Giuliano Torrengo is an Associate Professor at the Department of philosophy of the University of Milan, he is the founder and coordinator of the Centre for Philosophy of Time, a member of the LEMMings group, the PhilLAB, and the PHILTECH the University of Milan.
He is part of the Advisory Board of the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney, a Research Associate of Logos at the University of Barcelona, and a Research Fellow at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is president-elect of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science.
His current focus of interest is the connection between temporal experience and the scientific image of time. In his last book (Temporal Experience. The Atomist Dynamic Model, OUP, 2024), he develops an account of temporal phenomenology that aims at being empirically plausible and compatible with our best physical theories.
He is co-founder of AMAMI. He is vice-coordinator of the Doctoral School Human Mind and its Explanations. Language, Brain, and Reasoning – HuME.
Complete CV is here.
Temporal Experience: The Atomist Dynamic Model
Many physical theories suggest that time does not pass, yet temporality deeply permeates our experience. We perceive change and movement, we are aware of living in the present, of the constant flux of our sensations and thoughts, and of time itself flowing. In this book, the author considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience. The model is atomist because according to it we experience our own temporal position as undivided, and it is dynamic because it emphasizes the central role of the feeling of renewed experience as time progresses. The book critically examines prevalent theories of experience of change, presentness, succession, and passage of time both in philosophy and psychology. Each chapter contributes to the construction of the atomist dynamic model. Experience of change and movement are explained through mental events that present virtually instantaneous movement and change. The author challenges the common belief in the perception of ‘presentness’ and proposes an error theory based on narrative cognition. The experience of succession is elucidated through the concept of an overarching phenomenology, arguing against the tendency to overstate the phenomenal continuity of experience. Finally, the experience of the passage of time is approached through the non-representationalist theory of the phenomenal modifier. The author concludes by discussing the surprising consequences of applying the experiential model defended in the book to the scientific image of our existence in time as a sequence of physical events.
Filosofia del Futuro. Un’introduzione.
Il volume offre un’introduzione al contempo accessibile e rigorosa ai più recenti sviluppi di una fondamentale branca della filosofia del tempo: la filosofia del futuro. Al centro dell’attenzione sono le domande chiave del dibattito contemporaneo. Il futuro è già scritto o esistono cammini alternativi che il tempo è in grado di imboccare? Esistere significa semplicemente essere presenti o ci sono veri e propri oggetti futuri? Siamo davvero liberi di scegliere quali azioni compiere e di modificare il corso degli eventi?
Il dibattito intorno alle risposte di volta in volta offerte dalla filosofia esplora un’intrigante zona d’intersezione tra metafisica, logica ed etica, e interessa discipline diverse come la fisica, la psicologia e l’economia. Gli autori offrono gli strumenti necessari per inquadrare concettualmente le domande sul futuro, introducendo tutte le nozioni tecniche in un linguaggio chiaro e intuitivo.
Fragmenting Reality. An Essay on Passage, Causality and Time Travel
The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality.
Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time.
I viaggi nel tempo. Una guida filosofica
Sono possibili i viaggi nel tempo? Molti libri e molti film ci raccontano di storie in cui personaggi dal futuro giungono nel passato con l’intenzione di cambiarlo o, viceversa, di avventurieri che attraversano i secoli verso futuri sconosciuti. Ma se il futuro non è già determinato, e ci sono tante possibili continuazioni del presente, in quale di esse finirà il viaggiatore? D’altro canto, se il passato è chiuso e dato una volta per tutte, è davvero possibile che il viaggiatore possa tornare ad alterarlo? Che conseguenze ci sarebbero allora sul presente?
Il libro mira a fornire gli strumenti concettuali necessari per affrontare la sfida, difficile ma emozionante, lanciata da tali questioni. Le teorie, i rompicapi e gli esperimenti mentali elaborati dalla filosofia a partire da interrogativi come questi, infatti, si rivelano essenziali per capire cosa la scienza, e in particolare la fisica, ci può dire sulla possibilità di viaggiare nel tempo.
Time and cross-temporal relations
According to both ordinary and scientifi c thought, two objects can enter into relation not only simultanously, but also at different times, namely cross-temporally. For instance, we understand comparisons between entities as they are at different times, such as when we say that John is now taller than Michael was three years ago; causally related events are often not simultaneous, and objects of perceptions and perceivers usually have different temporal locations (we see ordinary things as they were a few milliseconds ago, we see the sun as it was eight minutes ago, and so on). However, many philosophers consider cross-temporality deceptive. Relations, according to the “standard view”, can hold only between things existing in the same time. In this book Torrengo defends the opposite view, according to which relations can be cross-temporally instantited and thus cross-temporal talk must be taken seriously. The theory is based on the idea that persisting in time is tantamount to possessing temporal parts at different times, and its central tenet is that persisting entities (objects and events alike) are cross-temporally related by having distinct temporal parts entering into relations.
