It’s the economy, stupid

It’s the economy, stupid. Votare in tempo di crisi

La crisi economica ha messo a dura prova la sopravvivenza dei governi nella maggior parte delle democrazie avanzate. Essa ha inoltre contribuito all’allontanamento dei cittadini dai processi di rappresentanza, alimentando la delegittimazione dei partiti tradizionali e favorendo la radicalizzazione della competizione politica così come il successo di nuove formazioni prive di un vero progetto politico. Le teorie del voto economico hanno da tempo documentato come i comportamenti elettorali siano influenzati dall’andamento dell’economia. Tuttavia, diversamente dagli effetti prodotti dai normali alti e bassi dei mercati, la Grande Recessione rischia di lasciare una pesante eredità ai regimi democratici, erodendo il funzionamento e la fiducia nel principale meccanismo della rappresentanza politica in modi che l’attuale ripresa fatica a mitigare.

Introduzione
1. La teoria del voto economico
2. La Grande Recessione
3. Gli effetti della crisi: disoccupazione e scelte di voto
4. Decomporre il voto economico
5. Voto economico e oltre: tre analisi within-case
6. Italia 2013: un voto retrospettivo sul governo tecnico
7. Spagna 2015: economia e corruzione nel voto retrospettivo
8. Germania 2013: il voto retrospettivo quando l’economia funziona
9. Conclusioni. Votare in tempo di crisi

Retrospective voting in the Italian 2013 election: a sub-national perspective

Italian political science review (2017)

The Italian 2013 election ended the period of bipolarism that characterized the so-called ‘Second Republic’, and paved the way for new parties such as the Five Star Movement.
We investigate that election, which took place after the technocratic government led by Mario Monti, through the analytical lenses of the retrospective theory of economic voting applied at the provincial level. Local unemployment rates shape the electoral performances
of those parties that were more supportive and sympathetic to the caretaker executive, thus confirming a distinction between incumbent and non-incumbent even in that critical and politically undecided election. We further contribute to the literature on retrospective voting by relaxing the locally untenable assumption of independence among the units. Making use of spatial regression models, we demonstrate the relevance of both the internal  and contiguous economies, and their relative impact due to the different size of the provinces.

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The economic vote at the party level: Electoral behaviour during the Great Recession

Party politics (2017) with S.A.Massari

The Great Recession is a non-trivial test bed for the theory of  economic voting, especially if its predictions are decomposed at the party level, as done in this article by analysing the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 national elections held in the 28 member states of the EU between 2003 and 2015. We acknowledge counterintuitively that prime ministers’ parties are able to exploit the relatively good state of the economy, while sharing the blame with their allies in times of crisis, counting on the lack of clarity in the attribution of responsibilities and deploying their heresthetic capacities. We further recognize that new parties, more than opposition ones, proportionally profited from the recession. Tough times magnify the alternation between left- and right-wing victories, without necessarily favouring the most radical parties, whereas the EU’s supposed responsibility in prolonging the crisis fuelled the success of Eurosceptic parties.

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