Archivi tag: European Union

Politicization and EU economic governance

Does politicization – the expansion of the scope of national conflict – shape EU policy design? Are the functional pressures shaping design disrupted?

We address these questions with regard to the EU economic governance regime in this @jepp_journal article.

We reach the following conclusions:

a) This regime, based heavily on Council-centred enforcement, is clearly not in line with standard liberal-intergovernmental expectations about policy design, especially given significant noncompliance.

The first figure below illustrates how enforcement-related prerogatives are pooled within the Council, rather than delegated to the Commission, as liberal-intergovernmentalism suggests, despite the extensive noncompliance. The second figure shows the patterns of noncompliance with this regime across time and member states.

b) We argue that this design has more to do with salience and severe implementation uncertainties, related to somewhat arbitrary criteria, like the reference values, and to unobservable quantities, whose measurement depends on uncertain estimates, THAN with politicization.

For instance, the Council is unlikely to heavily rely on Commission enforcement if the measurement of the output gap is highly uncertain.

c) Yet, problems of compliance and commitment, threats of exclusion and veto, issue linkages, path dependencies, and supranational involvement remain central in explaining the overall direction of reforms toward national tightening, limitation of Council authority and delegation to the Commission, despite recent politicization

d) Note however that this was a case where mass domestic politicization was triggered BY noncompliance and elite conflict. So we should not conclude that politicization is necessarily epiphenomenal for policy design.

Thanks to the special issue editors: C. Reh, C. Koop, and E. Bressanelli.

Franchino, Fabio, and Camilla Mariotto (2020) ‘Politicisation and Economic Governance Design ‘ Journal of European Public Policy, 27:3, 460-480.

European Union can afford to be more transparent

Transparency improves the relationship between citizens and politicians, but it could lead to posturing or pandering to public opinion. Politicians may therefore fail to adopt policies and reach valuable compromises. In a recent research,  Sara Hagemann and Fabio Franchino show that the drawbacks of increased transparency in the EU Council of Ministers have not materialized. The European Union can afford to be more transparent.

Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information.

We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations.

On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as they increase credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.

The article is available here

Hagemann, Sara, and Fabio Franchino. “Transparency vs Efficiency? A Study of Negotiations in the Council of the European Union.” European Union Politics, (February 8, 2016)  OnlineEarly. doi:10.1177/1465116515627017.

Personal websites: Fabio Franchino, Sara Hagemann


Your prejudices about law observance are (sometimes) wrong

Italy more law observant than Denmark and Finland? Spain more compliant than Germany? You hardly hear this in the news, but these are the surprising patterns of noncompliance with the regulation on state aid in the European Union between 2000 and 2012. We report the results from a research conducted by Fabio Franchino and Marco Mainenti that explains how electoral institutions shape the incentives of governments to comply with international obligations.

Check out this figure.


It illustrates the proportion of unlawful measures out of the total number of state aid measures adopted by the countries of the European Union (EU) (measures are unlawful if they do not comply with the EU provisions on state aid). Existing explanations of compliance and implementation in the European Union cannot satisfactorily describe these patterns.

These data not only display surprising patterns across countries but the simple fact that a government decides in the first place to avoid these rules is puzzling since the likelihood of being detected is high and the costs associated with noncompliance are not trivial (an unlawful aid must be recovered, including the accrued payable interests). Notice that certain state aid measures are compatible with EU law.

To explain why countries are willing to take these risks, we use the recent literature on how compliance with international obligations is affected by the types of electoral institutions employed in a country. These institutions can shape the incentives of governments to comply because of the misalignment they may engender between the collective objectives of a government party and the individual objectives of its members in the legislature.

We find that an increase of district magnitude improves compliance (district magnitude is the number of seats available in an electoral district). The higher the magnitude the less politicians are pressured to cater to constituency-specific interests and the less likely they will press their government to circumvent the EU provisions on state aid.

However, where either party leaders have no control over the ballot rank or other electoral rules strengthen the incentives to search for a personal vote, compliance decreases with higher magnitude. These electoral rules  increase competition among candidates in a multi-member district.  The higher the number of candidates, the toughest the competition and the need for politicians to distinguish themselves from copartisans, the higher the pressure to evade the rules.

Our work also provides evidence for the effects of electoral reforms on compliance.

The article is available here

Franchino, Fabio, and Marco Mainenti. “The Electoral Foundations to Noncompliance: Addressing the Puzzle of Unlawful State Aid in the European Union.” Journal of Public Policy 36, no. 3 (September 2016): 407–436. doi:10.1017/S0143814X15000343.

Data download (coming soon)

Personal websites: Fabio Franchino, Marco Mainenti