximately 66.2% receive help from relatives, 44.5% from the SAD, and 37.7% from other person under payment (formal or informal). And approximately 50% of people combine more than one type of care. Moreover, people living alone in Barcelona are the most likely to be users of the SAD and, conversely, the more people living in the household, the less likely they are to have access to this service, thus reinforcing the familistic model of care (Julià, 2019).

To counteract the feminisation and precariousness of care, Barcelona City Council has promoted the creation of support networks and public resources that improve the quality of life of both caregivers and those receiving care. Since 2015, several pioneering projects aimed at these groups have been launched (Alonso, 2022), including "Barcelona Cuida" (centralised management of all the city's care services and resources), the Caregiver Card (free support services for carers), "Villa Vecina" (a model of personalised and proximity-based social and health care), and the "Super-illes" (Super-blocks) applied to the Home Care Service.

According to Barcelona City Council, the SAD is a classic service in the care sector that has been unchanged for more than 30 years in terms of the provision and organisation of the service. The home care service is divided into four zones in the city which are supplied by different service providers. Generally, the workers spent a considerable amount of their working day commuting because of the long distances between users houses. In addition, the workers did not interact with each other and suffered from isolation. The City Council carried out a study of the location of the elderly people cared for, noting that there were areas of high concentration. In addition, the City Council received complaints about the constant rotation of staff. Besides, most users wanted the same working hours, with working hours being concentrated from early morning to midday (10:00 to 13:00). Thus, 70% of the workers had less than 30 hours of work per week.

4.3. The process

Given the high concentration of hours in the mornings and the effect it had on the increase in part-time work, the City Council considered the possibility of returning to a "village" model, i.e., a group of workers organising themselves, collectively commenting and assessing cases, and being a reference in each area. Thus, the Super-blocks project was seen as an organisational innovation which in turn made it possible to increase working hours, thus responding to one of the union's demands.

However, another of the main demands of both the trade unions and even the supplier companies were that the City Council should pay for the full working days of the teams and not for the hours worked by each worker. The city council rejected this because it believed it would increase the cost of the service:

> *"If the accumulation of hours of users who are not there due to hospital admission, because they have to go to the doctor, due to major problems, etc., is 30% of the scheduled hours, the City Council would have to pay for it". (Barcelona City Council)*

Thus, the City Council understands that, if it were to meet this demand, it would be responsible for the entire volume of hours that fall (for example, due to the non-presence of the users in the home). These depend neither on the company, nor on the worker, nor on the administration, but on the user himself.

Besides, the aim of the Super-blocks model is that home care workers can self-manage and therefore orient their work not so much to the performance of tasks in the home, but more to the fulfilment of objectives of what was intended in the intervention with the user from a more human and less 'taylorist' approach. That is to say, to

involve the workers in the intervention plan. The measure was planned to allow for the creation of teams that serve as mutual support, that are self-organised and can in some way provide the service in a more flexible way. For example, the processing and coverage of sick leave is a complex process in the traditional model. With the super-blocks, the team can move the calendar without so many incidents and respond quickly. This is an improvement for the workers and for the users as well. In the event of an incident, the user has a contact telephone number for the team, instead of a company switchboard.

4.4. The solution

One of the main innovations introduced by this model is the flexibility to work by objectives. The intervention plan in the traditional model is established at the beginning of the service to the client and then it is very difficult to readjust it. With this new model, the worker can modify the work plan to adjust it to changing preferences and needs:

> *"Although it may seem logical, workers are used to work focused on the performance of tasks without thinking about the purpose of their work. Teamwork and self-management must allow for a change of functioning and paradigm that rethinks what the ultimate goal of the intervention is. For example, the promotion of the personal autonomy of users, proper nutrition, adequate hygiene, etc." (Barcelona City Council).*

This new model also makes care work more visible and strengthens the community between users and caregivers. For example, if a family worker goes shopping or for a walk, perhaps in the same building there are other caregivers from the same team, so they can bring users together. And they are also more identified by the community environment (e.g., pharmacy, supermarket, health centre, etc.) as they are the workers in that area, which also empowers them. This in turn allows users who live in proximity (many suffering from social isolation) to meet and interact with each other. In this way, the objective of accompaniment from a collective and community approach is fulfilled. This embedding in the environment also facilitates, for example, better social and health coordination. For example, in the case of people with higher levels of dependency. In the traditional model, everything is mediated by the technical coordinators of the provider companies. But it is really the caregiver who knows the circumstances of each user. The new model allows for this mutual recognition between health centre staff and home care workers (Interview with Barcelona City Council).

