European Union can afford to be more transparent

Transparency improves the relationship between citizens and politicians, but it could lead to posturing or pandering to public opinion. Politicians may therefore fail to adopt policies and reach valuable compromises. In a recent research,  Sara Hagemann and Fabio Franchino show that the drawbacks of increased transparency in the EU Council of Ministers have not materialized. The European Union can afford to be more transparent.

Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information.

We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations.

On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as they increase credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.

The article is available here

Hagemann, Sara, and Fabio Franchino. “Transparency vs Efficiency? A Study of Negotiations in the Council of the European Union.” European Union Politics, (February 8, 2016)  OnlineEarly. doi:10.1177/1465116515627017.

Personal websites: Fabio Franchino, Sara Hagemann

 

Conciliation Committee Negotiations

Franchino, Fabio and Camilla Mariotto (2013) ‘Explaining Negotiations in the Conciliation Committee‘, European Union Politics, 14.

Abstract

The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. The European Parliament is more successful in the post-Amsterdam period, when the Council decides by qualified majority voting, the rapporteur comes from a large party, the European Commission is supportive, and when national administrations are more involved in the implementation process than the Commission.

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