The Italian Supreme Court has faced the issue of the competent court in actions filed by passengers against air carriers following cancellation of flights (Ordinanza 24632/2020, 5 November 2020).

The case was about seven EasyJet flight tickets from Rome (Fiumicino) to Copenhagen. The flight was suddenly cancelled. Therefore, the seven passengers had to buy tickets from another carrier and travel by taxi to their destination.

The passengers asked for both the default lump-sum compensation granted by artt. 5 and 7 of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation and for additional damages. This second claim is regulated by the 1999 Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air. The passengers sued EasyJet in front of the Perugia’s Tribunal according to art. 33 of the Convention, which states that the proceedings have to be brought at the “place of business through which the contract has been made”.

The air carrier objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, invoking the Brussels I-bis Regulation: the competent court were either those having territorial competence over the airport of departure (Civitavecchia, art. 7, Brussels I-bis) or arrival (Copenhagen, art. 7 Brussels I-bis), or in London (art. 4 Brussels I-bis).

Starting from the lump-sum claim, the Court stated that the Air Passenger Rights Regulation does not deal with jurisdiction: therefore, the Brussels I-bis Regulation applies. According to art. 7, the Italian territorial competent court is the one having jurisdiction over the airport of departure (Rome Fiumicino): the Giudice di pace of Civitavecchia.

Coming to the damage claim, the Montreal Convention prevails over the Brussels I-bis Regulation as it constitutes a lex specialis. The Court held that art. 33 grounds a territorial competence (CJEU Case, C-204/08; contra, Cassazione 8901/2016). Since the travel agency can be considered as a ticket office of the air carrier for the purposes of art. 33, the competent court will be the Giudice di Pace of Città di Castello.

The Court finally stated that art. 30 Brussels I-bis Regulation should apply to face practical issues arising from the severability of related actions grounded on same facts.

It should be noted that, in the case at hand, there were no parallel proceedings according to art. 30 Brussels I-bis. In any case, art. 30 refers to parallel proceedings pending “in the courts of different Member States”.

P.B.