According to UGT union, "these are political projects in which the City Council think that in the end they will get more votes because the user will be happy", which explains to some extent why they did not place more emphasis on consultation with trade unions before the implementation of the Super-Blocks. Although the UGT representative considers that the Super-Blocks are the model to follow, this should have been implemented with adequate training or at least a series of assemblies of the workers by zones with the companies and the technicians of the City Council to explain the Super-Blocks project. However, the City Council implemented the pilot project with more senior people who were used to the older model that also worked through self-managed teams:

> *"If they put to work in the pilot project the workers with whom they know it will work, they are adulterating the experiment" (Marina Giner - UGT).*

However, the City Council assures that the relationship with the unions is good: meetings every three months in which the functioning of the home service is monitored, attending to their demands, although they consider that "there are unions that somehow want everything to be standardised", in reference to the resistance to the new Super-blocks model. The UGT union insists on the idea that workers and their representatives must be more

involved, although it recognises that cooperative companies have complied with this. This is the case of Suara, a non-profit third sector cooperative company based in Barcelona specialising in care for dependent persons, which currently provides home care services in two of the four zones into which the service is divided in Barcelona:

> *"For us the works council and the unions have played a minor role. In fact, we started the pilot project with members, and I remember the moment when the union said 'we want to know', and I said 'Excuse me? Do you want to know?'. The works council can participate in the labour part, but not in the corporate part. I remember a moment when I was told that I had an obligation. Well, let's resituate where the obligations are. [...] When we started to have the first results, we were able to share with the committee the pros and cons that we found. [...] The City Council has given its role to the union, especially during the pandemic when a lot of work was done to apply the new model. Here, a lot of work was done to be able to work together". (Mar Mestre - Suara)*

The City Council assures that companies in general have embraced the innovation of the new model, assuring that they are always available to support them in case of any crisis, but also to monitor their performance. According to the City Council, innovation is accepted as a good thing to improve companies. However, Mar Mestre (Customer Area Manager at Suara), for her part, explains a much more active role on the part of the cooperative company. Following organisational changes since 2012 to make decision-making in the company less hierarchical, the company considered changes to the home care service inspired by the management model of the Dutch city of Buurtzorg. This city implemented a model that was less 'taylorised' and more based on an analysis of users' needs and work in self-managed teams and by meeting objectives. In 2017, technicians from both the Barcelona municipality and Suara went to Buurtzorg to study the model:

> *"This was the governance model we were looking for and for the City Council it was a leap forward in terms of changing the model, of a service that since the Dependency Law (2006) no one had innovated anything at all. The service had been provided in the same way, except for the budget increase each year. [...] Regardless of whether or not Barcelona City Council wants to change the model, for us this change is important, and we are going to go for it. And from there we started to work with the City Council, where we also provided the internal resources to be able to drive this change internally". (Mar Mestre - Suara)*

For this transition, the company chose a small group of ten motivated workers in each zone to pilot the change. The workers felt that the change brought them back to the essence of the original working model of care, which was more focused on teamwork and flexibility. The workers who were about to retire even decided to stay on to be part of this new model. However, it turned out that the caregivers needed training to be able to participate and make decisions, so the company allocated training resources to teach new skills and competencies. The first public tender that included the Superblocks model was in 2019. Thus, the development of the model was mainly carried out from 2017 to 2019. In addition to the self-management model, innovations on the health side were incorporated, taking steps towards integration between social and health care (e.g., having caregivers and nurses in the same space and doing training together). However, as aforementioned, the UGT union representative consulted believes that this pilot project was an adulterated experiment as it was implemented with more senior people who were used to the older model, which also worked through self-managed teams.

4.4. The implementation

Investment in the Home Care Service (SAD) increased by 50% in 2019. According to the City Council, the increase made it possible to incorporate more professionals into the service, improve working conditions and reduce temporary employment, with a total of 4,025 people hired. Progress has also been made in expanding and

improving the telecare service, which now reaches 108,000 people. This increase in investment has also allowed the Super-blocks model to be implemented in parallel.

At the same time there are benefits in terms of the working conditions of the workers. First, the social isolation of workers is prevented by making them part of a team. The other important aspect is the possibility to increase working hours. In addition, the City Council asks companies to ensure that the people who make up these teams have permanent contracts, with a certain degree of stability. With the new model, the teams negotiate with the users and agree that the tasks can be carried out at other times in a more flexible way (always within certain margins), which makes it possible to extend the working day, so that all workers have a full working day:

> *"With the new model] you can adapt to your schedule, as long as you do the hours you have contracted. In the old model, you had to start at eight o'clock by default, unless you found a user who really understood it. But if I come in later, I must leave later. I think that's the most positive part. The other positive part is that before, if I had a walk service scheduled, I had to walk the user, even if it was rainin". (Marina Giner - UGT)*

It is important to highlight that the new contract with the supplier companies has included certain support figures for the workers, such as the occupational therapist to evaluate houses and be able to activate technical aids, if necessary (e.g., lifts, mechanised sofas, etc.), above all for the most dependent cases. These occupational therapists also provide support to carers in case of emotional impact due to the frailty and death of their users, or in situations of aggression due to cognitive impairment. These new figures have been very difficult to incorporate because they are not included in the dependency service agreement, which is why the City Council is demanding more regulatory support from the regional and national administration to be able to innovate.

This new model is not without its critics. Some workers are demanding a return to the traditional model because they consider that this new organisation of work leads to management tasks that do not correspond to them, covering for teammates' absences, and, consequently, more hours of unpaid work:

> *"It is a change of mentality that is taking time because people are used to working alone, with the only support of the coordinator" (Marina Giner - UGT).*

> *"There are (more radical) unions that are against the Superblocks model because they think that management is the responsibility of the company, not of the workers. [...] They want Taylorism, that is, to do only mechanical work. And the philosophy of the Superblocks is just the opposite. It is true that the Superblocks are inspired by two elements: one, the urban Superblocks of Barcelona, which has its benefits from the point of view of creating territorial units that are smaller than the neighbourhood community. Because the neighbourhood is very large. So, measuring five or 6,000 citizens allows for sufficient critical mass for positive interactions. Urban planners have studied this very well. The other element is the inspiration of the Dutch model, where care workers are more professionalised (they usually have a health background, e.g., nurses), teams are self-managed and generally have no problem in doing non-health functions (e.g., making a bed). But here, tell a nurse to do a hygiene, she will tell you that this is not her job". (Barcelona City Council)*

> *"The background in the end is the trust of the group, teamwork, the capacity for reflection of the people who accompany these teams, empowerment, decision-making, and joint supervision. When a colleague falls, empathy is activated, which are intangible aspects that, if you only translate them into operational benefits, are difficult to measure. Moreover, even to be able to achieve good results requires a great investment in these intangible aspects, because this is what will lead to the good functioning of the process. We always say that if you and I must talk about how to paint this wall, we will surely argue. Well, imagine 12 workers, who are also very strong profiles, because the work they do is not at all easy". (Mar Mestre - Suara)*

As the City Council recognises that the workers now take on this part of the organisational work that used to be done by the coordinator, they have set up a system of annual salary bonuses. If the annual user satisfaction survey reaches at least an average of "B" (7 out of 10), the extra salary bonus is paid to all service workers. "In this way, the improvement in the quality of the service is converted into an improvement in salaries" (Barcelona City Council). This has generated controversy among the unions, who consider that the way to improve salaries is through negotiated changes in the agreement rather than bonuses. On the contrary, the City Council regrets that they cannot change this because the agreement is negotiated at regional level[3]:

> *"We encourage unions to negotiate an agreement at local level for Barcelona, but if the company then applies the regional agreement for Catalonia, it is of no use. [...] We also encourage them to negotiate the professional categories so that they can be recognised based on merit and experience, and so that there can be a vertical and horizontal career (and thus avoid workers always being stuck in the same category). [...] But everyone takes what interests them and in the end it's all a dialogue between the two sides". (Barcelona City Council)*

One of the main problems in implementing the new model comes with the Dependency Law's (2006) regulation of the hours of service. This law establishes the right of users to a fixed number of hours of care service. This is a difficult fit with the new model for achieving objectives. Moreover, the law requires full hours to be provided because the central government pays for each hour performed (not for each hour programmed). And the municipalities also pay the supplying companies per hour executed. However, there are tasks that may require less than an hour. For example, the task of getting several users living in the same building out of bed. And also, workers often accumulate backlogs because users are not at home (e.g., due to hospital admissions). This often forces them to take long breaks (e.g., two hours in a coffee shop or in the street waiting for the next service). Although the company does pay the workers for the number of hours scheduled, they accumulate these hours pending provision to users, which subsequently forces them to work long hours with exhausting work rhythms. Therefore, the new model encounters this lack of regulatory flexibility as a major obstacle:

> *"The National system of care on the basis of hours is very perverse when you know that there is a lot of mobility of hours. It is perverse. (Barcelona City Council)*

The strategy to overcome this is to make it clear to the user what help and services they are to receive, but with a disposition to a certain flexibility (favoured by the existence of a team). However, this often leads to disagreements and rigidities on the part of users and their families, who demand that carers have to come to their homes for a certain number of hours. Regarding possible improvements, Barcelona City Council suggests that the home care service and telecare should be offered as a joint service, so that the user can be helped with technology, with people and/or with technical aids, and thus be able to work towards objectives. But this requires a comprehensive assessment of the user. For its part, the trade union UGT insists on the idea of pending training for workers, who currently perform management tasks without adequate preparation. This investment in training would not only improve the planning of the service, but would also have a positive impact on the conditions of the workers:

> *"We need better training. With that there will also be a better salary, because it improves the professional categories. [...], what would happen is that they would recognise tasks that the workers are already doing. [...] The problem they have now is that they are being forced to do a task that is not theirs and on top of that they are being paid as a caregiver, not as a coordinator. And when you talk about it, they tell you that the management coordinator salary is €60 more, that it's not worth it either. So, I tell them that now I have to do it anyway, even if I don't get paid". (Marina Giner - UGT).*

[3] The Catalan dependency agreement 2019-2022 established a wage increase of 4% in 2021 and 8% in 2022, with two extra payments per year (equivalent to one monthly salary).

For her part, Mar Mestre from the cooperative company Suara, also agrees on the need to improve the economic conditions of the agreement to better recognise the work of the carer workers. But she also highlights possible improvements more focused on organisational aspects highlighted above: the transition to a model centred on the needs of the users and not so much on the exact number of hours of service.

5. Case 4: Strike by the Vitoria Home Care Service workers

5.1. The case study: the context, service governance and the employment relations at local level

Social services in Spain were highly centralized during the dictatorship period in terms of regulation, funding, and management. The political and territorial articulation of competences after the approval of the Spanish Constitution (1978) decentralized many policies and services such as health, education, social services and care services to guarantee regional grounded public provision. The Local regime Law (1985) enhanced this approach, obligating to local entities of more than 20,000 inhabitants to provide social services. Moreover, the approval of regional statutes and social services laws have established an heterogenous map of social services regulation (Ministerio de Derechos Sociales, 2021) and provision (Álvarez et al., 2020). That is, 17 different regional systems and contexts. However, the central Government establishes a general framework, regulated according to each activity and delimiting the funding, while allowing regional and local complements. This heterogeneity is also present according to the specific social services activity and those sectors to which it is linked. Thus, LTC has links at the professional level with the health sector and with domestic work at the provision level, where informal care is provided in a substantive way.

5.2. The case study: the issue.

In relation to this case study, the home care service shared by the City Council of Vitoria and the Provincial Council of Alava (Basque Country) is defined as a programme aimed at people (and their families) who temporarily or permanently have limitations in carrying out the basic activities of daily life, offering personal care, accompaniment, or educational support. Its aim is to improve the quality of life of the people to whom it is addressed so that they can remain in their usual home, providing support and complementing the responsibility of the family without replacing it in any case.

In this way, the Home Care Service (SAD) Programme has both a preventive and a welfare component, with the objectives of preventing and/or compensating for the loss of autonomy in carrying out daily life activities, maintaining the domestic environment in suitable conditions of habitability, providing support to carers in the home, improving the climate of coexistence, among others. Thus, there is an institutional predisposition to provide support considering the family-based care model. Specifically, the Home Help Service consists of providing services in the home of the user, such as support in personal hygiene and care, social support, and the performance of household chores, as well as an additional home meal service. The service can be requested by people with recognised risk of dependency or recognised dependency, their informal carers, people who have limitations in their functional autonomy close to dependency, and even people without family support who, due to other circumstances, have limited autonomy to carry out basic activities of daily living.

Although this service is mainly implemented in the city of Vitoria, it also covers the province of Alava. Since 2015, the rate of growth of this service has been proportionally higher than the rest of services and benefits aimed at caring for the elderly in the municipality: home care increased by 27% between 2013 and 2018, while other services fell by 12%. Thus, the SAD represents almost 20% of the supply of services and benefits for dependent elderly people in the city (SIIS, 2020). Around two thirds of the users are women and almost half are over 85 years old. In terms of degree of dependency, on the other hand, almost 75% of the users of the provincial service have a Grade II or III dependency assessment, while in the case of the municipal service, only 12.1% have a Grade II or

III dependency assessment. With regard to the services provided, 67.1% of users receive exclusively domestic services. In addition, only 30.2% of users receive personal care, 8.7% including accompanying tasks (SIIS, 2020).

This service employed 800 people in 2018 and covered 1081 people in Vitoria and 1900 in the rest of the province of Alava. The City Council approved that year a doubling of its budget (from 4.3 million per year to 8.6 million). With the budget increase, the City Council also intended to increase the hours dedicated to the care of these dependent persons. In 2017, a total of 110,000 hours of home help were provided and the forecast was 155,000-160,000 hours. However, the trade unions ELA, CCOO, LAB and UGT denounced that the negotiation of the collective agreement for home help in the province of Alava had been blocked since 2011 (thus preventing wage increases) and that they had a lot of part-time work. This meant that the workers used to have salaries of 900 euros net (implying a loss of 7.4% of purchasing power), even though they are obliged to be available 10 hours a day to work only 4 and a half hours. In fact, 50% of the staff did not have a fixed monthly salary, with wages sometimes fewer than €500 per month and workers working 2 hours a day. The unions also denounced the continuous commuting during their working day, even travelling through rural areas when they provide the service outside the city.

5.3. The process

In January 2018, the negotiating table for the new agreement (composed of the employers' association AESAD and the trade unions ELA, CCOO, LAB and UGT) met without making any progress. AESAD argued that it was impossible to raise wages as it is a fully subsidised contract with public administrations. Once the budget for the service was doubled, the unions understood that the conditions were in place to negotiate a wage increase, but the employers continued to block the negotiation because the Alava's provincial council maintained the same budget for the service, and most of the users were from the province outside the city of Vitoria. Faced with this situation, the unions called several days of demonstrations and three days of partial strike (4 hours) during March 2018. The workers were fully aware of the consequences of this decision on the users, because "they are at their side on a daily basis". But they argued to feel "forced to resort to this decision in the face of the closed-mindedness of both the companies in the sector and the Administration" (Union representative). These strike days went on regularly for 3 months (until May), together with continuous demonstrations in front of the headquarters of the Provincial Council of Alava. At the beginning of July, companies and trade unions met with representatives of the provincial social welfare institute (IFBS) and the Vitoria City Council. In this meeting both companies and institutions made their position clear to workers representatives and urged them to sign an agreement that was considered insufficient to unions demands (Trade union representative).

The proposal of the employers and the public administrations was to apply the hypothetical new agreement from the date of awarding the service from 2019, with a wage increase of 4.1% that year and 2% for 2020. They also proposed to increase the travel time between users' houses from 8 to 10 minutes. This increase proved insufficient for the unions. For this reason, the assembly of women workers decided to call an indefinite strike from 15 September 2018, also resuming mobilisations. The provincial council reacted with a new proposal, which this time was accepted by 80% of the workers, thus suspending the indefinite strike. The representative of the Provincial Council of Alava and the City Council of Vitoria-Gasteiz stated that they made a significant economic effort so that in just two years the SAD workers could recover the purchasing power they lost since the signing of the previous collective agreement in 2012.

The conditions of the new proposal included improvements such as guaranteeing a minimum of 130 hours of work per month, increasing travel time by 2 minutes per hour (from 8 to 10 minutes) and increasing midday rest

time on split shifts to 3 hours. In addition, the new contract signed between the company and the administration provided for an increase in the price per hour of work of between 10 and 13% in most areas of service provision. The unions believed that this would make it possible to achieve the wage increases sought in the negotiation process for the new agreement.

5.4. The solution

The new collective agreement for the Álava Home Help Service was signed on 17 December 2018 by the employers' association AESAD and the trade unions ELA, CCOO and UGT and was valid for two years (2019-2020). This agreement included a wage increase of 4.10% in 2019 and 3% in 2020. In addition, wage supplements are included for working at night and on public holidays. The full annual working day was set at 1,680 hours for all categories, except for nursing assistants, who would have their own regulation. The agreement also regulated wage guarantee clauses, ensuring a minimum of 1,430 hours per year and guaranteeing that when a worker has less than 35 hours per week, and a new service arises that is compatible with her hours, the company would be obliged to offer it to her.

Specifically, the agreement established salaries of 1196 euros per month (14 payments) and 9.20 euros per hour for the category of home carers from the signing of the agreement until March 2019 (when the new home help service programme was signed). From that date onwards, wage increases were applied: 1245.40 euros per month and 9.20 euros per hour from April to December 2019. And 1283.10 euros per month and 9.58 euros per hour in 2020.

Nonetheless, Alava is one of Spain's wealthiest provinces and its capital (Vitoria) a medium-sized city. That is, scale and budget may ease these type of agreements (Sanchez-Mira et al., 2021). The Vitoria's home-care service was awarded in 2021 at national level as good practices case, although in relation to the quality of its service rather than the quality of the employment. Indeed, workers still report regular dismissals after six month of employment, excessive ratio users per worker (intensive pace of work), long workdays for full-time workers, mobility time not adequately considered (implying unpaid working hours). Following this, workers have called for new mobilizations in 2022 to demand the beginning of a new collective bargaining process to improve these conditions.

6. Comparing the four cases. What we can learn from the case studies

Key factors of success, challenges, and obstacles in the four cases

In the selected cases, the role of trade unions was uneven. Both cases in ECEC were purely local government initiatives. In Barcelona there was an uneven trade union presence. In this case they appeared at the beginning of the process of restoring the service. In the case of Arenys de Munt, the unions appeared at the time of the negotiation of the new collective agreement, after the service had been recovered by the city council. In the first case, some unions provided guidance and advice to the outsourced workers in the process of transforming them into public employees. This led to a rapprochement between the workers and the unions. In some cases, the workers then joined the unions as shop stewards. In the case of Arenys de Munt, the unions were present at the negotiating table for the new collective agreement. In both cases, there is no evidence of the presence of employers' associations in the cases studied. In LTC cases, the Superblocks of Barcelona was also a political initiative of the City Council, with the support of local unions. In the case of Vitoria, the role of the unions was crucial in mobilising workers and achieving improvements in working conditions

The interplay between the national and local levels of employment relations was channeled through the collective agreement. The existence of these national agreements made it possible for the trade unions to be the reference point for the orientation of the outsourced workers who became employees of the local administration. But they can also be an obstacle if the working conditions in the collective agreement are not good. The case of Arenys de Munt is interesting because a new collective agreement was created without previous agreements, which allowed a degree of flexibility in agreeing working conditions. The Superblocks of Barcelona is also an interesting case because it is an innovation that uses other mechanisms beyond the collective agreement to improve working conditions.

The role of municipalities/decentralised government and of other public actors

In all three of the four cases the role of the municipalities is fundamental. In ECEC cases and in the case of Superblocks, left-wing local governments are at the origin of these innovative practices. In ECEC cases, the local government are the ones who design the recovery plan, the procedure and the steps to be followed, etc. However, there are differences between the cases. In the case of Barcelona, there was a conflict between the local government and the main opposition party, which was responsible for the previous outsourcing policy. On the other hand, once the city council starts the process of taking back the service, the relationship that is established between the local administration and the outsourced workers is basically bureaucratic. Cooperation is limited to a strictly legal-administrative dimension. This is where the trade unions come in, in some cases supporting the outsourced workers and in others criticising the process of transforming them into public employees. In the case of Arenys de Munt, on the other hand, although the process of recovering the service was initiated by a single left-wing party, the rest of the local political parties also supported the initiative. The political party that will govern in the next legislature not only supports the process, but also makes it a sign of its own identity. In this case, the relationship between the local administration and the outsourced workers is very close (closed). Communication is fluid and continuous throughout the process. There is a framework of trust and cooperation between these local actors. In the case of Superblocks, the City Council plays a leading role in the whole process. Superblocks are a political initiative of the local government, without the support of certain local political parties, but they also achieve consensus among some local actors.

Lessons by the local case studies

*1) Th*e local cases show differences in the relationships between the actors involved. Smaller areas seem to be those where there is more cooperation. In other words, cooperation seems to be easier in a scenario with fewer actors, as in the case of the reinsourcing of the nursery school of Arenys de Munt.

2) The case studies highlight a certain flexibility of the local dimension in the implementation of effective solutions. The greater knowledge of local problems and the greater knowledge and relationships between local actors seem to facilitate cooperation between them and the development of initiatives to improve the welfare services studied and the working conditions of the workers involved in them. In the case of the care model of Superblocks in Barcelona, the keystones for improving organization of work for home-care workers were the proximity (limiting mobility for care workers), the autonomy (reducing "tailorized" care work), horizontal efficiency control, and the community (reinforcing interactions and socializing care).

Nevertheless, local actors have limits to their capacity to act. Local administrations, especially those with small populations, have significant budgetary constraints. Moreover, the scope for action of these actors is limited or constrained by national factors such as relevant collective agreements or administrative-legal issues.

3) A relevant role for industrial relations in the generalisation of successful solutions was not identified, with the exception of Vitoria. In the case of collective actions by home care service workers in Vitoria, the deploy of structural and institutional union power resources were key to improve working conditions. Although, Alava is one of Spain's wealthiest provinces and its capital (Vitoria) a medium-sized city. That is, scale and budget may ease these type of agreements (Sanchez-Mira et al., 2021).

4) The case studies show the limitations of the social partners and the potential of the local level to improve the working conditions of workers in the social services studied. In the Spanish case, the local level does not have the capacity to influence the collective bargaining processes of regional and national agreements. However, there may be interesting local initiatives that go beyond this general bargaining framework.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Long term care

- Long-term care services in Spain are at the intersection of the health and social services sectors. Interpretations of long-term care provisions differ between regions due to unclear limits.
- The "Law on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for People in a Situation of Dependency" (2006) is the key law that regulates long-term care services in Spain. This law recognizes subjective rights, such as access to support services for activities of daily living based on three levels of dependency.
- The law failed to professionalize the long-term care sector due to budget cuts resulting from the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, Spain has a particularly low percentage of long-term care spending compared to other EU countries.
- The aging population in Spain has generated an increase in the need for long-term care, leading to greater demand for services and greater pressure on the care system.
- The number of beneficiaries of financial assistance for informal caregivers within families increased during the initial period of the crisis.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the decline of residential care and increased waiting lists for long-term care.
- Undeclared work is common in home-based long-term care services in Spain, leading to precarious working conditions, unclear job content and schedules, and pressure on workers to solve widespread social problems.
- The high frequency of temporary work in residential care services is especially relevant in the labor sector, while part-time work stands out in the private sector.
- Although the public sector is the main provider of services, the private sector has experienced significant growth in recent years.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the deficiencies of the long-term care system in Spain and increased the need to improve services and patient care.

Early childhood education and care

- The early childhood education system in Spain has evolved considerably since the 1970s, moving from a mainly welfare approach to an educational approach with improved requirements and methodologies.
- The system is divided into two levels: 0-2 years and 3-5 years, with different enrolment rates (41% and 98% respectively) and costs (free in the case of levels 3-5). Pre-primary education is not compulsory. Its requirements and content are regulated by the Autonomous Communities.
- The Education Law of 2020 (LOM-LOE) aims to universalise early childhood education and to guarantee a sufficient and affordable public supply of places.
- Private and public schools coexist, and some private schools receive public subsidies. Other forms of education (such as home schooling) are allowed, but this is a minority option in Spain.
- There are different types of service provision at different levels. Outsourcing of services has increased at the 0-2 level (nursery schools).

- Funding for pre-primary education varies between Autonomous Communities, with public investment lower than in other EU and OECD countries.
- Employment in the sector has increased since the 1990s, especially in the public sector, with a slight decrease during the 2008 crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The two main occupations in pre-primary education are teachers (ISCED 6) and early childhood educators (ISCED 5), with differences in the number of hours worked and wages between them, especially in the case of early childhood educators, who earn wages close to the national minimum wage in the private sector.
- The high level of temporary employment in early childhood education is particularly relevant in the public sector. In the private sector, the low salaries of female educators in early childhood centres stand out.
- The structure of industrial relations and coordination mechanisms are similar in the public and private sectors, but there are some differences in the mechanisms of labour regulation. Both sectors have centralised bargaining at national and regional level, but there are different bargaining bodies and industrial relations dynamics. The greater fragmentation of collective bargaining in the private pre-school sector makes it more difficult to improve the working conditions of the workers involved.
- One of the strategies most often used by the local actors involved to improve the conditions of workers is the recovery of outsourced services in nursery schools.

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ANNEX

ANNEX WP1

Annex 1. Main occupations in residential care (2020)

Nursing assistants	47,45%
Office, Hotel and Similar Establishments Cleaning Personnel	8,47%
Pharmacy and emergency health care technicians and other health care workers	7,26%
Nursing professionals	5,91%
Other health professionals	4,09%
Salaried cooks	3,94%
Managers of information and communication technology (ICT) services and professional services companies	3,09%
Kitchen helpers	3,01%
Sociologists, historians, psychologists and other social science professionals	2,23%
Other structural construction workers	1,90%
Information clerks and receptionists (except in hotels)	1,68%
Legal and social services support professionals	1,63%
Doctors	1,01%
Special education teachers and technicians	1,00%
Vehicle, Window and Hand Cleaners and Hand Cleaners	0,80%
Laundry and dry-cleaning machine operators	0,74%
Clerical clerks with customer service tasks not elsewhere classified	0,61%
Personal home care workers (except childcare workers)	0,56%
Orderlies, baggage handlers, delivery boys and related workers	0,50%
Database and computer network specialists	0,46%
Other personal service workers	0,44%
Postal, coding, proof-reading and personnel services employees	0,44%
Sportsmen, trainers, sports instructors; recreational activity instructors	0,40%
Physical, chemical, environmental and engineering science technicians	0,35%
Building maintenance and cleaning supervisors, caretakers and domestic butlers	0,28%
Heads of administrative departments	0,22%
Other clerical workers without customer service tasks	0,20%
Domestic servants	0,19%
Cashiers and ticket clerks (except banks)	0,17%
Organisational and administrative specialists	0,17%
Travel agency clerks, hotel receptionists and telephone operators	0,17%
Material recording, production support services and transport support services employees	0,15%
Other electrical equipment installers and repairers	0,14%
Other teachers and teaching professionals	0,12%
Child care workers	0,11%
Manufacturing industry labourers	0,08%
Directors and managers of accommodation companies	0,04%

Source: EPA microdata (2020).

Annex 2. Main occupations in early childhood education (NACE 225) (2020)

Early childhood teachers and educators	79.2%
Childcare workers	4.9%
Managers of information and communication technology (ICT) services and professional services companies	4.4%
Office, Hotel and Similar Establishments Cleaning Personnel	3.0%
Cooks	2.6%
Other teachers and teaching professionals	2.0%
Primary school teachers	1.6%
Food, beverage, and tobacco processing machine operators	0.8%
Vocational training teachers	0.7%
Sportsmen, trainers, sports instructors; recreational activity instructors	0.5%
Form workers, ironworkers, and related tradesmen	0.2%
	100%

Source: EPA microdata (2020).

Annex 3. Main occupations in other activities of social services (NACE 889, including 8891-Child Day care activities) (2020)

Sociologists, historians, psychologists and other social science professionals	20,1%
Early childhood teachers and educators	11,6%
Childcare workers	9,4%
Personal home care workers (except childcare workers)	7,4%
Legal and social services support professionals	6,8%
Other administrative workers without customer service	3,2%
Other health professionals	2,9%
Members of the executive branch and legislative bodies; directors of the public administration and social interest organizations.	2,8%
Office, Hotel and Similar Establishments Cleaning Personnel	2,7%
Nursing assistants	2,6%
Building maintenance and cleaning supervisors, caretakers and domestic butlers	2,5%
Managers of information and communication technology (ICT) services and professional services companies	2,4%
Clerical clerks with customer service tasks not elsewhere classified	2,2%
Sales, advertising, public relations and research and development managers	2,1%
Hairdressers and specialists in esthetic, wellness, and related workers	2,0%
Assemblers in factories	1,9%
Accounting and financial workers	1,6%
Administrative and specialized assistants	1,6%
Other legal professionals	1,6%
Special education teachers and technicians	1,3%
Financial specialists	1,2%
Primary school teachers	1,0%
Real estate agents and other agents	0,9%

Vets	0,9%
Salaried Cooks	0,8%
Organisational and administrative specialists	0,8%
Car, cab and van drivers	0,7%
Travel agency clerks, hotel receptionists and telephone operators	0,7%
Orderlies, baggage handlers, delivery boys and related workers	0,6%
Cashiers and ticket clerks (except banks)	0,6%
Nursing professionals	0,6%
Manufacturing industry labourers	0,5%
Judges, lawyers and prosecutors	0,5%
Kitchen helpers	0,4%
Heads of administrative departments	0,4%
Other structural construction workers	0,3%
Salaried waiters	0,30%
	100%

Source: EPA microdata (2020).

Annex 4. 0-2 level centres by ownership and fundings, by Autonomous Communities, 2018-2019



Source: Adapted from CEE (2020) Informe 2020 sobre el estado del sistema educativo. Curso 2018-2019.

Annex 5. 3-5 level centres by ownership and fundings, by Autonomous Communities, 2018-2019



Source: Adapted from CEE (2020) Informe 2020 sobre el estado del sistema educativo. Curso 2018-2019.

ANNEX WP3

Annex 1. Profiles of interviews

Interview code	Organisation	Role	Profile	Sector	Case
1	"Caspolino" ECEC Centre	Educator/UGT Shop Steward	Workers/Trade union	ECEC	1
2	"Caspolino" ECEC Centre	Director of ECEC centre	Workers	ECEC	1
3	"Enxaneta" ECEC centre	Educator	Workers	ECEC	1
4	"Enxaneta" ECEC centre	Educator/UGT Shop steward	Workers/Trade union	ECEC	1
5	IMEB (Barcelona City Council)	HHRR Responsible	Local Administration	ECEC	1
6	"La Petjada" ECEC centre	Educator	Workers	ECEC	2
7	"La Petjada" ECEC centre	Director of ECEC centre (Chairman of the bargaining committee of the new collective agreement).	Workers	ECEC	2
8	UGT Maresme (regional level)	Responsible for public services	Trade Union	ECEC	2
9	Arenys de Munt City Council	Responsible of the Department of Education	Local Administration	ECEC	2
10	GUSAM (Public management company)	Company manager and HHRR manager	Local Administration	ECEC	2
11	Municipal Institute of Social Services – City Council of Barcelona	Núria Menta	Local administration	LTC	3
12	Municipal Institute of Social Services – City Council of Barcelona	Ester Quintana	Local administration	LTC	3
13	Suara	Mar Mestre	Cooperative company provider	LTC	3
14	Suara	Sergi Rodríguez	Cooperative company provider	LTC	3
15	Social services and Equality department – UGT Catalunya	Marina Giner	Trade union	LTC	3
16	Anonymized	Anonymized	Trade union	LTC	4